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Abstract
In this work I discuss the relevance of the psychoanalytic concepts of resistance and
transference for an understanding of language from a psychoanalytic point of view, in
particular how it is that human beings relate to language and whether or not we can
conceive of a relation of reference between word and thing from the point of view of
Jacques Lacan’s notion of the subject of the unconscious. This investigation takes us
through the notion of reference and how it is possible (or not) for language to even refer
to anything outside of itself from a psychoanalytic point of view. How does
psychoanalysis force us to confront our prejudices about language? How might we
understand the status of knowledge differently (and productively) after Lacan, taking into
account the concept of the unconscious as “structured like a language”? We are
concerned throughout with understanding the unconscious in material terms.

Keywords
Psychoanalysis, Post-structuralism, Structuralism, Freud, Discourse, Derrida, Lacan,
Resistance, Transference, Reference.
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“It may thus be said that the theory o f psycho-analysis
is an attempt to account fo r two striking and unexpected
facts o f observation which emerge whenever an attempt
is made to trace the symptoms o f a neurotic back to their
sources in his past life: the fa cts o f transference and
o f resistance.'"
- Sigmund Freud

“The unconscious is neither the primordial nor the
instinctual, and what it knows o f the elemental
is no more than the elements o f the signifier."
- Jacques Lacan

‘‘The wounds that language inflicts upon human thought
can not be healed except by language itself. ”
- Ernst Cassirer

IV

A ckno wledgm ents
There are absolutely no words to express my profound gratitude for the patience,
guidance and kindness shown by Dr. Allan Pero—‘acknowledgement’ will have to do,
but I wish there was something better. Also, Dr. Jan Plug, for the enthusiasm and
meticulous feedback he brought to this work in his capacity as second reader. I would like
to thank (and sometimes blame) Dr. Roderick McGillis at the University of Calgary,
whose interest in and enthusiasm for theory set me on this path and Dr. Pamela
McCallum, also at the University of Calgary, who recommended The Centre for the
Study of Theory and Criticism. Let me also thank Emily Sugerman and Jason D’Aoust
for their kindness, generosity and encouragement.
Finally, it would be the most unforgivable academic dishonesty were I not to
acknowledge here the hard work of Melanie Caldwell-Clark who, in her position as
Graduate Program Coordinator, is nothing less than the representative of the
representation that is The Centre for the Study of Theory and Criticism. Thank you.
Such are the names of those who comprise what we shall call the object-cause of the
present work.
- Ian R. McCausland
London, Ontario
August 2011

v

Table o f Contents
Certificate o f E xam ination ............................................................................................. ii
Abstract.......................................................................................................................... iii
Epigraph ........................................................................................................................ iv
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................v
Table o f Contents ........................................................................................................... vi
List o f Figures .............................................................................................................. vii
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1
Language and the Subject in Psychoanalysis ............................................................... 12
An Introduction to “Negation " ................................................................................................... 18
The Subject o f the Unconscious.................................................................................................. 24
The Unconscious is Structured Like a Language........................................................................30
How to (Not) Get Outside o f Yourself......................................................................................... 35
'Primordial Discord’....................................................................................................................46
The Development o f Psychoanalysis & the Enigma o f the Other .................................57
The Opening of/to Resistance...................................................................................................... 59
Bumping Up Against the Transference.......................................................................................62
The Pathogenic Nucleus in Freud’s First Schemas o f the Psychic Apparatus.........................68
The Unconscious is the Discourse o f the Other.......................................................................... 74
The ‘DialecticalReversal’: Freud’s Failure with Dora.............................................................82
The Limits o f Cure........................................................................................................................85
Freud the Meta-physician ............................................................................................. 89
Aphasiacs and their Relation to the Unconscious.............................................................
90
“I Hear Your Voice But Not The Words Similarity Disorder...............................................100
“I See The Words But Hear No Voice": Contiguity Disorder.................................................102
Alienation and Separation: From Aphasia to Neurosis............................................................106
“To Speak, Then, o f a Letter"...........................................................................................
115
Our Father, Who Ar(en ’) t In Heaven, Hollow is Thy Name.....................................................124
Bibliography ................................................................................................................130
Curriculum Vitae ........................................................................................................ 135

vi

List o f Figures
Figure 1: Lacan's Modification of Saussure's Schema of the Sign..................................13
Figure 2: The (Lacanian) Structure of Language............................................................32
Figure 3: Saussure's schema indicating the unity of signifier and signified.................... 33
Figure 4: The schema of the cartesian subject............................................................... 34
Figure 5: The unconscious is structured like a language................................................ 35

Vll

1

INTRODUCTION

Resistance is a peculiar notion in psychoanalysis, and it is precisely its peculiarity—
which might announce itself as a feeling of perplexity, or even anxiety—that should pique
our interest. Resistance suggests a certain—we might say, motivated—ignorance that
crops up on the road to self-knowledge. This Socratic road is in fact always under
construction and, as a result, in order to follow it, one is forced to take a number of
detours. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the notion of resistance indicates that there are
certain parts of our lives with which we would rather have nothing to do. I assume here
that what constitutes our lives—that is, how they are primarily represented to us—is our
history as a series of mise-en-scenes composed from the sum total of our experiences
starting at this present moment and moving backward toward our beginnings. The fact
that we cannot experience, much less comprehend this ‘sum total’, whether all at once or
by trying to recall it in some kind of sequence, is significant here. We seem to inhabit a
place somewhere between memory and perception, and it seems at times as though some
experiences erupt into consciousness out of nowhere and make very little sense to us.
This is precisely the kind of experience that psychoanalysis is curious about.
The unconscious, so the story goes, comes into being through the repression of certain
things that are somehow disturbing, or that otherwise rile us in some way—certain
experiences, perhaps, although this word does not quite capture the extent of what is at
stake. In fact, it cannot be just certain ‘things’ or ‘experiences’ that are disturbing and
thus repressed, but certain truths—or, rather, certain things coming into contact with a
dimension of truth, for if they were not truths, or somehow experienced as touching the
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true, it is difficult to see what could possibly be so disturbing about them and thus what
reason we might have to repress them.
What is truly revolutionary about Lacan’s ‘linguistic turn’—what makes it, say, more
than the fashionable product of an epoch obsessed with tacking structuralism onto
anything-and-everything—is that by adapting the model of language introduced by
Ferdinand de Saussure to psychoanalytic experience, he succeeds in grounding
psychoanalysis in something more concrete than, say, mysterious agencies pulling levers
in the psyche. To be sure, as we will develop in more detail in chapter three, language
was there right from the beginning in Freud’s thought. His curiosity about how hysterical
symptoms function and particularly how it was that Anna O. (arguably the first patient of
‘psychoanalysis’, although there was no properly psychoanalytic theory to speak of in the
late 1800s when she was treated by Josef Breuer, who co-authored, along with Freud,
Studies on Hysteria in 1895) seemed to get better by talking, by narrating her symptom,
led him to a study of the aphasias, and to the relationship between language and
thought—what he called word-presentations and object-presentations—in the process of
speaking or otherwise using language (as in writing, etcetera). Structuralism provided
Lacan with a more rigorous language in which to foreground Freud’s own thinking about
language, which seemed to get lost in later conceptions of his work or otherwise
sacrificed on the alter of the ego.
Such an overlooking of the role of language in the subsequent theorization of
psychoanalysis after Freud was not without its effects, which reverberated, in a sense,
‘between the lines’ of the theory. Thus, one of Lacan’s chief complaints about the
psychoanalytic literature of his time was that one “continually find[s] Maxwell’s little
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demons making an appearance in analytic writing, possessing foresight, intelligence”,
alluding to a thought experiment by the Scottish physicist James Clerk Maxwell {Seminar
724). The point that Lacan is making here is that much of psychoanalytic literature, in his
view, reaches a certain limit and falls back on certain notions of the Tittle man within the
man’ or a ghost in the machine, often without even paying much heed to these slights of
hand; this is not without significance for the question of resistance, for the conception that
we will develop through Lacan and Freud is a conception of resistance as the moment
when words fail and transference begins, transference here being a complex symbolic
structure that articulates that which the words could not, as a dream articulates such
desires as cannot be put into words, in a strange language made up of the mnemic
residues.
We can understand Lacan’s method of reading psychoanalytic theory as an attempt to
figure out what to do with these little demons, how they function and what they reveal or
conceal in the text of analysts’ theorizing—in particular, Lacan is concerned with how
they function as signifiers or can be read as elements of a dream. He treats theory itself,
then, as Freud treats the manifest content of a dream; he treats the discourse that
psychoanalysts and theorists produce by writing about psychoanalysis is a hysteric’s
discourse, which envelopes a symptom expressed through the very language of
psychoanalysis itself.
So it is that with Lacan’s linguistic turn, repression functions not as the obscure will of
some agency keeping a careful watch over the ego1, deeming certain things disturbing and

1 I am not suggesting here that Freud meant this with his metaphor of the censorship that
appears in The Interpretation o f Dreams and is later re-worked into the super-ego in his
second topology; nevertheless, these metaphors can and have been read in this way.
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suppressing them. Rather, we might say that if the repressed and the return of the
repressed are the same thing, then this means that what is repressed lacks a proper means
of expression2. Instead of words, the neurotic ‘speaks’ with his or her being (Seminar III
155), something Freud refers to as ‘repeating’ in one of his 1912 papers on technique, as
though there are too many thoughts and not enough signifiers to contain them, like in
Lacan’s allegory of the honey pot in Seminar VII, where honey that is “very liquid” will
be “suddenly all over the place”, overflowing its container (19). In effect, Lacan uses
structuralist linguistics to think the dynamic unconscious in terms of the material
phenomenon of language. In this way, we understand his orders of the imaginary and the
symbolic as loosely based on the signified and the signifier, respectively: the symbolic
structures the imaginary and comes to be an issue for language when it escapes this
structure of signification. In this sense, Lacan’s understanding of meaning is radically
opposed to that of the Derridian/post-structuralist understanding: meaning, or the effect of
meaning over-and-against signification or the symbolically constituted universe of
(discursive) knowledge, for Lacan, comes about through a surplus that eludes
signification. In other words, where signification ‘fails’—in the sense that it fails to
contain or register meaning in language—meaning erupts. This fits into the
(Lacanian/Freudian) dynamic conception of the unconscious precisely insofar as meaning
is not a ‘hunch’ or an ‘intuition’ on the part of the analyst; on the contrary, it comes about

2 Consider, for example, the following passage from Lacan’s third seminar: “What is
repression for a neurotic? It’s a language, another language that he manufactures with his
symptoms, that is, if he is a hysteric or an obsessional, with the imaginary dialectic of
himself and the other. The neurotic symptom acts as a language that enables repression to
be expressed. This is precisely what enables us to grasp the fact that repression and the
return of the repressed are one and the same thing, the front and back of a single process”
(60).
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through a systematic and rigorous process of exploring how meaning is expressed through
other cues such as bodily tics or other symptomatic gestures, rituals or thought-processes,
etcetera. Meaning must always be revealed through some means, some (pseudo)symbolic,
symptomatic means of expression rather than through a projection onto the Other. In this
way, psychoanalysis is fundamentally empiricist: the analyst is always searching for signs
that may disprove (or prove) his or her theories about the analysand’s behaviour.
Language, or, more precisely, Saussure’s model of language allows Lacan to rescue
the unconscious from the obscurantist terms in which it is often thought, as a wellspring
of drives and infantile fantasies. Thus, it is language that has to do with its inception3, and
so we can situate the unconscious at the outset as an effect of the inability of language to
register everything (we experience). Or, to put this in another way, one that is deliberately
tautological but nonetheless more accurate: language can only account for what it is
capable of accounting for—it can only account for that which already has a place carved
out for it in language. The paradox is that language cannot say everything but within it
everything can be said. The signifier is in some sense responsible for the registration of
reality at the level of consciousness, granting determinate existence to some part of the
amorphous mass that Lacan calls the real, but it does not refer to the real, for there are no
objects in the real to refer to. Objects are made, not bom; they are the product of complex
processes. The world of objects, for Lacan, is derived from the world of the imaginary, of
images, for perception refers primarily to the surface of things and not essences. In this
way, images are also bound up with the body, for perception is in the first place
embodied.
3 See Seminar XVII, where Lacan insists, “language is the condition of the unconscious”
(41).

6

So language refers not to the real as such but to objects of perception that are derived
from our being in the world, but there is not for all that a necessary relation between
perception and object at least in the sense of perceptions reflecting the ‘objective’ state of
reality. According to psychoanalysis, we create the world of objects that we inhabit and to
be sure, this gives rise to a tension between word and thing, language and the world of
objects, insofar as language links us to the social, individually, there is no necessary
relation between the world we perceive and the world of objects, but this does not,
obviously, mean that we can make language refer to anything we want. Language, indeed,
begins to play a role in shaping the world of objects—but what of, for example,
perceptions from childhood before language could exert this formative influence? The
wager here is that such experiences do not simply disappear; the fact that they do not
come easily to mind is not evidence that they do not exist but rather evidence that they
exert themselves elsewhere than in consciousness, such as in fantasy: not only the kinds
of fantasizing with which we might be most familiar, such as daydreams or other sorts of
semi-conscious introspective indulgences, but unconscious fantasies which structure our
spontaneous mode of relating to the world, such as the things from our experiences that
we are most apt to remember, the words that are most apt to come to mind, our
spontaneous way of interpreting intersubjective situations, etcetera. All of these things
require a choice that is already made and that we are not even aware of having made.
Things that come into conscious awareness do so at the expense of other things; things
that we choose to say come at the expense of other things that we have chosen not to say;
words that we choose to use come at the expense of other words. All of these choices will
also depend on the person to whom we are speaking. For psychoanalysis, language does
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not consist of words alone: every ounce of our being participates in the symbolic and, in
this way, speaks. It is precisely when words fail that we are most ourselves.
And so, the dimension of language that Lacan is concerned with has to do with the
breakdown of meaning, of the dimension of non-sense. If Lacan emphasizes the signifier
it is precisely insofar as, abstracted from the signified, it is the non-sense of language, the
enigma that persists and motivates the search for understanding; it is only by
excommunicating or exiling non-sense that understanding is achieved. Like Napoleon on
Elba, however, non-sense is tenacious and busy plotting its return. Why? Because this
non-sense is part of the subject’s being that resists signification, which cannot be
accounted for in language. This resistance is at the same time structural: a kernel of non
sense is necessary in order for sense to be maintained. To situate the problem in Cartesian
terms: something must remain un-thought in order to sustain a correspondence between
the I think and the 1 am.
Language introduces a radical cut between these two sides of the cogito: the I think
takes place elsewhere than the I am. The two T’s in the cogitio should not deceive us:
they do not refer to the same locus. Thus one of Lacan’s formulations of the cogito is “I
am thinking where I am not, therefore I am where I am not thinking” (“Instance” 430).
The ‘I’ that holds the place of the subject in language is not at all a simple matter for
psychoanalysis, for it is not immediately clear whether or not, “when I speak of myself, I
am the same as the self of who I speak” (430). Such is what is at stake in Lacan’s
formulation of the split subject, which will be explored in chapter one.
The symbolic order, serving as the social link, establishes the relation between the
subject and Other: being is situated on the side of the subject and meaning on the side of
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the Other. My being, in other words, has no meaning without the existence of an Other,
but this is not to say that the meaning imputed there is the whole story. Although being
and meaning overlap slightly, one will never be reducible to the other; it is impossible to
come to possess with certainty, for example, the meaning of (one’s) being unless one can
somehow possess the Other utterly; the psychoanalytic name for such a fantasmatic
possession is perversion. Fantasy is the name given to representations of impossibility.
Fantasies are little scenes that contend with, and try to signify the impossible, but they
bear the trace of this impossibility; the pervert, for example, overcomes in fantasy the
impossibility of possessing the meaning of being by making himself (perverts are
invariably masculine) into the instrument of the Other’s desire. Lacan, we should add,
distinguishes between ordinary, neurotic fantasy and perverse fantasy according to their
respective stances vis-à-vis the objet petit a. Ordinary, neurotic fantasy attempts to use
the objet petit a as a means of answering the question of the subject’s desire: it is the lost
object that the neurotic wants to recapture. Perverse fantasy, on the other hand, strives to
embody the objet petit a in order to master and fill out the Other’s lack. In this way, the
pervert’s being gives way to the Other: his being is defined by and expressed through the
Other. The pervert himself disappears.
What is at stake, ultimately, in terms of the relation of language to the unconscious is
how the subject’s discourse is linked to the Other—that is, how the process by which
signifiers come to shape the subject’s reality, to determine what can be ‘seen’ (or not
seen), is mediated by the reality of a shared language. Lacan develops his conception of
the subject—the subject of the unconscious—in contrast to Descartes’ subject, which
Lacan calls the subject of certainty. His method is not simply to ‘oppose’ the Cartesian
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subject, but to ‘traverse the fantasy’ of self-transparent subjectivity: the subject of the
unconscious, then, develops out o f an encounter with the Cartesian subject, instead of
simply in opposition to it.
Thus, in chapter one, we examine the logic of this encounter, especially in terms of the
relationship between psychoanalysis and philosophy as two discourses whose function is
to refer in some capacity: in a word, to produce knowledge (about the world). The
entirety of the world presented here turns, ultimately, on this question of the relationship
between psychoanalysis and (Cartesian) philosophy and what is at stake in their
respective attempts to produce knowledge. We are interested in Descartes in particular
not only because of the way that Lacan, as early as his well-known 1949 paper on the
mirror-stage, situates psychoanalysis in relation to the cogito, but also because for him, as
for us, the cogito represents the fundamental structure of modem subjectivity and in
particular the subject of science, exemplified in the quest for transparent, indubitable
knowledge about the world. For such a purpose, all manner of institutions and
apparatuses are created, to be sure, in order to compensate for the uncertainty of linguistic
reference.
Descartes was ultimately concerned with securing a foundation for certainty within
discourse itself, which, amounts to securing a foundation from which knowledge can
refer to the world, can refer outside of itself within discourse, without any prosthetic
apparatuses or institutions. Of course, the problem we will encounter in chapter one is
that God itself in Descartes’ discourse functions as a prosthesis that facilitates reference,
which Lacan identifies as a structural position inherent to discourse. He calls this position
the sujet supposé savoir, which is, as we will see, behind the mechanism of transference,
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closely related to the interruption of speech, and thus the suspension of even a semblance
of reference, which is manifested in resistance. Chapters two and three will continue to
unravel this relation between knowledge and reference from two different angles: first by
looking at psychoanalytic theory itself as a knowledge, albeit a peculiar one, insofar as it
bears the mark of its founder, Freud, whose desire was put utterly into the service of
psychoanalysis; and then, in chapter three, we will return to the problematic relation
between psychoanalysis and the cogito from the point of view of the physiological
disturbances of speech found in the aphasias and how they can shed light on the Lacanian
theory of the subject and Derrida’s “Difference”, which we see as an attempt by Derrida
to forestall the problematic closure of being brought about by the cogito.
The problem of reference is indeed a thorny one, to say nothing of the storied history
of psychoanalysis itself. As such, this thesis constitutes less a thorough study of the issue
and more a starting point for further research. If I had only one reservation about what
unfolds in the following pages, it would be, perhaps, that I might be interpreted as being a
little too easy on psychoanalysis, a little too willing to give it the benefit of the doubt.
This may be true, but I think the merit of this study nevertheless consists in another way
of looking at what psychoanalytic theory contributes to the study of the problem of being
(human). There is, to be sure, already a bulk of criticism on the subject of psychoanalysis
and especially its founder, Freud. In the following pages, I have explored this only
through the medium of one of psychoanalysis’ most vocal critics, Mikkel BorchJacobsen. Nevertheless, I think this work represents a productive starting point for further
thinking about the problem that psychoanalysis poses for the discourses of both
philosophy and science, which I hope to continue thinking about in the years that follow.
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The death of God, we might say, seems to have given way to the undead Father Freud,
who continues to stalk the 21st century despite myriad pronouncements of the death of
psychoanalysis4. If we conclude in chapter three that God is a symptom, in particular, a
symptom of the impossibility of certainty, we can only allude to the supplementary
problem of how the figure of Freud functions as a symptom, not only for psychoanalysis,
but for the Humanities in general. Such a question merits a thorough study of its own, for
t

which I believe I have succeeded only in laying the foundation.
This work’s primary concern, on the other hand, is in thinking about how the
psychoanalytic notion of resistance can shed light on the problem of the relationship,
which we see as being at its core the problem of referentiality, between discourse, being
and thought. The Lacanian notion of the objet petit a as that little piece of being caught up
in signification will inform our journey through this problem. For Lacan, it is ultimately a
surplus element that escapes being pinned down either to thought or being. It escapes
signification, which is to say that it cannot be directly represented, but at the same time it
cannot be thought purely on the side of being, either. This is, ultimately, our point of
departure and if we begin with thought in chapter one, we end on the question of being,
especially how it the objet petit a is tied up in the psychoanalytic notion of the act and
fantasy, fantasy, for us, being not quite a discourse proper, but nevertheless playing an
important role in structuring our very relationship to the world.

4 Some examples of these pronouncements of the death of psychoanalysis include: the
November 29th, 1993 issue of Time Magazine, which famously asked on its cover, “Is
Freud Dead?”; Todd Dufresne’s 2003 book, Killing Freud and his February 2004 op-ed
for the LA Times titled, “Psychoanalysis is Dead.. .So How Does that Make You Feel?”.
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CHAPTER ONE
Language and the Subject in Psychoanalysis

Our story of the psychoanalytic concept of resistance begins with the problem of
reference, with not only the question of the thing or things to which language refers but
what makes it even possible for language to refer in the first place. While it is
commonplace to understand Jacques Lacan’s well known ‘return to Freud’ as a distinctly
structuralist reinterpretation of Freud’s works in light of the theories of Swiss linguist
Ferdinand de Saussure, it would be a mistake, as Richard Boothby rightly points out, to
put “too much stress on the linguistic side of Lacan” (21). The notion of reference, in our
view, moves beyond a too narrow focus on language by bringing it into relation with a
world and the subject or rather, the subjectivity that dwells within it, whose objects make
up this world, from which meanings are also derived through these objects. At the same
time, the subject itself is not reducible to its objects or their (conscious) meanings; this is,
in the first place, what is meant by the unconscious: something eludes the field that
constitutes that which is referred to. We situate, then, the notion of reference in the
relation between Lacan’s orders of the imaginary, the symbolic and the real. Lacan’s
notion of the symbolic and its role in the unconscious “must be understood in its dynamic
relation to his earlier and seminal conception of the imaginary” (21). To put this another
way, if the unconscious is indeed ‘structured like a language’, then we must understand it
not only in terms of the signifier but also of the signified, which is often overshadowed in
Lacan’s work owing to the stress he places on the signifier. Only in this way, as we will
see, does the real come to be understood as something outside this relation of the
symbolic and the imaginary. The (Lacanian) real is not something that is easy to talk
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about directly, but we will nevertheless approach it in this chapter through the various
ways that the subject tries to avert signification or disown it, namely, repression and
resistance, which are, ultimately, two sides of the same process.
Resistance has to do with the fact that these two parts of the Saussurian schema of the
sign are ultimately incommensurate; they are separated by a gap that precludes their ever
coming together to form a perfect unit(y). Thus, in translating the Saussurian schema into
what he calls an algorithm (figure 1), Lacan draws attention to the bar, that part of
Saussure’s schema between signifier and signified, where he ‘says more than he intends’.

/ .Signified

"V

V

Signifier /
Saussure’s schema

S
Lacan's algorithm

Figure 1: Lacan's Modification of Saussure's Schema of the Sign

Lacan’s algorithm is the germ cell or embryo from which his reinterpretation of
psychoanalysis develops. By drawing attention to the bar, Lacan is drawing attention to
the unconscious. He is not saying that it is impossible for language to carry meaning, but
rather that the recognition of meaning necessitates a loss of meaning elsewhere: one is
effectively (although not consciously) choosing a meaning at the expense of other
possible meanings. This is how we can understand Lacan’s answer in his seminar on the
Four Fundamental Concepts o f Psychoanalysis to one of his students, Jacques-Alain
Miller, who asked whether the unconscious implied an ontology. Lacan replied that the
unconscious was “neither being, nor non-being, but the unrealized” (30). In every
‘crossing of the bar’ (into consciousness), in every attempt to put a thought into words,
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there is something that gets left out. This does not mean that what is left out goes ‘in’ to
the unconscious, as though the unconscious were some kind of holding cell for unwanted
thoughts, but the things that get left out do have what we might call unconscious effects
because there are reasons why they are left out. This will become clearer over the course
of the next three chapters, but I should point out that there is no definitive explanation or
theory in psychoanalysis that explains everything that has to do with the unconscious.
Part of our task here is to follow Lacan as he tries to understand what is implied by
Freud’s discovery5 of the unconscious and how it might be understood to operate in
human beings.
Lacan’s algorithm brings the unconscious into the structure of language, owing to
which there is a resistance that is structural to language itself, that one cannot escape and
that is at work from the moment one puts language to use. The bar indicates that the
signifier resists signification: contrary to Saussure’s schema where the signifier and
signified happily co-exist, Lacan’s signifier does not imply any meaning whatsoever,
much less a meaning we might expect. Such a structure implies that language itself,
which is the “condition of the unconscious” (Seminar XVII 41), introduces an
unbridgeable gap between the human being and the representation of its world.
This first chapter, then, will examine, within the framework of resistance, the status of
language for the human being as such, that is, distinct from the subject, which is—in the
strict Lacanian sense—an effect of human being’s entry into language, a product of our

5 That Freud ‘discovered’ the unconscious is something that is sometimes thought
contentious. Suffice it to say that when I use the word here I am talking about the
dynamic unconscious. Obviously the term itself has a long history in philosophical
discourse. For more information on the philosophical and cultural underpinnings of the
unconscious, see Henri Ellenberger’s The Discovery o f the Unconscious: The History and
Development o f Dynamic Psychiatry (New York, Basic Books, 1974).

15

dwelling in a linguistic universe, and not a category denoting substance. Language is, as it
were, the field from which Lacan mounts a critique of the Cartesian cogito, a structure
that Lacan returns to again and again over the span of his teaching and which he considers
to be the foundation of modem subjectivity.
In “The Mirror Stage”, Lacan goes so far as to suggest that his formulation of the
mirror-stage, and the “light it sheds on the I function in the experience psychoanalysis
provides us of it” sets us “at odds with any philosophy directly stemming from the
cogito” (75). Cartesian subjectivity—as a fundamental opposition between subject and
object, of subject qua thinking-substance (res cogitans) over-and-against a worldsubstance (res extensia)—is considered to be fundamentally at odds with the
psychoanalytic conception. As Mladen Dolar puts it: “in the very first paragraph of the
first notorious écrit, there is a clear alternative, an emphatic choice that one has to
assume: either the mirror phase or the cogito” (11). And indeed, although Dolar suggests
that what is at stake is that “one has to decide one way or the other between
psychoanalysis and philosophy, which has, in the past three centuries, largely issued from
cogito, despite its variety of forms and despite its often proposed criticism of cogito” (11),
it is also crucial to note that with this statement Lacan situates psychoanalysis in
proximity to a specific (philosophical) discursive horizon. Psychoanalysis, as Lacan
conceives it, is not merely opposed to the aims of this philosophy but exposes its
foundation; its aim is to enter into the discourse in order to ‘traverse the fantasy’ that
underpins it. In this way, the cogito becomes the fantasmatic core of modem subjectivity.
The aim of psychoanalysis is to call into question the very thing that sustains knowledge
production: the fantasy of transparent consciousness.
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Psychoanalysis concerns itself with the cause of knowledge. Descartes, according to
Lacan, situates the thinking subject in a specific relation to the world; however if this
makes possible the production of the knowledge with which science is concerned, this is
because God functions as the guarantor of truth (Fink, “Science” 60), of cause: not, to
quote one of Lacan’s formulations of the objet petit a, “the cause as logical category, but
as causing the whole effect” (“Science and Truth” 738). God is thereby the exception that
simultaneously constitutes and delimits the field of reality: through a kind of slight of
hand, Descartes overcomes the problem of reference, setting “modem man free of the
burden of truth” and allowing him “to go on to develop knowledge that referred to
nothing outside of itself’ (Fink, “Science” 60). Of course, at the same time, the field of
reality itself becomes a kind of ‘symptom’ of this foreclosure.
If the tradition of German Idealism from Kant to Hegel is any indication, Cartesian
‘reality’—what we are calling ‘modern subjectivity’—nevertheless bears the trace of the
act of the foreclosure of God. It is not within the scope of the present study to go into any
detail regarding the relation of Descartes to the tradition of German Idealism6. Our point
is that Lacan’s first move is to situate psychoanalysis in relation to a philosophical
tradition and secondly, as that discourse which concerns itself with what Lacan calls
(regarding Cartesian subjectivity) the ‘subject of science’, psychoanalysis concerns itself
with how the discourse of science puts into practice a certain self-transparency of the
subject that is a vestige of the Cartesian legacy. This vestige appears to us in the form of a
certain illusory relation to language that continues to persist today: that language is
capable of referring to things in the world in the sense that it can be evaluated in terms of
6 See Slavoj Zizek’s Tarrying With the Negative for an excellent analysis of this
problematic.
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propositions possessing ‘truth values’. On closer examination, the paradox of this position
should become clear: in order to determine the truth-value of a proposition, it must be
measured against a certain objective knowledge of the world that somehow persists
beyond any particular propositions or claims. Propositional logic paradoxically presumes
and disavows a subject supposed to know—the position of God in the structure of
Descartes’ discourse.
No wonder, then, that Lacan insists, against the Nietzchean claim that “God is dead”,
that the true formula of atheism is that “God is unconscious” (Four Fundamental 59).
This statement, of course, is truer to the Nietzschean meaning of his oft-misunderstood
phrase anyway. “God is dead” in the Nietzschean sense needs to be supplemented with
“but he has not been properly buried”7 and this is precisely how we should understand the
unconscious. Formations—slips of the tongue, dreams, bungled actions, etc.—of the
unconscious operate precisely because they have not been properly buried. How does one
‘bury’ them? Through analysis, or, more specifically, through understanding how they
operate in (the patient’s) discourse. Although the analyst offers what are called
‘interpretations’, psychoanalysis is not a hermeneutic practice. As a first step to
understanding this (we will examine the interpretive method of psychoanalysis in more
detail in Chapter 2), we need look no further that Freud’s 1925 paper on negation.

7 I am referring here to aphorism 125 from the Gay Science (page 181 of the Walter
Kaufman translation, New York: Vintage, 1974): “Do we hear nothing as yet of the noise
of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell nothing yet of the divine
decomposition?”
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A n Introduction to Negation ”

Objects, both abstract and concrete, surround us. Daily life is a veritable deluge of
objects: we manipulate them, affirm them, assert connections between them, and, as often
as not, try to ignore (some of) them. Under normal circumstances, language facilitates this
almost seamlessly so that it appears that we are at one with the objects that populate our
world. No wonder, then, that Saussure’s diagram of the linguistic sign (figure 1) reflects
this spontaneous relationship of language and object. Lacan, working from a discourse
that has always taken as its starting point those instances where this relationship fails, had
more opportunity to notice that this very failure tells us something about the nature of
language. Lacan’s algorithm, in other words, is descriptive: it describes the way in which
this failure to fully ‘connect’ with the world is in fact a part of language and not the
product of some insidious external influence, whether psychological such as psychosis or
other forms of madness or physiological such as brain lesions or other forms of brain
damage8. Yet if language does not naturally form a unifying bond or otherwise seamlessly
interface with a pre-existing world of objects, then where do objects come from and what
role does language play, if any, in their constitution and perdurance? Psychoanalysis has
always been very curious about how the subject comes to inhabit a world of objects and,
its corollary, how these objects come to be. In fact, we can think of the Lacanian subject
as being always in question and always a question (situated in the register of becoming
rather than being), which is reflected back, however enigmatically, by the failure of the
8 We should note, to Freud’s credit, that he was never one to mark rigid distinctions
between the normal and the pathological, or otherwise quarantine them off from one
another. Neurosis is, for him, an ‘exaggerated’ version of normal functioning, just as the
psychoses, too, although incurable by Freud’s standards, guide his thinking about the
‘normal’ functions of the ego.
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objects, which (in)form the subject’s world, to satisfy, to be it. The subject is sustained by
this kernel of non-sense that supports the meanings he or she makes—whether or not the
aim is to affirm or deny them.
There is, at the very heart of the human organism’s entry into the symbolic, of its
coming into being as subject, an impossible-to-say. All of the subject’s discursive
formations crystalize around a void that cannot be symbolized, that resists symbolization
and yet at the same time is, paradoxically, its cause9. As early as 1895, Freud had named
this impossible-to-say the ‘pathogenic nucleus’ in order to account for a peculiar
phenomenon in his early technique (which we will describe in more detail in chapter
two): “[t]he deeper we go the more difficult it becomes for the emerging memories to be
recognized, till near the nucleus we come upon memories which the patient disavows
even in reproducing them” (Studies 289). This is the first description of resistance, and
Freud posits the pathogenic nucleus in order to account for it. As the analysis progressed
toward what Freud assumed was the origin of patients’ symptoms, they would exhibit a
steadfast refusal to recognize the mnemic material that entered consciousness as having
anything to do with them.
Are we to assume here that resistance ‘traps’ the patient into confirming the analyst’s
preconceptions, that any agreement on the part of the patient is confirmation but any
disagreement is evidence of resistance and therefore also confirmation? Such an
understanding of the logic of resistance completely misses the mark, jumping too quickly
into ascribing meaning to the patient’s discourse, a step that Freud does not take or

9 Note that these are the exact words that Slavoj Zizek uses to describe the Real, but for
the purposes of the argument I am developing here, we will leave to one side this
complex Lacanian notion.
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condone in any of his accounts of technique. Such an argument against Freud as we are
outlining here is situated in the register of what Lacan calls the imaginary, which is to
say, in ego discourse and the relationship of ego to ego that gives rise to ordinary
understanding. Freud’s concern was not to intervene at this imaginary level, but to take
account of the patient’s discourse as a symbolic formation, to defer the moment of
understanding and the attribution of meaning in order to get a more complete picture of
the symbolic constellation that makes up the patient’s world. Freud’s technique here
consists in a curiosity about this peculiar logic of the patient’s statements: that one would
bring something up only to immediately deny or disavow it. The question at the outset is
not what does this mean? or what truth-value should be ascribed to these statements? but
where did this material come from, if not from the ‘p atient’? In other words, Freud is
effectively saying to the patient, “I believe you! The problem is, there is another you, at
another scene, who is apparently begging to differ.” The task is, then, to find out how this
other scene functions in the patient’s psychic economy without dismissing it outright or
reducing it to some privileged imaginary meaning. Freud seeks the coordinates of a
knowledge that is operating somewhere unbeknownst to the patient. In order to bring this
knowledge into the foreground, meaning must be suspended. Such is precisely what the
technique of free association aims at: the suspension of meaning.
We see evidence of this suspension in Freud’s technique outlined in his 1925 paper,
“Negation”. Here again, the peculiar opening of this article might strike one as scandalous
insofar as it appears to put into question—even deny—the patient’s precious ability to
distance him- or herself from misunderstanding; it appears to remove the patient’s last
line of defense against the analyst’s own prejudices. At first glance, one is tempted to
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dismiss “Negation” as further proof of the ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ mentality
attributed to psychoanalysis by Freud’s interlocutor in a later paper, “Constructions in
Analysis”. Since Freud maintains that such a view is mistaken, let us follow him awhile
and see if we can tease out a different interpretation. The first paragraph of “Negation”
reads:
The manner in which our patients present their associations during analytic work
gives us occasion for some interesting observations. ‘Now you’ll think I want to
insult you, but I don’t really mean to.’ This, we realize, is a thought being
rejected, as it emerges, by means of projection. Or: ‘You ask who this person in
my dream can be. It’s not my mother.’ This we amend: ‘So it is your mother.’ In
our interpretations we take the liberty of disregarding the negation and seizing on
the pure content of the thought. It is as if the patient had said: ‘My first thought
was, it’s my mother, but I have no desire to admit this.’ (96)
From the first sentence, then, Freud stresses “[t]he manner” in which patients present
associations and this is what the entire meaning of the paragraph turns on. He is
concerned not with the implicit meaning of his patients’ utterances, but with their form;
reference and meaning are suspended. We should notice that Freud’s ‘correction’ of the
patient’s utterance—“So it is your mother”—does not for all that ascribe any Oedipal
meaning to it, thereby forcing the analysand into some kind of nefarious psychoanalytic
trap. It merely suggests that ‘mother’ came to mind without any prompting10. It is, in
other words, a particular way of listening and of registering the patient’s speech rather
than paying attention to what is a search for some kind of underlying ‘deep’ significance.
If we read his or her statement for meaning alone, we are led astray, toward a referent that
is elsewhere rather than right in front of us—we supplement the statement with our own
ideas, whether favorably or disparagingly, of what the Oedipus complex means instead of
10 One should pay attention to the way in which this utterance reveals the analysand’s
anticipation of the analyst’s knowledge, a scenario that is rife with significance in terms
of transference.
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tarrying with the word ‘mother’ until a later time when its meaning might present itself in
the patient’s own words. By “disregarding the negation and seizing on the pure content of
the thought”, Freud allows the imaginary contours of the analysand’s specific mode of
relating to the world, his or her own way of cutting it up into determinate, workable
objects, come into view.
Negation, somewhat paradoxically, conjures a presence, as it were, ex nihilo. After all,
in order to deny the existence of this something, it must first be made present. Statements
structured along the lines of, “you ’ll think I want to insult you, but I don’t mean to”, are
so commonplace that we might be inclined, in ordinary conversation, to pay little
attention to this bizarre logic. And yet, if we concern ourselves not with meaning but with
manner, with what the statement reveals apropos of the interplay of presences and
absences, and that it contains an associative element, whether or not the goal is ultimately
to disavow it, we see that out of the almost infinite array of possible intentions that this
analy sand could impute to the other, the analysand’s statement affirms the existence of an
insult-intention11. Why does the patient assume that the analyst will be insulted, as
opposed to, say, curious or perhaps even relieved that the patient has finally spoken his or
her mind? Some rather convoluted psychic gymnastics are implied, whereby the
analysand ‘steps into’ the mind of the analyst, hearing his own words through the ears of
this other and trying to anticipate in advance what impact that might have.
11 The crucial point to keep in mind here is that, of course things would be different if the
analyst first said, “you mean to insult me.” The point is, however, that the utterances
Freud is concerned with here are ones that appear spontaneously, without such overt
prompting by the analyst. This is why, although transference does occur in the
analysand’s ordinary relationships (insofar as it is an effect of language), it is more
difficult to pin down. There are too many presences to contend with. The analytic
situation attempts to distill this, so that the presences can be dealt with in a more
controlled setting.
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Meaning and reference go hand-in-hand here. By suspending the meaning of the
analysand’s statements, the referential function of language is also obscured. Indeed, part
of what might strike one as scandalous about Freud’s short paper is that we are so used to
thinking about language as what Jacques-Alain Miller calls a “tool for reference”
(“Language” 25). What is not adequately stressed in Freud, but is evident in his examples,
is the way in which the negation attaches itself onto the Other qua analyst. In Freud’s
examples, there is always a ‘you’, whom the patient is attempting to distance him- or
herself from: “you ask who the person in my dream is,” says the patient, or, “you ’ll think I
want to insult you.” Even in statements that do not explicitly contain this ‘you’, but which
follow the same logic, such as (my personal favorite), “I’m not racist, but...”, there is an
implied ‘you’—whom, otherwise do we suppose is the one who might think the statement
following the ‘but’ is racist? For whom do we feel the need to preface our statement? In
“Negation”, Freud brings into focus the fact that, ultimately, the “analyst is the reference
of the analytic process” (25). More generally, the Other (which, in analysis, the analyst
functions as) ultimately sustains the referential function of language, acts as a guarantor
of reference so that the suspension of the negation is effectively a suspension of any
reference to an ‘outside’ at which the patient’s speech might aim: Freud “seiz[es] the pure
content of the thought” by refusing to be drawn into the overt meaning of the statement,
by refusing, in other words, to play the role of the subject supposed to know for the
patient. By frustrating reference in this way, he draws attention to how the ‘outside’ of
language, in the sense of a language referring to things in the world, is effectively
sustained by a fantasy that ‘sutures’ the gap between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, word and
thing: reference is supplemented by a supposed subject o f knowledge.
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A supposed subject o f knowledge or subject supposed to know—Lacan’s term, sujet
supposé savoir can be translated into English either way—is structurally necessary in
order for knowledge to refer. By reading Freud’s “Negation” alongside the Cartesian
structure of the cogito, we can discern its importance for Lacan’s thought: in particular,
what we are concerned with is how his psychoanalytic theory can reveal a materialist
understanding of the human relation to language. Language, as we are accustomed to
acknowledging without really believing it, is not magical—and yet, that language can
refer straightforwardly to things in the world, that truth, as logic would have it, is a
correspondence of language to a factual state of things, requires nothing less than a divine
intervention: Descartes, if nothing else, proved as much in his Meditations. If Lacan is
concerned with a materialist conception of language, it is to the extent that God is an
element in a structure that is immanent to human experience through the use of language;
it cannot be simply cast aside or ignored (lest something else take its place), but rather it
must be brought ‘down to earth’ in the general form of the subject supposed to know. For
Lacan, as I have already alluded to at the beginning of this chapter, God is unconscious
insofar as the signifier ‘God’ continues to have a function and hold a place in the structure
of human experience: to facilitate reference, to bridge the gap between word and thing.
The subject supposed to know is the gateway through which knowledge of the external
world is encountered; it must be taken into account as a function if we are to understand
in material terms how meaning functions.
The Subject o f the Unconscious

The cogito is a primary point of reference for Lacan at least as far back as his 1949
paper on the mirror-stage where he presented the mirror stage and the cogito as mutually
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exclusive. Indeed, the very notion of the unconscious, as introduced by Freud, would
seem to corroborate this mutual exclusivity, and sign, as it were, the cogito's death
warrant: the “self-transparent subjectivity that figures as the foundation of modem
philosophy—even in those parts of it that were critical of cogito—seems to be submitted
a decisive blow with the advent of psychoanalysis” (Dolar 12). And yet this ‘choice’—
either psychoanalysis or the cogito—is not as clear-cut as it might at first seem. For
Lacan, the self-transparency generally associated with the Cartesian subject is really only
half the story. As he points out in The Four Fundamental Concepts, the Cartesian subject
of certainty—for Descartes is in the first place concerned with determining how one can
be certain of knowledge—is built upon a foundation of doubt: “Descartes tells us—By
virtue o f the fact that I doubt, I am sure that I think, and ...by virtue o f thinking, I am” (3 5;
emphasis in original). Moreover, Lacan claims that the respective methods of Freud and
Descartes are brought into close proximity owing to their interest in this function of
doubt. Freud’s patients, as we have already seen in the previous section (although there
are examples in abundance in his work), also doubt—“It’s not my mother”, “I’m not
insulting you”—and in their doubt, Freud, like Descartes, “is assured that a thought is
there” {Four Concepts 36). It is, however, here that Freud and Descartes also part ways:
whereas for Descartes this thought becomes the support of being qua (self-)presence,
becomes (literally, we might say, by an act of God) identical to being, for Freud doubt is
the assurance of a thought “which is unconscious, which. . .reveals itself as absent” (36);
it is, in a sense, the trace of a being which is elsewhere. In this way, doubt is “a sign of
resistance” (35), resistance being an eruption of being into thought, a disruption of
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thought qua the signification/representation of being. It is in precisely this way that
resistance takes us to the limit of reference.
With the introduction of the unconscious as that place where the subject, in the strict,
Lacanian sense (which is to say, the subject as non-substantial, elusive remainder) is “at
home”, as that place to which thought is relegated and through which “the subject will
reveal himself’ (36), Freud introduces an irreducible gap between thought and being; it is
here, then, between thought and being, that the drama of psychoanalysis plays out. To be
sure, the introduction of this gap is not arbitrary; it is the place, ultimately, which
functions as the locus of doubt, which suspends or holds in abeyance reference. By
doubting, both Freud's patients and Descartes alike enter into the problem of being. Lacan
reformulates the cogito in light of psychoanalytic experience thus: “I am thinking where I
am not, therefore I am where I am not thinking” (“Instance” 430). It is the moment of
resistance signified here in the “not”, which reveals the gap that forever separates
thinking from being and which, crucially, forces the subject, who cannot have it both
ways, whose being is not liberated but alienated in its signification (the “I think”), to
choose.
We can begin to see here how the signifier, as the support of signification qua
representation, introduces a cut between thought and being. Here, Lacan effectively
inherits the tradition of German Idealism (Dolar 14), the development of which, after
Descartes, is evident in, among others, Kant and Hegel, aimed to explore the void of
subject between thought and being12 that Descartes was quick to close up by rendering it

12 In Kant, this split takes the form of his distinction between the intelligible world and
the sensible world; in Hegel, the same split occurs along the lines of desire and
knowledge. In both cases the subject is not reducible to either the intelligible world or
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as res cogitans. In Kant, for example, the split between thought and being introduced by
Descartes is conceived of as a split between an intellectual and a sensible world, the point
being that the subject is reducible to neither: we might formulate the problem of the
subject in German Idealism as being a matter of how to think a subject that has a being
that is both ‘interior’ and ‘exterior’ to itself. Effectively, what is gained by Kant’s
distinction between the intelligible and the sensible is an acknowledgement of what
amounts to two ‘modes’ of being in which the subject seems to be caught—or, more
accurately, between which the subject is split—neither of which is reducible to a final
squaring of accounts that would tell us what the subject is. The subject remains, as it
were, as an empty place, a spot or (in the evocative words of Lacan) “stain” that cannot
be reduced to any positive content (Four Fundamental 74). Our aim is not to give a
complete picture of this long and complex history of the subject13 but to sketch out, in
passing, how this subject has continued to be a persistent problem for philosophy, a
fundamental, if elusive piece of the real around which discourse has circulated—even,
ultimately, structuralist discourse could not proceed without some acknowledgement of
the subject, albeit to situate itself in opposition to it. By bringing the subject back into
psychoanalytic discourse—and in particular, scandalously, a discourse notorious for its
apparent ‘structural’ reinterpretation of psychoanalysis—Lacan, in the first place,
acknowledges the subject as operating on this discourse, he plays the analyst to

desire (in the way that Descartes’ subject qua thought is reducible to its being), but is
suspended between ‘inner’ (intelligible world, desire) and ‘outer’ (sensible world,
knowledge) modes of being.
13 Those interested may wish to consult Slavoj Zizek’s Tarrying with the Negative
(Durham: Duke UP, 1993), which deals with the subject of the relation between Lacan
and German Idealism quite extensively.
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structuralism’s negation. We can imagine structuralism as a patient on the couch, saying,
“Whatever that thing, that empty place, that ‘I think’, in my discourse is, its not the
subject”, to which Lacan amends, “so it is the subject....” We will examine the
differences between Lacan and (post-)structuralism in more detail in chapter three,
however, there is also another, more fundamental, reason why Lacan re-introduced the
subject which must be dealt with here: precisely because it is ultimately the signifier that
introduces this gap—which is to say that it is structure itself that presupposes the subject.
We have already claimed that Lacan’s project vis-à-vis psychoanalysis can be
productively thought as providing the materialist coordinates by which the unconscious
can be understood14. The materialist foundation, then, of the unconscious is sought in
language, which was why he turned to structuralism. In this way, Lacan couples the
“empty spot” of the subject “with the lack implied by the Symbolic” (Dolar 16). In the
last instance, Descartes cannot formulate the cogito otherwise than to say it: “this I think,
for us, certainly cannot be detached from the fact that he can formulate it only by saying it
to us, implicitly—a fact that [Descartes] forgets” {Four Fundamental 36). If the signifier
introduces the gap, it cannot be detached from speech, which brings the signifier into play
and by means of which the subject is divided into the subject of the enunciation —the “I”
of the statement, “I think”—and the subject of the enunciated—the thing, in Descartes’
case, which doubts and which is thus the place of the cause, the gnawing, inarticulable
suspicion which leads Descartes to doubt in the first place, thus giving rise to the
Meditations. There is, to be sure, ample evidence of this place of the cause in Descartes’
14 Even today critics of psychoanalysis often consider the unconscious to be
fundamentally if not hopelessly metaphysical, which might, moreover, account for why
many analysts are wont to abandon it in favour of the (supposedly) less metaphysical
‘ego’.
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first meditation. Lacan defers to a particularly illuminating passage from the Discourse on
Method, which sets the stage for the Meditations (quoted in italics)15:
What is Descartes looking for? He is looking for certainty. I have, he says, an
extreme desire to distinguish the true from the false—note the word desire—in
order to see clearly—in what?—in my actions, and to walk in assurance in this
life. (Four Fundamental 222)
We see, then, that Descartes’ desire for certainty, a desire that is in a sense realized1617in
the Meditations, founded as this work is upon by a kind of barely perceptible, gnawing
suspicion that the world revealed by his knowledge might be otherwise, that Descartes, in
other words, might be lacking/missing something. His thirst for knowledge reveals a kind
of ‘primordial maladaptation’ at the core of his very being, which sets in motion a desire
for certainty. Already here we see the early signs of a cavity forming in the relation
between knowledge qua formalizable propositions about the world and the world as such,
a sneaking suspicion that word does not add up to world17. Descartes supplements the “I
think” with a benevolent, truthful God (who makes possible the ‘ergo’), which,
functioning as a signifier, allows him to simultaneously affirm and deny the subject qua
void at the core of being. His discourse circumscribes the problem of the real, which is in
15 The original quotation from Discourse on Method, reads: “I always had an excessive
desire to learn to distinguish the true from the false, in order to see clearly in my actions
and to walk with confidence in this life” (9).
16His desire is not only ‘fulfilled’, if only illusorily, but is also lent the symbolic
coordinates by which it can be recognized.
17 On this point, readers may be interested in the following passage from The Four
Fundamental Concepts o f Psychoanalysis: “For Descartes, in the initial cogito.. .what the
I think is directed towards, in so far as it lurches into the I am, is a real. But the true
remains so much outside that Descartes then has to re-assure himself—of what, if not of
an Other that is not deceptive, and which shall, into the bargain, guarantee by its very
existence the bases of truth, guarantee him that there are in his own objective reason the
necessary foundations for the very real, about whose existence he has just re-assured
himself, to find the dimension of truth” (36).
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turn circumvented through this God, who stands in for the real, who takes its place qua
representative, turning it into a discourse.
The Unconscious is Structured Like a Language

We arrive, then, by way of this extended but necessary detour to what is at stake in
Freud’s “Negation”, namely, that to deny something by way of a negation—“it is not my
mother”, “I am not insulting you”—one must first bring it to mind, to conjure up by
means of language that thing one wishes to deny. This is Freud’s patients’ conundrum: to
say, “It is not my mother” is simultaneously a denial and an admission that it was, in fact,
“mother” that came to mind in association with whatever it was he or she was thinking
about. This negation sets up by way of the patient’s discourse, an ‘outside’ that belongs to
the patient—that is, an ‘outside’ for which the patient is responsible, an outside that is
projected onto a subject supposed to know in the same way that the ‘outside’ for
Descartes belonged to God. It is no less a symbolic construction for all that. This outside,
which belongs—can only belong—to the patient is precisely the place where analytic
work is aimed. To anticipate somewhat our conclusion, “Negation” concerns nothing less
than this operation of separating—which is, paradoxically wholly internal to the ego—the
inside from the outside, and thus leads us to Lacan’s discussion of his operations of
alienation and separation first outlined in The Four Fundamental Concepts of
Psychoanalysis.
In this way, “Negation” is one of the key texts in Freud’s oeuvre behind Lacan’s
formulation, “the unconscious is structured like a language”. Far from being a mere
structuralist fancy, a quaint but antiquated slogan emanating from a bygone era, it should
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be understood as an axiom that aligns the unconscious and thus psychoanalysis along not
structuralist but materialist lines. To be sure, evidence abounds that the unconscious is
structured like a language in Freud’s work, but this has not stopped analysts from
imbuing it with metaphysical whimsy. A case-in-point is, of course, Carl Jung, who
mutates the unconscious into a container for supposedly timeless and immutable
‘archetypes’. Less extreme (though equally insidious) views proliferated during Lacan’s
time (and indeed extend into ours) under the banner of ‘ego psychology’ to which Lacan
placed himself firmly in opposition on account of the fact that the ego psychologists, as
the name implies, saw the ego as their primary if not total concern, leaving the
unconscious by the wayside. Against this background of ego psychology, we can read
Lacan’s “return to Freud” as a return to the unconscious. Indeed, too narrow a focus on
the ego leads us back to the Cartesian illusion of certainty, reflected in the clinical
practice of ego psychology, concerned as it is with getting the patient’s “weak ego” to
identify with the analyst’s “strong ego”—ego psychology, in other words, is founded
upon instilling in the patient a confidence in a subject supposed to know occupied (or,
better still, substantialized) by the analyst. By emphasizing the unconscious, Lacan
sought to re-situate psychoanalytic theory and practice back within the problematic of the
(dis)relation between thought and being.
Let us state the obvious, so as not to miss it: “the unconscious is structured like a
language” means, foremost, not only that the unconscious has a structure (which is
already no small thing since the unconscious has been thought many ways, but never
before as a structure), but that it is structured in accordance with that of language. We
must insist on stressing, at the risk of tedium, this obvious implication of Lacan’s
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statement precisely because, in my view, “the unconscious is structured like a language”
is usually equated with some variation of the idea that the unconscious is made up of
signifiers. To be sure, there is (minimal) support for this reading in the opening pages of
“The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious”, taken to be Lacan’s standard text on his
structuralist reinterpretation of the unconscious, where he states that “it is the whole
structure of language that psychoanalytic experience discovers in the unconscious” (413;
my emphasis). My contention is that “the unconscious is structured like a language” aims
at something more fundamental, namely, the question of why it is that language comes to
play such an important role in Lacan’s thought. In this way, I interpret this “in”, which I
have italicized in the above quotation, to suggest the sense of ‘reflected in’, against any
presumption that the unconscious is a container for holding signifiers (as though the
unconscious were no different than a satchel for storing one’s Scrabble pieces). Thus we
are led to conceive of the unconscious as, for Lacan, modeled upon the Saussurian
algorithm (figure 2), introduced in “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious”:

s
Figure 2: The (Lacanian) Structure of Language

The implications of the unconscious consisting of this same structure are far more radical
than conceiving of it as a mere container: it allows us to take into account the relationship
between the symbolic and the imaginary (rather than fetishize the symbolic); it will
require us to take account of Lacan’s elaboration of this structure between the so-called
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‘early Lacan’ of the 50’s (when “Instance of the Letter” was written) and that found in
The Four Fundamental Concepts o f Psychoanalysis, which has thus far been our point of
reference for our elaboration of the relationship between the subject, being and thought.
Let us note, first of all, that Lacan describes this structure in “The Instance of the Letter”
as consisting of “the primordial position of the signifier and the signified as distinct
orders initially separated by a barrier resisting signification” (415).
Here we should recall that Lacan arrives at this linguistic structure by way of a
modification of Saussure’s original schema of the sign. Saussure thought of the sign as a
‘linguistic unit’, which is formed from the coupling of the signified and the signifier into
a meaningful and inseparable (except when considered in the abstract) whole.

/" S i g n i f i e d ^
'

Signifier.

Figure 3: Saussure's schema indicating the unity of signifier and signified

I would like to propose, then, that according to the path we have followed through the
reading of the cogito presented in The Four Fundamental Concepts o f Psychoanalysis,
which effectively reveals the Cartesian subject as irreducibly divided between the twin
realms of thought and being, that Lacan repeats the gesture of modification that gives rise
to the algorithm (figure 2). In order words, the Saussurean schema of the sign is decidedly
Cartesian in its arrangement. Saussure does not so much depict language as it really
functions but rather as it ideally functions. Like Descartes, Saussure’s schema relies on a
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supplementary subject supposed to know, namely, the (ideal18) community of speakers.
Thus, in order to resolve the problem of referentiality, so as to make of the sign a
meaningful totality, Saussure must support it with the “the social fact”: “[t]he community
is necessary if values that owe their existence solely to usage and general acceptance are
to be set up; by himself the individual is incapable of fixing a single value” (Course 113).
We can, then, on the analogy of Saussure’s linguistic unit, schematize the Cartesian
subject accordingly, the arrows implying, as they do for Saussure, the transparent
movement ‘across the bar’, signifying a unity of thought and being:

Having thus schematized the Cartesian subject on the model of the Saussurean sign, we
arrive at the algorithm that reflects the unconscious as “structured like a language” by
inserting the bar between being and thinking, and thereby removing any indication of
self-transparent subjectivity:

18 Let us note in passing that, in order for Saussure’s conception of language to function
according to his schema, the individuals that make up this community of speakers are
Cartesian subjects with all that this implies, including a transparent relationship to
language.
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Being
thinking
Figure 5: The unconscious is structured like a language

Here, I have, following Lacan’s reversal of the signifier and the signified in the shift from
Saussure’s schema to the algorithm, reversed the positions of being and thinking, thereby
marking the primacy of being with respect to thinking. I am not thereby affording ‘being’
any specific pride of place, but merely indicating that being persists irrespective of any
meaning afforded to it in thought. This point will become clearer in what follows, but has
to do with the experience of anxiety.
By formulating unconscious structure in this way and separating being and thinking
into “distinct orders” (to borrow the description of the signifier and the signified from
“Instance of the Letter”) with the bar which, in Lacan’s algorithm of the sign represents
the “barrier resisting signification” (415), we are effectively making explicit the
coordinates implied by Lacan’s matheme for the split subject, represented by an S with a
line through it (S). In other words, this bar is not limited to Lacan’s algorithm of the sign
but is of fundamental importance to the entire formulation of his theory.
H ow to (Not) Get Outside o f Yourself

That “the unconscious is structured like a language” is, not surprisingly, only a part of
the story. We might now turn to the question of why the unconscious is structured like a
language, or, at any rate, what justification Lacan had for positing this peculiar idea other
than the fact that many of Freud’s works, especially The Interpretation o f Dreams, The
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Psychopathology o f Everyday Life, and Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, deal
either implicitly or explicitly with the question of the unconscious vis-à-vis language.
Following Richard Boothby I have already noted at the beginning of this chapter that we
ought not to focus too narrowly on the linguistic side of Lacan lest we miss the crucial
problem of how language relates to being. My thesis is that the psychoanalytic theory of
resistance, especially as it is elaborated by Lacan, allows us to bridge the gap between
this prominent, overdetermined ‘linguistic side’ and being, which leads us into the
territory of Lacan’s imaginary order and the real, thus allowing us to grasp the
interrelatedness of his three orders.
Our schema (figure 5) has the advantage, in the first place, of foregrounding how what
is at stake in the Lacanian split subject ($) is an irreducible fissure introduced into the
very fabric of human reality, the effect of which is a division between thought and being.
Secondly, by making tangible the parallel between unconscious structure and Lacan’s
structure of language, introduced in “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious”, we
are now in a position to examine the significance of the bar that separates being and
thought, signified and signifier.
We have seen, then, that Lacan’s modification of the Saussurean schema of the sign
(figure 1) better reflects his experience with neurotic speech (and, for that matter,
psychotic speech, which is nevertheless a slightly different beast as we will see) which,
because neurotic symptoms are effectively structured around a certain question or
uncertainty that appears in the place of the sujet supposé savoir, reveal a dis-relation or
rupture at the level of the joint between signifier and signified. In other words, owing to
resistance, the patient’s speech, rather than following a path toward a unified
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representation or a sensible discourse, erupts into non-sense. We have seen, moreover, the
great lengths that Descartes went to in order to contain this kernel of non-sense at the very
core of his relation to knowledge that led to his desire for certainty.
Ultimately, it is this rupture that disturbs the smooth unfolding of the chain of signifiers
that accounts for the bar, which runs from the Lacanian structure of language (figure 2) to
the structure of the unconscious (figure 5). The (Lacanian) subject is revealed in these
elusive moments of the failure of discourse to make sense, disturbances of speech
wherein meaning fails and the ground of being-in-sense becomes, however momentarily,
a question mark. This is, to be sure, usually a fleeting hesitation—quickly laughed off or
dismissed as unimportant; however, this almost immediate dismissal following the
moment of hesitation also has significance in itself. The subject’s brief appearance is
precipitated headlong into the enigmatic, indistinct presence of the Other. To be clear, this
presence has no positive content in this moment. In the analytic setting, subject and Other
immediately coincide in what Lacan calls the presence of the analyst insofar as the
analyst qua Other functions as the bar in our schema of the structure of the unconscious
which materializes the gap between being and thought. Lacan has a matheme that
correlates to the $ of the divided subject, namely, the barred Other (A). Here, at the
moment of resistance, just when the subject “seems ready to come out with something
more authentic, more to the point than he has ever managed to come up with up to then,
the subject, in some cases, breaks off, and utters a statement, which might be the
following— I am aware all o f a sudden o f the fact o f your presence” (Seminar 1 40).
Let us recall the evidence of this precipitation of the subject toward the Other in
Freud’s “Negation”: one of the examples he gives is of a patient whose negation takes the
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form of “a thought being rejected, as it emerges, by means of projection” (96).
Effectively, an insult-intention comes to mind, which the patient imputes to the analyst by
way of the statement, “you’ll think I mean to insult you”. Behind this ‘you’ll think” is an
attempt to fill out the lack introduced by the A and brought into play by in the analytic
setting, by the position of the analyst as an unknown element, a stranger vis-à-vis the
patient (and, for that matter, vice versa).
The development of Freud’s technique, which we will look at in more detail in chapter
two, can be thought as a gradual recognition of the structural necessity of the bar that
separates thought and being. In the beginning, Freud’s technique was directed toward
getting his patients to tell him about the images on the surface of their minds. The aim of
analysis was to get them to historicize the parts of their histories that remained foreign to
them and thus exerted a pathogenic influence as they attempted to keep these alien
elements from contaminating the consistency of the ego. The moment of resistance
announced the disavowed parts of the patient’s history but not in a form that could be
integrated into the subject’s universe of meaning; rather, these parts of the patient’s
history were brought to consciousness as so many scraps of thought: in a word, non
sense. In the throes of resistance, the patient comes up with innumerable clever ways of
not saying what comes to mind: perhaps declaring, “I expected something would occur to
me, but all I thought was how tensely I was expecting it. Nothing came” (Studies 278).
And yet, despite the tenacity of resistance, Freud notes that the patient usually announces,
after finally saying what has come to mind, that he or she ‘knew it the whole time’:
T could have told you that the first time.’ ‘Why didn’t you say it?’ T couldn’t
believe it to be that. It was only when it came back every time that I made up my
mind to say it.’ Or else: T hoped it wouldn’t be that of all things. I could well do
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without saying that. It was only when it refused to be repressed that I saw I
shouldn’t be let off.’ (279)
This ‘I could well do without saying that’ is a minimal awareness of the presence of the
analyst as something Other, foreign. Something is elided in this statement; what the
patient really means is, “I could well do without saying that to you”—I am afraid to tell
you, you, who seem to imbue these fragments o f the non-sense o f my being with sense. I
am afraid o f the meaning you might give to them. This indeterminate, enigmatic ‘you’
indicates a short circuit between the analyst as presence, as presence of a ‘something
else’, as an imago, perhaps, of a judging figure from the patient’s past. The Lacanian
matheme for the guises in which this ‘you’ becomes present—for example, a judging
figure of the patient’s past or perhaps as a seducer, etcetera—is S(A), the signifier of the
barred Other. It is here that we can locate the relationship between resistance and
transference: S(A) emerges at the moment of resistance insofar as the recognition of lack

(A) always implies a signifier, S(A), which becomes the rootstock of the transference, a
signifier around which the transference crystalizes qua symbolic structure. Thus,
resistance facilitates the transference, or, more accurately, the recognition of lack qua A
exerts a kind of ‘gravitational pull’ on content, and thus never simply exists for long
(hence the brevity of the moment of hesitation that announces resistance) as void qua
void, as Lacan puts it in Seminar I, “resistance makes itself felt in the guise o f
transference” (46; emphasis in original).
This intersection of resistance and transference takes us to the core of the notion of
repression, a fundamental point of reference for Freud insofar as it is by way of the theory
of repression that he was able to formulate his idea of the unconscious. The logic of
repression seems to presuppose some kind of minimal recognition of something, of an
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indistinct, unconscious knowledge which is articulated negatively in such forms as we
have just mentioned, namely, a certain I am afraid to tell you, or, I did not want to believe
it could be that, which attach (that is, project) themselves onto to the figure of the analyst.
Repressed material does not simply disappear, consigned as it were to some nebulous,
metaphysical unconscious repository. The seeming paradox of repression is that “one still
knows something about the very thing one doesn’t want, in some sense, to know anything
about, and the whole of analysis consists in showing us that one knows it very well
indeed” {Seminar III 149). Freud describes this process in “Negation” as showing how
“the intellectual function is separated from the affective process”:
With the help of negation only one consequence of the process of repression is
undone—the fact, namely, of the ideational content of what is repressed not
reaching consciousness. The outcome of this is a kind of intellectual acceptance of
the repressed, while at the same time what is essential to the repression
persists....A negative judgement is the intellectual substitute for repression; its
‘no’ is the hall-mark of repression, a certificate of origin[.]...With the help of the
symbol of negation, thinking frees itself from the restrictions of repression and
enriches itself with the material that is indispensible for its proper functioning.
(236)
In this way, repression implies some kind of process of self-judgment that happens,
behind the scene, for without some way for which the patient to judge his or her
associations as being indicative of something disturbing, without them somehow entering
the horizon of the subject’s meaningful relation to him- or herself in the form of an ’is
not’ or ’does not want to be’, there would be no reason for material to be repressed. We
should, then, understand the terms of Freud’s description, those of the ‘intellectual’ and
the ‘affective’ as suggesting a distinction between the propositional and the descriptive,
which will become relevant for our discussion of the aphasias in chapter three. In other
words, Freud’s description confuses the fact that it is language that is implicated in both
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cases: the formulation of propositions do not implicate the repressive function because
they allow one to achieve some distance from the propositional content, whereas the
descriptive is wholly implicated in the subject; it, as it were, touches the real. To be sure,
the propositional statement is closer to an ‘intellectual’ use of language, but the
descriptive is not purely on the side of the affective, it has to do, rather, with describing
an affective state in language, it is here that repression intervenes, preventing a
description that would reveal too much, that would take oneself as referent.
We see then that this unconscious knowledge pointed to by repression connects up to
an apprehension and maintenance of a border between inside and outside: lam not this, 1
refuse to be associated with that. Here, then, we can grasp the convergence of the notions
of repression, transference and resistance. A repression always refers back to something;
it has a point of reference, which Freud calls the ideal-ego, that cannot be expressed in
words or recognized as such. If resistance hints at a fundamental signifier, which we have
called S(A), following Lacan, a signifier of a lack in the Other, the transference entering
at this point as the production of signifiers that encircle this lack, then repression links
this lack up to an image, i(a), the Lacanian matheme for the ideal-ego, which undergirds
SfA) and escapes recognition (which is a symbolic process) as such insofar as it guides
the structuration of inside and outside, being a kind of inverse of the ego, the image that
looks back from the mirror surface and makes possible the illusion that gives rise to
repression: seeing oneself seeing (oneself).
The inter-related phenomena of resistance and transference make their appearance in
the attempt to ‘undo’ the repression. In fact, Freud tells us in Studies on Hysteria that his
technique (this was before the technique of free association) involved the “overcom[ing]
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of resistance” which suggested to him that “by means o f psychical work I had to
overcome a psychical force in the patients which was opposed to the pathogenic ideas
becoming conscious” (268; emphasis in original). Thus, he concludes, “this must no
doubt be the same psychical force that had played a part in the generating of the hysterical
symptom and had at that time prevented the pathogenic idea from becoming conscious”
(268). Here we see Freud setting the stage for an understanding of repression, which he
had not yet named, and that allows us to see that a relationship emerges such that
resistance is the inverse of repression. The psychical force that keeps the repression intact
is loosened in the analytic setting. To put this in terms of Freud’s later technique of free
association: by inducing the patient to speak through the technique of free association, the
patient produces signifiers until such a time when these signifiers fail to surface. At this
point, as we have seen, resistance is brought into the foreground, as this ‘something
else’—which Freud refers to vaguely as a ‘force’—which appears, in a sense, as a hole in
the patient’s signification, represented by a very special signifier, the signifier of a lack,
S(A), a lack which “hooks on to” {Seminar I 48) the Other, which we have seen most
concretely in relation to the analytic situation, in the form of an awareness o f the
analyst’s presence.
This is precisely why I prefer to think of ‘resistance’ in a passive sense, rather than to
think of it in active terms such as ‘the patient resists'1 insofar as the entire point of the
notion of resistance hinges upon the fact that there is no patient qua individuated,
(imaginary) total personality that could resist'9. Resistance, as it were, happens in spite of19

19 If this kind of resistance were possible, which would occur from the solid ground of a
self-assured desire, there would be no need of psychoanalysis and in fact, I have no
objection to thinking of some variation of this, of perhaps a ‘resistance that is sure of
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any desire of the patient. Even the most docile patient, obsessed with following the
fundamental rule of analysis—to say whatever comes to mind—cannot avoid resistance;
it happens whether the patient wants it to or not and is in this way a structural necessity of
analysis. It is more fruitful—and more accurate—to model resistance on the metaphor of
the resistance that generates heat in an electrical wire20 rather than on some notion of
political resistance or active resistance to power (such as it is sometimes thought:
resistance, for example, to Freud’s supposed authoritarian power).
If resistance and transference are to have any relation, it is in the environs of the hole
in signification that resistance makes manifest. By introducing this hole as such in the
patient’s discourse, resistance carves out a space for the sujet supposé savoir and, as
Lacan tells us in The Four Fundamental Concepts, “as soon as the subject who is
supposed to know exists somewhere...there is transference” (232). It is in this sense that
we speak of resistance bringing forth a signifier of lack, and not a lack as such, for what
is at stake is ultimately a specific place from which the sujet supposé savoir in its various
guises can be articulated. The entire elaboration of the psychoanalytic view of psychosis
marks the difference between the signifier of lack and the lack as such. In psychosis, to

itself (whatever this might mean) as the end of analysis so that, when a patient can say
“No!” and really mean it, the analysis is over. Let me add that the end of analysis is not a
clear-cut issue (which is why Freud wrote “Analysis Terminable and Interminable”) and
the topic of much debate. One will find as many ideas about what constitutes the end of
analysis as there are analysts to think them.
20 Another such metaphor that comes to mind, which is akin to the resistance in an
electrical wire, is friction, which, although it is a counter-force that generates a
supplement of energy that is useless for work (in the sense physics gives to this term), i.e.
entropy, it also makes controlled locomotion possible. I mention it here only for the
interest one might take in it for further thinking about the notion of resistance, with no
intention to follow up on this metaphor. A more elaborate discussion of the metaphor of
resistance in an electrical wire, however, will be found in chapter two.
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cut a long story short, the signifier of lack is what is lacking and it is interesting to note
that, as a result, the significations of the psychotic are, to a non-psychotic observer,
profoundly nonsensical, which is to say, absent of any immediate or obvious reference
point from which to understand them. Paradoxically, from a psychoanalytic point of view,
the self-transparent Cartesian subject of certainty is a psychotic and thus it may be no
coincidence that Judge Schreber, whose Memoirs form the basis of Freud’s sustained
engagement with the problem of psychosis, saw himself as in intimate relation with
God21.
In our ordinary use of language, then, it is less a tool for referring to ‘things’ in the
‘world’ and more a reflective surface, the pool in which Narcissus is captivated by his
reflection: meaning is fundamentally narcissistic. As listeners trying to decipher the
meaning of what someone is saying to us, we often ‘understand’ the other insofar as we
can situate his or her discourse in relation to our own experiences. As Bruce Fink puts it,
uour usual way o f listening overlooks or rejects the otherness o f the other'’'' (2; emphasis
in original). Meaning seems to exert a rather tenacious gravitational pull on discourse,
eschewing difference and bulldozing the nuances of speech in the name of understanding:
“[i]n our haste to identify with the other, to have something in common with him, we
forcibly equate stories that are often incommensurate, reducing what we are hearing to
what we already know. What we find most difficult to hear is what is utterly new and

21 Freud’s Schreber case-study makes for fascinating reading, as does the source material,
Daniel Schreber’s book, whose English translation bears the title, Memoirs o f My Nervous
Illness. Suffice it to bring to the reader’s attention Freud’s observation that Schreber “felt
that he was God’s wife” (“Notes” 32). Such comprises the core of this elaborate delusion.
Those interested may wish to consult Freud’s “Notes on a Case of Paranoia”, The
Standard Edition o f the Complete Psychological Works o f Sigmund Freud Volume 12
(1911-1913) pp. 3-82. Nowhere is the narcissism of signification more evident than in the
case of paranoia.
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different” (2). Ultimately,

‘understanding’ involves a transparent transferential

relationship to the Other that “reduce[s] what another person is saying to what we think
we already know” (6).
By trying to understand too quickly, in trying to grasp at meaning, the dimension of
the other’s alterity is completely glossed over; we effectively ‘see ourselves’, we translate
another’s discourse into familiar terms supported by our own knowledge and frameworks
it provides to our understanding. Furthermore, this way of understanding—which
effectively turns the other’s chain of signifiers into a purely reflective surface upon which
we (re)experience ourselves—situates us rather firmly in the imaginary, which we can
conceive of as a ‘closed’ structure of sense, along the axis of a relation of ego to ego.
Thus, if language refers to objects, these objects belong to the order of the imaginary, not
unlike Saussure’s schema of the sign, which, taken literally, shows the signifier coupled
to the signified without any direct reference to external reality. In other words, then, and
herein consists

the pivotal point that guides our thinking

about language

psychoanalytically: language ‘refers’ by way o f the imaginary, thus, in order to refer to
anything ‘outside ’ o f itself the signifier must pass through the imaginary. The Other qua
subjet supposé savoir marks the place of the ‘outside’ of language which is precisely why
the psychoanalytic situation between analyst and analysand (patient) is no ordinary
conversation. The aim is to confront the analysand with his or her signifiers, which
amounts to the analysand listening intently to him- or herself from the place of the
Other—imagining what the Other hears when he or she speak. This place from which we
hear ourselves is held by the image of the ideal-ego, i{a), which we mentioned above.
This confrontation with one’s signifiers cannot but generate resistance, as that which
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manifests this locus which we call the signifier of a lack, and which marks the place from
which the patient situates him- or herself in relation to externality. It is around this locus
that the ego qua “representative in the mind of the real external world” crystalizes
(Freud, Ego 28; my emphasis). In bringing out the necessity of a representative of the
external world, foremost as a signifier of lack, psychoanalysis is brought into close
proximity with the Derridian thesis that, ‘there is no outside of language’—indeed, there
is no outside to the extent that what is outside must nevertheless possess some kind of
representative. That is to say that what is ‘outside’ must be registered in language in order
to be recognized as such, blurring the distinction between inside and outside.
‘Primordial D iscord’

Probably the most profound expression of the Lacanian thesis, “the unconscious is
structured like a language” occurs, not surprisingly, in Freud’s 1915 metapsychological
paper, “The Unconscious”:
the conscious presentation [Vorstellung\ of the object [is]. . .split up into the
presentation of the word and the presentation of the thing [Sachvorstellung]; the
latter consists in the cathexis, if not the direct memory-images of the thing, at least
of remoter memory-traces derived from these. We now seem to know all at once
what the difference is between a conscious and an unconscious presentation. The
two are not, as we supposed, different registrations of the same content in
different psychical localities, nor yet different functional states of cathexis in the
same locality; but the conscious presentation comprises the presentation o f the
thing plus the presentation o f the word belonging to it, while the unconscious
presentation is the presentation o f the thing alone. (201; my emphasis)
Let us pay close attention to Freud’s logic here: that which is presented to consciousness,
that is, the “conscious presentation”, consists of the joining of word-presentation
[Wortvorstellung] to thing-presentation [Sachvorstelling], Repression, then, which aims at
preventing something from entering consciousness, is a process by which the thing-
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presentation remains but detached from its word-presentation. Crucially, however, this is
not the whole story. Freud brings three elements into play at the beginning of this
passage: object, word and thing [Sache]. Interestingly, it is not the thing itself that is
subject to

repression but rather its word-presentation;

the thing-presentation

[Sachvorstellung] endures regardless of whether or not repression takes place. This is
precisely why Lacan insists that “ Verdrängung [repression] operates on nothing other
than signifiers” (Seminar VII44). In this respect, Freud posits an unconscious element—
thing-presentation—at the very core of consciousness; but what, then, are we to make of
this elusive object, which seems to have no place and is given only a passing reference?
This object, it seems, disappears from our purview as quickly as it appears.
Between the thing-presentation and the word-presentation, we are situated firmly in a
circuit constituted by the pleasure principle, wherein repression as it is ordinarily
understood operates. Here, too, is the domain of ordinary, conscious discourse, where
repression often rules the day in those moments when, in the midst of narrating some
story or another to an interlocutor, we suddenly forget a word or lose our train of thought.
Freud provides an illuminating example of how repression operates at this level in The
Psychopathology o f Everyday Life, where he recounts the story of how, during a
conversation with a traveler on a train, he has trouble remembering the name of the
painter of a fresco in the cathedral at Orvieto22. Substitutes come to mind—Botticelli,
Boltraffio, etcetera—but none of them is quite right. Upon analysis, Freud recalls that his
mind had wandered while talking to his companion about the respect that Turks extend to
the authority of doctors, a respect Freud found lacking in some of his patients. During the

22 For Lacan’s account, see (among other places) pages 46 - 48 of Seminar I: Freud’s
Papers on Technique.
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conversation he was also thinking about how much value Turks attach to the sexual
functions, which he decided not to bring into polite conversation with a stranger. At the
same time, another thought occurred to him: “On this occasion I was still under the
influence of a piece of news which had reached me a few weeks before while I was
making a brief stay at Trafoi. A patient over whom I had taken a great deal of trouble had
put an end to his life on account of an incurable sexual disorder” (10). He does not share
these thoughts with his interlocutor, which is where the trouble begins.
Significantly, the name is not forgotten outright. Part of the discourse that Freud
refuses to share with his companion finds expression in a distorted way: in Botticelli, the
last part of Signorelli is remembered; Boltraffw partly expresses the name of the place
where Freud received the news about the death of his patient, Trafoi; Herzegovinia,
another substitute that came to Freud’s mind, expresses Herr, which is the German
equivalent of the Italian Signor. There is a convergence of discourses, where one
discourse seeking revelation latches onto a discourse that is present to consciousness. We
see here a veritable proliferation of thing-presentations and word-presentations unleashed
by the omission of this little word ‘Signor’, a chain of associations consisting of scraps of
the surrounding context of this forgetting: the importance that Freud felt the Turks ascribe
to sexuality no doubt mirrors the importance that he ascribes to sexuality in his
psychoanalytic theory, which was not well received and undermined his credibility; the
death of a patient that he had cared for a long time, and who moreover committed suicide
on account of an incurable sexual dysfunction, was no doubt “experienced by the doctor
as a problem of mastery” (Seminar I 48). Here then, we have Freud’s most succinct
dramatizations of the pleasure principle operating at the level of discourse.
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Here, too, we are also confronted with the reality principle, which goes hand-in-hand
with the pleasure principle, the reality principle being that which sets it within certain
limits, isolating it. In the decision not to engage his interlocutor in a discussion about the
cultural differences in the importance attached to the sexual function, Freud succumbs to
the reality principle. This is not repression per se, since Freud is well aware of what he is
truncating, but it does set him on the path to repression in the way that he presupposes an
idea about this other, his interlocutor, which precipitated a judgment not to mention the
thoughts that had occurred to him: the assumption that his interlocutor might have certain
(moral) ideas about what should and should not be said in polite company. We see here
the relation between the pleasure principle and the reality principle qua limit and it is not
insignificant that the reality principle intervenes in Freud’s discourse around, as I have
pointed out, a concatenation of thoughts connected to sexuality. The repression properly
so called, according to the letter of Freud’s early understanding of this process, occurs in
relation to the word Signorelli, which disappears from Freud’s discourse and which
required considerable effort before it could be unearthed.
Although The Psychopathology o f Everyday Life was written some fifteen years before
“The Unconscious”, we nevertheless see in the repression of the word Signorelli an
illuminative demonstration of the process Freud describes in its pages. There remains,
following the repression of the word-presentation, an intensely vivid thing-presentation:
“so long as the painter’s name remained inaccessible,” Freud writes, “the visual memory
that I had of the series of frescoes and the portrait which is introduced into the comer of
one of the pictures was ultra-clear—at any rate, much more intense than visual memorytraces normally appear to me” (13). If we translate what occurs here into a relation
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between resistance and transference, we see that transference is happening at the level of
the persistence of this intense visual image. It is more difficult to locate in relation to
Freud since he was his own analyst but this should not stop us from noting that the
persistence of this image, which to an extent can be put into words, just not the right
word, the one Freud is looking for, the one that, through an elaborate short-circuit (Freud
provides a diagram of it within the pages of The Psychopathology o f Everyday Life23),
was caught up in the process of repression. In the same way that a patient at the moment
of resistance might suddenly become aware, however indistinctly, of the presence of the
analyst, Freud, too, becomes aware of a certain kind of presence, the presence, no doubt,
which is felt as, I should know this! I have seen it with my own eyes! Here we are again
brought into close proximity with the problem of mastery, the mastery of knowledge in
this case, that we described above, which the entirety of Freud’s works leave little doubt
as to the importance of this signifier for the organization of his symptom.
Let us, then, return to the problem that Freud is faced with in “Negation”. We are now
in a position to see that it concerns nothing less than the elusive object given only passing
mention in “The Unconscious”. It persists, as is evident in the manner in which Freud
introduces it, beyond the Vorstellung, the representation, comprised of its derivatives,
thing- and word-presentation. It is, to my mind, no mere coincidence or shortcoming on
Freud’s part that this object that is our ultimate concern—this object that for us will
provide the bridge into the very core of the issue vis-à-vis the human experience of
language—attained so little clarity in Freud: it concerns the most profound and
indeterminate part of our being, that which fundamentally eludes signification. It is no

See page 5 of Volume 6 of the Standard Edition, The Psychopathology o f Everyday
Life.
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accident, either, that Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the work that deals with this object
most extensively is also one of Freud’s most speculative and, in a sense, mythological.
Lacan himself devotes an entire seminar to the study of this peculiar object, which he
names das Ding, drawing attention to the fact that Freud ultimately settled on Sache to
name his thing-presentation, despite the German language having two different words for
‘thing’ and, moreover, in relation to Sache, Ding connotes a dimension of the beyond;
Lacan provides the example that in German, one “does not use Sache for religious
matters, but one nevertheless says that faith is not jederman Ding” {Seminar VII62).
Das Ding is most evident in the Fort/Da game Freud describes in Beyond the
Pleasure Principle, and which is on the whole concerned with nothing less than an
attempt to come to terms theoretically with this elusive Ding. Although Freud does not
appear to lend any great weight to the fact that an object serves as the enduring point of
reference in this child’s game of naming and performing the oscillation of presence and
absence. As Lacan rather evocatively puts it:
There can be no fort without da and, one might say, without Dasein. But. . .there
is no Dasein without the fort. That is to say, there is no choice. If the young
subject can practise [sic] this game of fort-da, it is precisely because he does not
practise [sic] it at all, for no subject can grasp this radical articulation. He
practices it with the help of a small bobbin, that is to say, with the objet a. {Four
Fundamental 239)
Das Ding in Seminar VII is what will become objet petit a in The Four Fundamental
Concepts {Seminar XI); it is ultimately the very foundation of signification, the thing
around which signification—and especially, as we have seen, Freud’s signification—
circulates: “there can be no fort without da and...without Dasein”. It is impossible to
articulate as such and yet, all of the subject’s discourse points back to it and is sustained
by it. We have seen this most clearly in our reading of Freud’s Signorelli example in The
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Psychopathology o f Everyday Life, where his discourse circulates around and is structured
by some relation to ‘mastery’. To be sure, this ‘mastery’ does not reveal to us ‘the whole
story’ apropos of Das Ding/objet petit a, but it goes a long way toward an approach to it,
to the extent that it sets in motion the repression of this innocuous word, Signorelli, which
gets linked up to it by way of a short-circuit.
Objet a (to call it by its more common name) occupies the place of the bar in our
schematization of the axiom, “the unconscious is structured like a language” (figure 5); it
is precisely because the objet a serves as a Tittle piece of the real’ that eludes
signification but is at the same time the thing around which all signification is organized.
In this way, it is the foundation of what Lacan calls in The Four Fundamental Concepts,
the vel of alienation: a forced choice in which one can either choose thought or being, but
the choice of one over the other comes at a cost, that is, the choice is destined to give rise
to some loss (the vel referring to the ‘v’ symbol that signifies ‘or’ in symbolic logic). As
Mladen Dolar puts it:
Thought depends on the signifier, which turns the subject into the empty point of
enunciation, instead of founding his/her being. In the place of the supposed
certainty of the subject's being, there is just a void. It is not the same subject that
thinks and that is; the one that is not the one that thinks, even more, the one that
is ultimately not a subject at all. One should already mark here that should one
choose being, one would have to espouse the object, precisely the object that
Lacan has labeled objet a, the object that detains being, but a being over which
one cannot be master. Choosing being would entail desubjectivation, one would
have to give up the status of the subject altogether. (19)
Thus, it is precisely this object that eludes Descartes’ search for certainty and that is
destined to manifest itself in such a guise as God, this guise being Descartes’
(unconscious) strategy for crossing the bar and ensuring the self-transparency of thought
in relation to being. Significantly, the very gesture of introducing God in order to
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‘complete’ the subject is already a choice of thought over being insofar as it is a particular
idea of God that is introduced in order for being to make sense.
We can trace this elusive core of being back to Lacan’s 1949 paper, “The Mirror Stage
as Formative of the / Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience” where he
hinges the entire drama of the infant’s entry into language on a “certain dehiscence at the
very heart of the organism, a primordial Discord betrayed by the signs of malaise and
motor uncoordination of the neonatal months” (78). It is in the context of this “primordial
Discord” at the core of the human organism that predestines the assumption of the
specular image of the other in the form of an identification. To be sure, the mirror stage is
most often thought of in the context of the imaginary, however, it is precisely this
identification with the specular other (that must indeed be situated in the imaginary) that
sets the stage for the subject’s entry into language, that “situates the agency known as the
ego ...in a fictional direction that will forever remain irreducible to any single individual”
(76; my emphasis). The signifier will enter here, in the gap that emerges between
“insufficiency” and “anticipation”, between the identification with the specular image
through which the infant anticipates a mastery, and the insufficiency of its present state of
being (78). We can read this oscillation from insufficiency to anticipation as leading
toward an oscillation between the non-sense of being and the establishing some
semblance of sense in thought via the (imaginary) unity of the ego. In this way, the forced
choice of the subject is, at its core, a repetition of this drama of the mirror stage.
The crux of Freud’s “Negation” concerns this very choice, the terms of which are
discovered through the suspension of the negation. The philosopher Jean Hyppolite, who
gave a presentation on “Negation” in Lacan’s seminar of 1953-54, stresses that negation
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is, for Freud, “a mode of presenting what one is in the mode of not being it” (747). The
ego is sustained in its ‘I am’ qua subject of the enunciation only against the background
of the ‘I am not’, for there is, too, a trace of the subject’s being in these signifiers found in
the field Freud designates as negation, a field which he connects up to the repressed as
amounting to “a way of taking cognizance of what is repressed; indeed, it is already a
lifting of the repression, though not, of course, an acceptance of what is repressed” (235
6). Thus does a statement such as “You ask who the person in my dream is, it is not my
mother” follows a very peculiar logic in which an avowal and a denial converge in
passing through the analyst qua Other, the sujet suppose savoir who functions for the
speaker of this statement as the subject who is supposedly mistaken/deceived. As a
signifier, ‘mother’ is seen here functioning as a place holder for the desire of the Other,
which is encroaching upon the subject, tries to reject, to cast out by way of his or her
negation; in doing so, however, the subject at the same time brings this desire into
existence, marking its place with a signifier, and shapes it according to his own image.
Are we to suppose, then, following Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, that the “subject is the
other, . . . the same as the other” (“Freudian Subject” 62), that “the subject continues to
subsist in the representation of its lack, in the closed combinative of signifiers in which it
stubbornly continues to self-represent itself, always vanishing but always, upon
disappearance, reemerging” (64)? On the contrary,
it follows from the basic property of the signifier that it can never be counted for
one; “one” signifier already counts for two, because the empty place of its absence
also counts. Differentiality, the Saussurean definition of the signifier has to be
extended to the point where the signifier differs from itself: ultimately, it is the
difference between itself and the void of its absence. Once we find ourselves in
the realm of the Symbolic, there is never a simple absence or an innocent lack,
and this invisible “missing half’ that inherently sticks to the signifier is for Lacan
precisely the place to which the subject can be "pinned" [.] (Dolar 16)
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Borch-Jacobsen’s (fundamentally paranoiac) criticism is founded upon a structural
impossibility that conflates the imaginary and the symbolic. In order to follow this logic,
we would have to suppose not only that a signifier is capable of carrying some kind of
signified content in-and-of-itself (which contradicts the very definition of a signifier) but
that this (impossible) signified content is reducible to the signifier itself, that it can
represent itself, be counted as one. However, the signifier is not a representation of lack,
but rather what Lacan calls, in his translation of Freud’s Vorstellungsreprasentanz, a
“representative of the representation”: it is, in a nutshell, the very lack which opens up the
space for representation, which makes representation possible. Thus, the dimension of the
“representation of its lack” in itself is impossible; every signification is, on the contrary,
at its most fundamental, a representation of lack: the minimal, nonsensical founding
gesture of assuming the lack, of submitting oneself to the signifier’s unfolding24. This
dimension of freely assuming the signifier is precisely what is at stake in Freud’s
“Negation”. In saying, “it’s not my mother” or “You think I mean to insult you”, the
patient betrays in the negation the very fact that he has already made a choice, has already
submitted to the necessity of the signifier, in the very act of speaking. Against the
background of the radical negativity of the void, the signifier cannot but appear in its
necessity. Thus, the question underlying the interpretive procedure of psychoanalysis is,
precisely: why did the patient say that and not something else? Out of all the things the
patient could have said—indeed the infinite possibilities—why did he or she choose to
say that? The moment of speaking involves a choice that has always-already been made.

24 I follow here the logic that Zizek outlines in The Parallax View (MIT Press, 2006):
“The subject’s elementary, founding, gesture is to submit oneself (17).
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Thus, for language to refer to anything requires, minimally, that it be supplemented by
a choice. The lesson of psychoanalysis is that language is not something that exists ‘out
there’, over-and-against the individuals that put it to use: objet petit a means, at its most
elementary, that the signifier is caught up in the real of the human organism, the blind,
palpitating flesh. After all, a brain supports this so-called deep feeling of ‘inwardness’
that we call the mind, and the brain is part o f the body itself. In this way, Freud’s entire
oeuvre—starting with his 1891 book on aphasia, which will introduce him to the strange
relationship of signification to brain function through the patterns evident in disturbances
of speech due to physical damage to the brain—can be read as an attempt to discover how
meaning and signification emerges from this organismic, fleshy thing we call the
‘human’. He notices similar disturbances of speech in neurotics who have nothing
physically wrong with their brains. Psychoanalysis, then, at its most fundamental, is
concerned with the understanding and treatment of the peculiar phenomenon of
psychosomatic aphasia. What, then, of the founder of psychoanalysis, Freud himself?
Certainly he cannot be placed outside of the circuit of signification, constituting
psychoanalysis from this safe, neutral position. Chapter two will examine not only how
the analyst influences psychoanalytic treatment (whether consciously or unconsciously)
but how this influence is unavoidable and constitutive of the treatment itself.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Development o f Psychoanalysis & the Enigma o f the Other

Having characterized neurosis as a psychosomatic aphasia, with which we emphasize
the peculiar dimension of a body in/of language, that is, the fact that language does not
refer transparently to the external world but that a piece of being—objet petit a—is
caught up in the signifier, let us now turn to the development of Freud’s technique. Our
aim in doing so is to dramatize this piece of being caught in the signifier vis-à-vis the
theory of psychoanalysis itself, Freud’s theory. I say dramatize, of course, and not
represent, for the objet a does not yield to us a signification, only signifiers. Moreover,
we cannot provide here an exhaustive account of the development of psychoanalysis, as it
is found in Freud’s works. We will, however, touch its key themes: the emergence of the
concept of resistance in Studies in Hysteria out of Freud’s abandonment of hypnotic
suggestion; the subsequent attention given to transference following Freud’s failure with
his patient, Dora; and the question of the cure (the end or ultimate aim of analysis, at least
from the point of view of the patient). Both resistance and transference emerge as
theoretical concepts in their own right out of the problem of the analyst’s effect on the
analysis; in other words, resistance and transference are each concepts through which
psychoanalysis opens onto to question the Other, specifically that Other which the analyst
comes to be for the patient, which is to say, the symbolic guises in which the analyst
appears to the analysand as itself a discourse (transference) that emerges from and tries to
contend with the failure of speech (resistance). Each is named, one after another,
following a series of eruptions that the state of Freud’s theoretical apparatus at the time of
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their emergence cannot contain. Thus, each arrives on the scene, as it were, accompanied
by a sense of failure. Here we have a dimension of signification not unlike the neurotic’s
discourse. This point is not insignificant insofar as psychoanalysis itself is in the
beginning the discourse of Freud, who, after all, cannot himself be outside the continuum
of the normal and the pathological.
In this way, we are specifically concerned in this chapter with the idea of
psychoanalysis as praxis. What are we to make of the theoretical apparatus through which
Freud desired to constitute a body of knowledge? This question reveals, particularly with
the word desire necessary to its grammatical construction, that psychoanalysis is nothing
if not the realization of Freud’s desire in the sense that our analysis in chapter one gives
to the term: not as a representation o f a lack, but rather a signification produced by an
encounter with the signifiers emanating from a lack, encircling the lack in being—what
Lacan refers to in The Four Fundamental Concepts as manqué-à-être, or “want-to-be”
(29)—which drives the human, sometimes with a certain urgency, to speak.
Freud spoke, and founded psychoanalysis. To be sure, that was not all there was to it;
there had to be Others who played their part in recognizing this knowledge, not the least
among them Wilhelm Fliess, Freud’s confidant, and later Jung, who was Freud’s protégé
for a time, to say nothing of the members of the International Psychoanalytic Association,
the institution that Freud founded to ensure the continuation of this knowledge. But
nevertheless, the question needs to be asked: insofar as we have come to understand, in
chapter one, objet petit a as a bit of being caught up in the signifier, insofar as we have
determined that reference is caught up in this piece of being which is the absent place,
from the point of view of the symbolic, of the subject, what should we make, then, of
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psychoanalysis as (originally) Freud’s speech? To be sure, this question as a whole is too
large for the present work, but in gesturing toward it by way of the themes that we have
singled out above, it will afford us a different view of the relationship between resistance
and reference, two concepts that concern, ultimately, nothing less than the limit of
psychoanalytic knowledge itself.
The Opening of/to Resistance

The development of psychoanalysis begins in hypnosis. Freud describes his break with
hypnosis in Studies on Hysteria as having to do with two factors: (1) that some patients
diagnosed as hysteric proved not amenable to the hypnotic treatment; (2) that some
patients that “no one could have mistaken for hysterics]”, whose symptoms exhibited
“genuine obsessional ideas...without a single trait which recalled hysteria”, could also be
treated with Breuer’s ‘cathartic method’ (256). This would otherwise be unremarkable
except that one of the main tenets of Breuer and Freud’s theory of hysteria up to this point
was that “the basis and sine qua non of hysteria is the existence of hypnoid states” (12),
which Freud’s experience seemed here to disprove. His abandonment of hypnosis, then,
occurs in the first place over a dispute about “what essentially characterized hysteria”
(256). His experience led him to assume that something else was at the root of the
hysteric’s illness and not, as Breuer would have it, a pathological state inherent to the
hysterical disposition. Thus, what paved the way for resistance began as a problem of
nosology. Freud’s abandonment of hypnosis was motivated by the calling into question of
the theoretical underpinnings of Breuer’s method.
As early as 1888, in the preface to his translation of Hippolyte Bemheim’s book, De
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La Suggestion, we see that Freud was well versed in the opposing views regarding the
efficacy of hypnosis, which was understood as having either a physiological or a
psychical foundation:
One party...maintains that all the phenomena of hypnotism have the same origin:
they arise, that is, from a suggestion, a conscious idea, which has been introduced
into the brain of the hypnotized person by an external influence and has been
accepted by him as though it had arisen spontaneously. On this view all hypnotic
manifestations would be psychical phenomena, effects of suggestions. The other
party, on the contrary, stand by the view that the mechanism of some at least of
the manifestations of hypnotism is based upon physiological changes—that is,
upon displacements of excitability in the nervous system, occurring without the
participation of those parts of it which operate with consciousness; they speak,
therefore, of the physical or physiological phenomena of hypnosis. (77)
Freud’s own understanding of hypnosis was on the side of suggestion25, as evidenced by
his break with Breuer over the latter’s idea of ‘hypnoid states’, which cannot be detached
from an explanation of hysteria that involves an innate disposition. The realization that
Breuer’s ‘cathartic method’ was unreliable (as far as hysterics’ amenability to hypnosis
was concerned) prompted Freud to view such a lack of amenability as a significant
phenomenon in its own right, one worth taking into account at the level of technique,
caught up as it was in his own deficient skill as a hypnotist. Already, then, Freud’s break
with Breuer’s method also exhibits a certain attunement to the fact that suggestive
influence is part-and-parcel of an intersubjective situation in which the doctor and the
patient are involved.
Resistance, then, emerges as the inverse of suggestion, which conceals the Otherness

25 This point is corroborated in Freud’s short paper, “Hypnosis”, where he makes
numerous references to the efficacy of hypnotic treatment’s dependence on the
“physician’s influence”, describing at one point how some patients guard themselves “by
not allowing [themselves] to be hypnotized by any physician who does not seem to
deserve the fullest confidence” (107). Freud’s advice here, for the most part, follows the
theme of establishing and maintaining a certain authority vis-à-vis the patient that allows
the patient to put his or her trust in the physician.

61

of the Other—a ‘successful’ hypnosis is successful only to the extent that it hides the
position of the Other behind the charisma of the hypnotist. In Lacan’s apt words, the
hypnotist “attempts to make an object of the subject...to make him supple as a glove”
{Seminar 1 27). Conversely, resistance has the effect of bringing the subject’s relation to
the Other into play as an enigma, as an indeterminate presence. This shifts the emphasis
of therapeutic technique, in Freud’s view, to one of “knowing how to conquer” the
resistance so that the patient can “integrate what the resistances [separate] him from”
(27).
Freud describes this method of ‘conquering’ the resistance as requiring a counter
effort on his part, which he describes as ‘insistence' :
if I assured them that they did know [what originally occasioned their symptom],
that it would occur to their minds, - then, in the first cases, something did actually
occur to them, and, in the others [i.e. those patients that already could describe
what originally occasioned their symptom without further prompting from Freud],
their memory went a step further. After this I became still more insistent; I told the
patients to lie down and deliberately close their eyes in order to ‘concentrate’ - all
of which had at least some resemblance to hypnosis....Experiences like this made
me think that it would be possible for the pathogenic groups of ideas, that were
after all certainly present, to be brought to light by mere insistence; and since this
insistence involved effort on my part and so suggested the idea that I had to
overcome a resistance, the situation led me at once to the theory that by means o f
my psychical work I had to overcome a psychical force in the patients which was
opposed to the pathogenic ideas becoming conscious (being remembered). A new
understanding seemed to open before my eyes when it occurred to me that this
must no doubt be the same psychical force that had played a part in the generating
of the hysterical symptom and had at the time prevented the pathogenic idea from
becoming conscious. (268)
Through this method, Freud situates himself in the position of bearing the burden of his
patients’ resistance. By not using any direct suggestion, thereby foregrounding this
‘psychical force’ that prevents certain ideas from becoming conscious, it is he that must
attempt to overcome it by way of insistence, which amounts to mobilizing the weight of
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his authority26 toward diminishing the patient’s doubt about the significance (not to
mention the existence) of his or her recollections.
Freud tells us, moreover, that this ‘psychical force’ makes its appearance alongside
certain ‘pathogenic ideas’. These ideas are “of a distressing nature, calculated to arouse
the affects of shame, of self-reproach, and of psychical pain, and the feeling of being
harmed; they were all of a kind that one would prefer not to have experienced, that one
would rather forget” (269). By way of resistance, we come to a crossroad of affect and
idea. We see that a psychical idea does not exist in a vacuum, but that a certain quantum
of affect is always attached to it which seeks to discharge itself and whose discharge
brings about the manifestation of an idea. The idea is the (qualitative) manifestation of
this (quantitative) discharge. This ‘affective’ side of resistance brings into focus the
organismic dimension of the human being, which accompanies the problem of the
recollection of memories in the presence of another. Such are the dynamics of resistance.
B um ping Up A gainst the Transference

The significance of resistance lies in the way in which it reveals an indeterminate,
enigmatic link to the Other, where suggestion elided it. In this way, that which Freud
recognized as a ‘psychical force’ is nothing other than a certain gap or hole in the
patient’s discourse, a hole that Freud attempts to compensate for with what he calls
‘insistence’. This method involves, as Freud is well aware, a kind of light hypnosis, which
amounts to introducing a strategic, controlled transferential relationship built on a

261 do not mean some kind of ‘personal’ authority but an authority that is structural in this
doctor-patient relationship, something akin to what Lacan calls ‘the subject supposed to
know’.
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foundation of authority that Freud tries to convey. He does not recognize what he is doing
as manipulating the transference (since he had no idea of the significance of transference
at this point), but that is what it is. He tells us that he supplements his insistence with a
physical application “of pressure to the forehead” (270), which, as he is perfectly aware,
is pure artifice: “a pressure on the forehead like this could be replaced by any other signal
or by some other exercise of physical influence on the patient; but since the patient is
lying in front of me, pressure on his forehead, or taking his head between my two hands,
seems to be the most convenient way of applying suggestion for the purpose I have in
view” (271).
Freud supplements his insistence with this ‘pressure technique’ because he discovers
that assurances such as, “‘of course you know if, ‘tell me all the same’, ‘you’ll think of it
in a moment’ do not carry us very far. Even with patients in a state of ‘concentration’ the
thread breaks off after a few sentences” (270). Breaks of this kind indicate to him that
there is something else at play in this relation between the patient and the therapist, that
his statements are not reducible to the level of the subject of the enunciated; they need to
be lent a specific weight from the position of the enunciation, the position from which
Freud speaks or, more accurately, from which the patient hears him. By occupying this
place, his insistence can take root and affect the resistance. He tells us, rather flatly, that
insistence “on the part of a strange doctor who is unfamiliar with what is happening is not
powerful enough to deal with the resistance to association in a serious case of hysteria”
(270). Indeed, Freud is not unaware that both this ‘pressure technique’ and hypnosis
involve a certain “influence...on the part of the doctor” and that, moreover, it is a “sine
qua non to a solution of the problem” of resistance (266). Here we see his first attempts to
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situate his utterances in the position of a sujet supposé savoir, which involve, instead of a
spontaneous unfolding of the transference, an active manipulation of it in a strategic but
limited way, in order to facilitate in overcoming the resistance.
Freud’s first mention of the transference occurs near the end of Studies on Hysteria
where he describes three scenarios in which his ‘pressure technique’ fails. In each of
these it is clear that the specific mode of this failure involves a certain disturbance in the
doctor/patient relationship, a resistance to his manipulation of the transference. Of these,
Freud highlights one specific disturbance which involves the
transferring on to the figure of the physician the distressing ideas which arise from
the content of the analysis. This is a frequent, and indeed in some analyses a
regular, occurrence. Transference on to the physician takes place through a false
connection....The content of [a] wish had appeared first of all in the patient’s
consciousness without any memories of the surrounding circumstances which
would have assigned it to a past time. The wish which was present then, owing to
the compulsion to associate which was dominant in her consciousness, linked to
my person, with which the patient was legitimately concerned; and as the result of
this mésalliance - which I describe as a ‘false connection’ - the same affect was
provoked which had forced the patient long before to repudiate this forbidden
wish. (302-3)
The ‘pressure technique’ fails in this situation owing to the patient’s thoughts having to
do with Freud himself. He surmises, however, that these thoughts do not really have
anything to do with him, but reveal a distressing idea that cannot find its way directly into
consciousness and thus finds a means of expression by attaching itself to the Other qua
physician, or, more specifically, something in the past is confused with the present here
and now of the analytic situation.
Such an attachment facilitates a resistance that cannot be overcome by Freud’s
manipulation of the transference, because it is directly implicated in his technique:
In one of my patients the origin of a particular hysterical symptom lay in a wish,
which she had had many years earlier and had at once relegated to the
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unconscious, that the man she was talking to at the time might boldly take the
initiative and give her a kiss. On one occasion, at the end of a session, a similar
wish came up in her about me. She was horrified at it, spent a sleepless night, and
at the next session, though she did not refuse to be treated, was quite useless for
work. (303)
Having been unable to properly remember, to properly historicize this experience, the
patient symbolizes it through the very means that Freud uses in order to get the patient to
speak—his person. What could have otherwise been a simple, detached association of the
form, ‘I had these feelings for this person’ facilitates resistance by implicating the
presence of the analyst, becoming transformed into the statement, ‘I have these feelings
■ j'j

for you’ . Freud, to his credit, recognizes here that the patient’s desire is aimed
elsewhere than his person, that he occupies the symbolic position of the Other apropos of
the patient’s psychic reality. He very well could have taken this patient’s mode of
expression as having some straightforward correspondence to some ‘objective’ state of
things, repudiating the wish as vile and unacceptable. Instead, he views it as signifying
something, the meaning of which remains indeterminate.
The transference recognized by Freud in the failure of his technique reveals to us,
nevertheless, the hint of a social relation playing out spontaneously in the present. It
involves certain features of the analytic situation through which a part of the patient’s
history is expressed that otherwise cannot be put into words. As Lacan notes:27

27 As Freud will point out in his 1912 paper, “The Dynamics of the Transference”: “it is
evident that it becomes particularly hard to admit to any proscribed wishful impulse if it
has to be revealed in front of the very person to whom the impulse relates. Such a
necessity [in the analytic situation to say everything that comes to mind] gives rise to
situations which in the real world would scarcely seem possible”, because, of course, we
can choose to keep these wishful impulses secret (104). Freud also explores the
consequences of keeping these wishful impulses from another in his example of the
forgetting of the word ‘Signorelli’ in The Psychopathology o f Everyday Life. See Chapter
1 (pages 1 to 7 in Volume 6 of the Standard Edition).
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at the level of neurosis, which brought about the discovery of the realm of the
Freudian unconscious qua register of memory, our good fellow, instead of using
words, uses everything at his disposal—he empties his pockets, he turns his trousers
inside out, he puts his functions, his inhibitions inside, he gets completely inside
himself, with the signifier, it’s he who becomes the signifier. His real, or his
imaginary, enters the discourse. (Seminar III 155)
Transference involves remembering in the guise of repeating, a remembering at the level
of being as opposed to in speech. If this is the case apropos of the failure of the ‘pressure
technique’, and if, as I have claimed, transference is still at play even when it is
successful, then what kind of repetition might be involved in the latter?
Jonathan Lear emphasizes the way in which the ‘success’ of Freud’s ‘pressure
technique’ depended on how well it reinforced a certain pre-existing, invisible (social)
relation of doctor and patient, within which the patient’s associations are situated. Freud
“conceptualizes the transference in such a way as to preserve the standard image of the
doctor-patient relationship” in a way that “reassures the doctor that, really, this has
nothing to do with him” (119). As Lear puts it, the transference
also include[s] the social world of both patient and doctor. In this case, the social
world is tum-of-the-century Vienna, with its mores, artifacts and other
manifestations of European culture. The social world must be included in the
assumed background because the possibility of Freud recognizing this moment as
transference requires that he see it as abnormal. (119)
If a disruption of this ‘social world’ is what is foregrounded in Freud’s initial recognition
of the transference, we might say that the pressure technique’s success consisted in a
manipulation of the transference such that it reinforced and maintained the harmony of
the doctor-patient relationship peculiar to this social world: it says to the patient, ‘you
may not want to reveal to just anyone your most intimate thoughts, but I am a doctor and
the treatment demands it.’ So long as the manifest content of these thoughts do not refer
directly to the analyst, which would breach the unspoken contract, the ‘pressure
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technique’ seemed to be enough to reinforce the doctor-patient relationship and thereby
encourage the patient to speak.
However, when Freud’s technique ‘worked’, it did not provide any way for him to
discern the underlying process, the source of its efficacy. We should note here the
connection that Freud’s pressure technique has with the problem of mastery, which we
noted in chapter one as being significant in his forgetting of the word Signorelli. Freud is
blind to the way that the transference operates even at the level of the successful
functioning of his technique owing to the stock he places in assuming the position of the
sujet supposé savoir in order to facilitate the patient’s associations. In this way, he
occupies by way of his technique the position of a subject of certainty vis-à-vis the
patient’s “conscious searching and reflecting” (271)—in a word, the patient’s doubt. It is
in consciously occupying this place of the sujet supposé savoir that Freud is able to bring
about in the patient the confidence that the first thing that comes to mind will indeed be
what is significant, that there is no need to apply any judgment to it because it has already
been determined in advance, regardless of its content, to be exactly what Freud, the
authority on the matter, is looking for. At the same time, what is crucial is that the
‘pressure technique’ does not determine the meaning of the material, but only breaks
through the patient’s resistance to bringing it to the surface through the medium of
speech, so that it can be worked over. The fact remains, though, that Freud’s early
technique was conceived of in terms of a problem of mastery, of how to master the
patient’s doubt; his overlooking of a transference that continued to function even when he
seemed to achieve the mastery required by the resistance was to have a profound effect on
his practice.
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The Pathogenic N ucleus in F reud’s First Schem as o f the Psychic Apparatus

Early in Seminar /, Lacan draws attention to a rather intriguing image first evoked by
Freud in Studies on Hysteria in order to schematize the relationship of resistance to what
he (Freud) calls the pathogenic nucleus lying beyond or ‘outside’ ordinary consciousness.
It does not enter the purview of the (conscious) ego directly but has very profound effects
at the level of its structure. Lacan invites us to imagine a “stream of parallel words, and
these broaden out at a certain moment to encompass this famous pathogenic nucleus
which itself is also a story, they move away from it in order to include it and join up a
little further on” (22). If the pathogenic nucleus is a story, it is one that gets the psyche
rather riled, to the extent that it causes the chain of signifiers (the “stream of parallel
words” described above), which would otherwise tell this story, to split apart the closer
one gets to it in a way that is rather unpredictable. Only one part of the story gets told (to
consciousness). In fact, in chapter one, we encountered an arrangement similar to the one
Lacan describes here, in Freud’s metapsychological paper, “The Unconscious”:
the conscious presentation [Vorstellung] of the object [is]...split up into the
presentation of the word and the presentation of the thing [Sachvorstellung]; the
latter consists in the cathexis, if not the direct memory-images of the thing, at least
of remoter memory-traces derived from these. We now seem to know all at once
what the difference is between a conscious and an unconscious presentation. The
two are not, as we supposed, different registrations of the same content in
different psychical localities, nor yet different functional states of cathexis in the
same locality; but the conscious presentation comprises the presentation o f the
thing plus the presentation o f the word belonging to it, while the unconscious
presentation is the presentation o f the thing alone. (201; my emphasis)
Here again we have this object, “split” into parallel word- and thing-presentations, whose
joining comprises a conscious presentation. But are we to suppose, then, that should we
be able to restore the two chains, we would have the full story? As we have already
examined in the previous chapter, this might be the case if consciousness were a
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representation of the unconscious, in a manner no doubt that writing, according to
Derrida, is thought to ‘represent’ speech; in which case, the psychoanalytic cure could be
defined as the moment when the unconscious could finally be put into words. Here we
would arrive at precisely the dimension Borch-Jacobsen singles out as the representation
o f the lack. However much Freud may have desired a cure such as this in the beginning,
as is evidenced by what he felt the aim of analysis was at the time of Studies on
Hysteria—to ‘conquer the resistances’ and restore the chain of signifiers to
consciousness—this was never to be effected so long as he had to contend with this
pathogenic nucleus. As early as 1895, in what is considered to be one of the founding
texts of psychoanalytic experience, Freud had already stumbled upon psychoanalysis’
ultimate obstacle, Das Ding/objet petit a, the very place or lack from which the subject
speaks.
Freud introduces the pathogenic nucleus amidst his theorization of the pathological
organization of memories, which his (pre-psychoanalytic) technique aims to impact. This
was his first attempt to formulate in words what the data that was made available to him
by applying his technique implied about the organization of the psyche. Significantly,
Robert Leventhal points out in his study on German hermeneutics that Freud articulates a
relation “between the nucleus and the surrounding mnemic material, as well as that
between the types of ordering this material must be subjected to, not as a relation between
depth and surface, but as a relation precisely of linear-chronological, concentric, and
logical ‘stratification,’ as a surface archive or group of files that encompasses the
nucleus” {Disciplines o f Interpretation 317). Leventhal situates Freud within an anti
hermeneutical tradition that “dispensed with the classical hermeneutic assumption of
)
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there being a deep ‘meaning’ or sense beneath the surface of the text” (311). This tension
between textual representation and the thing represented, a fundamental tension at work
in psychoanalytic theory about language, plays out also at the level of Freud’s own
attempted schematization. He was no doubt aware of this, noting that the series of similes
that he presents us with in this section “have only a very limited resemblance to [the]
subject and...are incompatible with one another” insofar as the psychic apparatus is a
“highly complicated topic which has never yet been represented” (Studies 291). This
section deserves our attention because the logic of Freud’s three schemas will continue to
be elaborated throughout his entire oeuvre. It represents an attempt, as Leventhal
suggests, to ‘read’ the unconscious in a fundamentally new way, not as a well-spring of
already existing meaning concealed under the surface text, but following a linear,
temporal logic better represented by movement along a Mobius strip, where one always
ends up on the same side as one started from. Meanings are secondary; what matters is
following the chain of associations, that is, the path of the signifiers.
A peculiar structure of memory in language, then, emerges from the beginning of
Freud’s researches into neurosis in the form of a thematic organization of memory.
Language does not relate to memory as surface to depth, as representation to thing; the
point is not that the patient’s narration represents his or her memories qua some ‘depth’
of the psyche or essence of his or her being. Rather, memories are grouped in the first
place according to a theme. What emerges is an autonomy of the signifying chain, a
“distribution of the sensible”, to use Rancière’s apt phrase28 (12). Memories qua images

28 Rancière calls the distribution of the sensible “the system of self-evident facts of sense
perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common and the
delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within it. A distribution of the
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or ideas accessible to consciousness are distributed according to the logic of signification
peculiar to the subject. Thus, in Freud’s first schema, memories are arranged in a
metonymic, linear-chronological order stemming from a theme, which is itself a
metaphor—the example he uses is the theme of Breuer’s patient, Anna O.’s deafness,
which we will examine in more detail in the next section, becomes a metaphorical
substitution for her father. The theme of deafness was “differentiated according to seven
sets of determinants, and under each of these seven headings ten to over a hundred
memories were collected in chronological series” (288). ‘Deafness’ itself expresses a
metaphorical relation to some thing, which is lacking any other means of signification—
for what is a father, in the end, but a thing of which no signification can grasp the
essence? As metaphor, ‘deafness’ is the trace of a symptom, produced by an otherwise
unsignifiable conflict or antagonism in the subject’s history; it is thus not so much as a
representation but as a representative of something that otherwise cannot be integrated
into the structure of Anna O.’s experience, pointing to a limit in her mode of relating to
the world through the Other, specifically, the Other’s desire. For the world is not only
‘out there’, but also concerns how we relate to it in language, how it is represented to us
through language, which implicates other beings, who also belong to the world and who,
along with us, comprise the social.
Contained within this thematic organization of experience, there is an implicit theory
of the structural organization of memory that has to do with forming memories and not

sensible therefore establishes at one and the same time something common that is shared
and exclusive parts” {The Politics o f Aesthetics 12). To my mind, there is no better way to
describe speech in the analytic setting, the words that are shared in common between
patient and analyst, and that organize sense-perception into something communicable to
another always at the same time has at its foundation something that cannot be said or that
the patient does not want to say.
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just simply accessing them. The theme as an ‘empty’ signifier, metaphorizing something
in experience that cannot otherwise be symbolized, exerts a kind of gravitational pull on
fresh perceptual experiences, foregrounding some at the expense of others. The theme
exhibits the contours of objects whose constellation comprises the subject’s economy of
sense. We remember certain initially perceptual material because they can be linked
associatively to something else according to a certain logic or pattern.
In the second schema, we get a better idea of the associative arrangement of mnemic
material along a continuum from most to least conscious. The themes by which memories
are grouped in meaningful relation to one another are “stratified concentrically round the
pathogenic nucleus” (288). The “most peripheral strata contain the memories (or files),
which, belonging to different themes, are easily remembered and always have been
clearly conscious”, which is to say that immediate consciousness, accessible through the
subject’s immediate (spoken) associations, is characterized by a proliferation of themes,
whose traces can in turn be followed to the deeper strata. These memories at the periphery
of consciousness are overdetermined with respect to their themes; associations at this
level condense a large array of thematic material.
It is crucial to point out here that this way of understanding the relationship between
theme, memory and nucleus avoids situating the nucleus as some kind of originary
‘cause’ in a straightforwardly deterministic causal chain. The second schema exhibits a
dispersal of themes along different strata that should be considered as permutations
issuing from an embryonic structure, a densely packed knot or tangle of memories. While
there is no doubt that this is the core from which all subsequent significations emanate,
there is no way to predict from this core the form that these significations will take. It is
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all content and no form, and as such, the content is radically inaccessible, ««conscious.
Quite literally, this core is a bunch of non-sense, a bundle of non-sense, what will become
the Oedipus complex: the non-sense from which sense emanates. For, after all, what can
the Oedipus complex be, in the end, but non-sense? There exists a father and a mother,
who together conceived a child—what can this strange origin of the subject possibly
mean!
While speech is not a dimension manifestly recognized by Freud, when we read him
with it in mind, a meaning is foregrounded that was hitherto obscured in Freud’s ‘third
arrangement’ of the pathogenic material:
What I have in mind is an arrangement according to thought-content, the linkage
made by a logical thread which reaches as far as the nucleus and tends to take an
irregular and twisting path, different in every case. This arrangement has a dynamic
character, in contrast to the morphological one of the two stratifications mentioned
previously [and discussed above]. While these two would be represented in a spatial
diagram by a continuous line, curved or straight, the course of the logical chain
would have to be indicated by a broken line which would pass along the most
roundabout paths from the surface to the deepest layers and back, and yet would in
general advance from the periphery to the central nucleus, touching at every
intermediate halting-place - a line resembling a ziz-zag[.]... The logical chain
corresponds not only to a zig-zag, twisted line, but rather to a ramifying system of
lines and more particularly to a converging one. It contains nodal points at which
two or more threads meet and thereafter proceed as one; and as a rule several
threads which run independently, or which are connected at various points by sidepaths, debouch into the nucleus. (289-90)
Do we not have here a perfect schematization of how Freud as listener attempts to follow
(the path of) the speech presented by his patient at the level of its signification? The
meaning of the subject’s speech here resonates on the many levels of Freud’s concentric
model simultaneously, although the speaker does not recognize many of these meanings.
The signifiers of the subject’s (spoken) discourse zig-zag throughout the structure,
spinning a kind of delicate web of connections to the various levels, situating him or her,
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qua subject, at many levels simultaneously within the psychic apparatus. We might say
that Lacan’s focus on speech foregrounds the dimension of the speaking situation implied
in Freud’s early reflections on technique by naming it as such, so that it could be thought
as a concept in its own right.
The Unconscious is the Discourse o f the Other

It is, of course, a characteristic of case histories that they are a product of their praxis,
that is, they are limited by the state of the theorist’s knowledge and the influence this
knowledge has on his or her actions; regarding the case histories presented in the Studies,
their value is in the fact that they are written up at a time when there was very little
knowledge about hysteria. In this way we witness the development of a symbolicimaginary structure emerging out of an almost absolute darkness of the real, they are the
products of two doctors who come face-to-face with some bizarre phenomena and grope
around in the dark for a way to explain it at a time when theoretical frameworks for a
‘psychosomatic’ view of hysteria were only beginning to materialize.
How then, finally, is the pathogenic nucleus “also a story”? We find in Breuer’s casehistory of Anna O., whom we will call by her real name, Bertha Pappenheim, support for
the thesis that the pathogenic nucleus is the story of the Other. In this nucleus, subject and
Other meet around an enigma. At the furthest limit of signification, in the presence of the
Other who functions as the representative of the outside, who holds the place of the
outside of signification, there are no signifiers that can account for this radically
indeterminate place. The subject must thus contend only with a reconfiguration, through
metonymy and metaphor, of the signifiers already at his or her disposal in order to signify
this strange place outside of the ego, marked by the Other. Interestingly, we get the most
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radical confirmation of the Derridian thesis that “there is no outside of the text” in the
Lacanian axioms, “the unconscious is the discourse of the Other” and “desire is the
Other’s desire”. At the furthest limit of signification, there is only a desire, that appears to
come from the outside and that is written in a language comprised of a reordering of one’s
own signifiers.
Let us, then, examine the passage from Breuer’s case study of Bertha Pappenheim that
Freud refers to in his theorization of the pathogenic nucleus. Here we can see at least in
part how what Freud calls the “theme” of deafness is a metaphor organized around the
enigma of the father.
[i]t was our regular experience that the patient did not hear when she was spoken
to. It was possible to differentiate this passing habit of not hearing as follows:
(a) Not hearing when someone came in, while her thoughts were abstracted.
108 separate detailed instances of this, mentioning the persons and circumstances,
often with dates. First instance: not hearing her father come in.
(b) Not understanding when several people were talking. 27 instances. First
instance: her father, once more, and an acquaintance.
(c) Not hearing when she was alone and directly addressed. 50 instances.
Origin: her father having vainly asked her for some wine.
(d) Deafness brought on by being shaken (in a carriage, etc). 15 Instances.
Origin: having been shaken angrily by her young brother when he caught her one
night listening at the [her father’s] sick-room door.
(e) Deafness brought on by fright at a noise. 37 instances. Origin: a choking fit
o f her father’s, caused by swallowing the wrong way. (36; my emphasis)
This recurrence of the figure of the father at the ‘origin’ of Pappenheim’s symptom tells
us a little something about the social nature of Pappenheim’s symptoms. Breuer is kneedeep in the transference and does not know it, something that Freud is said to have
recognized in retrospect with a comment to the effect that Breuer ‘held the key in his
hand’. The result is that Pappenheim’s memories are structured around the enigma of
Breuer’s presence qua Other, indeed her symptoms are realized through his presence, her
desire mobilized through the ‘game’ being played between them, without either of them
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recognizing it: Pappenheim’s illness was, indeed, “as real (as surreal) as they get—until
the day she decided that this sterile and desperate game was no longer worth the trouble”
(Borch-Jacobsen 92).
We see in this excerpt from Breuer’s case history that deafness is Pappenheim’s
symptom, which holds together in metaphorical relation a constellation of elements all
pointing back to this signifier, father, through which Pappenheim contends with the
enigma of Breuer’s doting presence: is he an object o f satisfaction or not!29 Pappenheim
returns to the theme of the father in order to find some way to symbolize, to come to
terms with, Breuer’s enigmatic Otherness. We find further confirmation of this strange
short-circuit that occurs between the father and Breuer in Breuer’s own case history, even
though he does not explicitly recognize his own role or relation to it. Breuer finds himself
in this place purely circumstantially, a simple matter of him being in the wrong place at
the right time; out of this contingency emerged a necessity, a structure that played out to a
logical end since Breuer had the theoretical means at his disposal neither to recognize
what was happening, nor to intervene productively.
Pappenheim’s illness emerges around the time that she is nursing her father, of whom,
Breuer describes, “she was passionately fond” (22). During her father’s illness, she
devoted her whole energy to nursing her father, and no one was much surprised
when by degrees her own health greatly deteriorated. No one, perhaps not even
the patient herself knew what was happening to her, but eventually the state of

291 am referring here to Freud’s disputation over Breuer’s observation, early in the case
history, that the “element of sexuality was astonishingly undeveloped in her”, which he
refers to in a footnote in Three Essays on the Theory o f Sexuality {Studies 21). In the same
section in which the footnote appears, Freud surmises, in a way that might point toward
an understanding why this transference emerges in response to Breuer’s person:
“Between the pressure of the instinct and his antagonism to sexuality, illness offers him a
way of escape. It does not solve his conflict, but seeks to evade it by transforming his
libidinal impulses into symptoms” {Three Essays 165).
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weakness...became so bad that to her great sorrow she was no longer allowed to
continue nursing the patient. The immediate cause of this was a very severe
cough, on account of which I [Breuer] examined her for the first time. (23; my
emphasis)
Soon after Breuer’s first visit, her “adored father” died:
During her illness she had seen him very rarely and for short periods. This was the
most severe psychical trauma that she could possibly have experienced. A violent
outburst of excitement was succeeded by a profound stupor which lasted about
two days and from which she emerged in a greatly changed state. (26)
In his opening lecture delivered at Clark University in September 1909, Freud himself
admits that Pappenheim’s symptoms “can only be regarded as mnemic signs of his [her
father’s] illness and death” and that they “correspond to a display of mourning” {Five
Lectures 17). Here we are in a position to grasp the significant place of the father in
Pappenheim’s psychic structure.
Breuer arrives on the scene, with his “sympathy and interest” and his unwavering
devotion to the case at the moment of the imminent loss of this beloved, (real) father. Let
us call Breuer’s devotion to finding a cure for Pappenheim’s illness by its name: Breuer’s
desire, the desire to solve the enigma presented to him by the hysteric, his Other. Here
occurs a crisscrossing of two desires, of two lacks, forming an X that marks the spot of
the enigma between Pappenheim and Breuer, an enigma around which all of their
subsequent significations will stem, forming a transferential bond between them that will
run amok since Breuer has no real clue what he is doing. Pappenheim’s symptoms will, as
a result, structure themselves around the question, to paraphrase Lacan, what does Breuer
(qua Other) want from me?
Support for this reading comes from an unlikely source: Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen’s re
evaluation of the case of Pappenheim, Remembering Anna O.: A Century o f Mystification.
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He intends to show how Breuer’s case history reveals the founding of psychoanalysis
(Borch-Jacobsen makes no distinction between psychoanalysis proper and the material of
Studies on Hysteria, which is actually something different) to be marked by a profound
ineptitude that should call its efficacy into question by painting Breuer as “a rather
gullible Viennese doctor”, who gets drawn in by the lure of “a game whose strange rules
the two of them made up together as they went along”30 (92). We cannot but agree with
Borch-Jacobsen’s premises. Breuer’s attitude was indeed marked by a certain gullibility
and hysteria, owing to the ‘social’ character of its inception and repetition, that is, the
transference, can certainly be characterized as a ‘game’ being played between two people.
However, in the first place, the ‘cause’ of Breuer’s gullibility is displaced: it is not
simply that he was suffering from an innate imbecility or was otherwise a genetically
endowed naive dupe (which Borch-Jacobsen implies, insofar as he expects we just take
Breuer’s behaviour at face-value); rather, these characteristics that are imputed to
Breuer’s personality are symptomatic of the fact that the theoretical perspective guiding
his praxis was premature. This is precisely what Lacan means when he describes the
counter-transference, which for Lacan is not distinct from the structure of transference as
a whole, as “nothing other than the function of the analyst's ego, what I have called the
sum total of the analyst's prejudices” (Seminar I 23). Breuer approached Pappenheim’s
symptoms through the use of hypnosis, which he used in order to induce her to speak
about them, as would a surgeon (to borrow an analogy from Freud) extract “a foreign
body from the living tissue” (Studies 290). In this way, he unwittingly and detrimentally

30 We should be forced to wonder, moreover, following Borch-Jacobsen’s logic here,
whether or not the obvious ineptitude of Ptolemy, which we can now discern from our
present vantage point, should retroactively call the entire science of astronomy into
question.
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situates himself outside of the analysis, just as a surgeon does not become implicated in
the ‘foreign body’ that is at the root of his patients’ (physiological) symptoms. Breuer’s
use of hypnosis compounded the problem by concealing the resistance necessary to
indicate the borders of the ‘game’ taking place between doctor and patient, thereby
obscuring the transference, which, even in 1895 (when Studies on Hysteria was
published) but especially between 1880-1882 (when the case actually took place), did not
comprise a part, much less a significant part, of either Freud’s or Breuer’s theoretical
framework. It was operating, obviously, but without anyone being able to recognize it.
All the evidence of Borch-Jacobsen’s study points toward a confirmation of the
Lacanian thesis, the unconscious is the discourse o f the Other, and moreover confirms
Freud’s intuition that the resistance, far from being a mere inconvenience to be overcome
through hypnotic suggestion, is in fact a significant and necessary part of the analytic
situation that must be taken into account and worked through insofar as it has a
significance for the relation between patient and doctor.
We could sum up Borch-Jacobsen’s main premise thus: Bertha Pappenheim’s
symptoms were meant only for Breuer, they manifested themselves in his presence, and
were often even induced by his suggestions:
[a] close reading of her 1895 case history reveals, surprisingly, that no one close
to Bertha Pappenheim noticed any o f the symptoms from the so-called incubation
period. But, if we can believe the ‘reminiscences’ that Breuer obtained during the
fourth phase of the illness, Bertha’s symptoms at this time—deafness, episodes of
fainting, trancelike states (‘absenses’), nausea, muscular and glottal spasms, visual
disturbances—were not symptoms that would have been easy to hide. More than
once, it seems, Bertha had even lost the ability to speak....And yet at no time
throughout this period did anyone around Bertha Pappenheim notice anything at
all. (78-79)
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Breuer himself confirms this in his original report of 1882, of which Borch-Jacobsen
makes extensive use. Breuer in fact notes in this report, without perhaps realizing it, the
extent of his (suggestive) influence on how Pappenheim expresses or signifies her
symptom:
I recount the matter as I learned it from her; it can be verified only by comparison
with details from other known dates, since there is general agreement. This part of
her illness is altogether hidden from those around her. Even she herself, I believe,
knows in detail only such things as I have told her according to her report under
hypnosis, which we deal with later, (quoted in Borch-Jacobsen 79-80; my
emphasis)
The precise wording of Breuer’s revelation—this “[e]ven if she herself... knows only such
things as I have told her”—clearly indicates that at some level he recognized his role in
directing the manifestation of his Pappenheim’s symptoms.
This alternative reading, by which we arrive at a different conclusion from the same
premises as Borch-Jacobsen, pivots upon a fundamental tension between theory and
practice that is exemplified by this section of Breuer’s 1882 report, which points toward a
limit of Breuer’s praxis. The analytic situation has effects whether or not they are
explicitly taken into account or able to be recognized; what one is able to recognize
depends fundamentally on the present state of their theoretical apparatus. In this short
statement of Breuer’s, something momentarily irrupts, punches a hole in the network of
signifiers mobilized by Breuer to understand his patient. Borch-Jacobsen even goes as far
as recognizing that Breuer “certainly had his own theoretical assumptions, and there is
every reason to believe that these, especially his belief in hypnotic hypermnesia, are what
gradually directed Bertha Pappenheim’s treatment toward the excavation of ‘memories’”
(64). However, he does not elaborate any further. We are apparently supposed to assume
that Breuer’s (conscious and unconscious) “theoretical assumptions” contaminate his case
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and lend further support to the claim that he is naive and inept. But what is at stake in
psychoanalysis proper is the extent to which the analyst’s “theoretical assumptions”
operate unconsciously. If Freud’s recognition of resistance, which sets him on the path to
psychoanalysis, is to have any meaning at all, then it is precisely that it indicates such a
failure of both the analyst’s and the patient’s guiding “theoretical assumptions”.
Unfortunately—and this is the only point at which we can agree with Borch-Jacobsen’s
assessment that there was something inept about Breuer’s methodology—the reliance on
hypnotic suggestion did not allow Breuer’s “theoretical assumptions” to ‘enter into the
conversation’ as Freud tells us that the patient’s symptoms do during analysis.
All practice takes place within a (symbolically structured) horizon of meaning which
comprises the particularity of the ‘worlds’ that each human being lives in. The theories
which guide our understanding determine our mode of being-in-the-world. Indeed it is
within precisely this problematic that psychoanalysis proper enters the scene; but
furthermore, this problematic is the impetus behind Lacan’s ‘return to Freud’, guided by
the question, so crucial to the tension between theory and practice, “what do we do when
we do analysis''’ (Seminar 1 10)? This is the inaugural question of Lacan’s first seminar in
1953 and it is significant that Lacan does not seek to resolve this question through his
seminar. Rather, he intends to point toward it as the limit of the practice of
psychoanalysis. It is a question that fundamentally cannot be resolved, but must already
remain at the forefront of any psychoanalytic endeavor, to be renewed each time the
analyst enters an analytic session. However, far from being merely or distinctly a question
for psychoanalysis, it points toward a fundamental discrepancy between the symbolic and
the real: every time we act, every time we intervene in the world, it presupposes a horizon
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of meaning that eludes our grasp because this world that we intervene in is a distinctly
intersubjective world that is beyond our individual control and grasp. Breuer’s naivety,
then, consists in misrecognizing the referent of the manifest content of his patient’s
symptoms. He is searching for a point of reference in the real—in the form of originary
‘true’ situation a la Freud’s initial belief in some actual scene of seduction when in fact
the point of reference consists in the intersubjective relation between doctor and patient.
The ‘Dialectical R eversa lF reu d ’s Failure with Dora
Interestingly, it will take a repetition of the failure of Freud’s technique before he
grants the transference the status of a distinctive phenomenon, worthy of being taken into
account in its own right, and not as a mere derivation of resistance. This repetition is
outlined in the case of Dora, which Lacan elaborates in his “Presentation on
Transference” as characterized by “a series of dialectical reversals” and “developments of
truth” (178). Crucially, Freud did not structure his case history in this way as “mere
contrivance” but rather “the conception of the case history is identical to the progress of
the subject, that is, to the reality of the treatment” (178). The three schemas from Studies
on Hysteria were very much on Freud’s mind as he wrote up the Dora case-history, as
indicated by some of his prefatory remarks in which he states that he proposes to
“substantiate those views” of “the pathogenesis of hysterical symptoms and upon the
mental processes occurring in hysteria” (Freud, “Fragment” 7; my emphasis).
What is involved in the Dora case—and, more generally, precisely what the second
schema invites us to consider—is “a scansion of structures in which truth is transmuted
for the subject, structures that affect not only her comprehension of things, but her very
position as subject, her ‘objects’ being a function of that position” (Lacan, “Presentation”
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178). Our relation to the objects through which we perceive the external world is
constituted by the position we adopt in language, how we are positioned as subject. In
order for this universe of (meaningful and thus imaginary) objects to be constituted in a
totality something must be left out, something must remain, as it were, unconscious,
namely, the signifier through which we position ourselves in relation to the world. We see
this most clearly in the way that Bertha Pappenheim positioned herself as subject,
unconsciously, through a signifier that marked the father’s desire and which structured
her relation with Breuer as a result. In this way, it is the symbolic guise of the objet petit
a, the representative of the representation. This is why Lacan insists on translating
Freud’s Vorstellungsreprasentanz as ‘representative of the representation’31: by drawing
attention to its status as representative, he emphasizes that the objet petit a can never be
represented as such (as we have seen, there is no representation of lack), is never
reducible to a representation.
Thus does Dora begin her treatment with Freud, according to Lacan’s summary, with a
proliferation of representations: she “open[s] up a file full of memories whose rigor
contrasts with the lack of biographical precision characteristic of neurosis: Frau K and her
father have been lovers for so many years, and have been hiding it with what are at times
ridiculous fictions; but what takes the cake is that Dora is thus offered up defenseless to
Herr K’s attentions, to which her father turns a blind eye, thus making her the object of an
odious exchange” (“Presentation on Transference” 178). From the beginning, Freud is
faced with a dilemma: Dora displays a preternatural awareness of her situation; she
suffers no illusions about it. Her discourse, as Freud himself describes it, was a “sound

31 In particular, see pages 216-222 of Chapter 17, “The Subject and the Other: Aphanisis”
in The Four Fundamental Concepts o f Psychoanalysis.
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and incontestable train of argument” (“Fragment” 35). As what we will associate with the
first stratum in Freud’s model from the Studies, we see this narrative curiously marked by
the event of love-affair between Dora’s father and Frau K. It bears the peculiar feature of
Dora’s full awareness: nothing “had escaped her perception, which in this connection was
pitilessly sharp; here there were no gaps to be found in her memory” (32; emphasis in
original).
Now, this case comes fresh off the heels of Freud’s successes32in the Studies. There he
tells us that the analyst proceeds from the initial stratum by following the traces left by
“gaps and imperfections” in the patient’s account, which, like Dora’s, “sounds as if it
were complete and self-contained. It is at first as though we were standing before a wall
which shuts out every prospect and prevents us from having any idea whether there is
anything behind it, and if so, what” (293). Previously, Freud relied on the resistance to
show the way, submitting the patient’s speech to a kind of logical analysis. The analyst
proceeds by searching out ‘weak spots’, “detecting lacunas in the patient’s first
description” (294) where “the train of thought is visibly interrupted and patched up...with
a turn of speech or an inadequate explanation” or a “motive that would have to be
described as a feeble one in a normal person” (293). What no doubt makes an impression
on Freud in the initial stages of Dora’s treatment is the way in which the material she
initially presents to him is absent of all of these features; this peculiarity is in turn pointed

32 For the skeptical reader of Freud, let me point out that it makes no difference whether
or not one actually considers the treatment of the hysterics outlined in the Studies to be
successes; on the contrary, what matters is that, without a doubt Freud felt them to be
from the vantage point of his theoretical apparatus at that present time. It is precisely this
kind of confidence in his theoretical apparatus that is brought into question in the Dora
case. The failure of the treatment must be viewed as a failure of the theory to guide
psychoanalytic practice.
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out by Lacan when he stresses in his short summary that Dora’s narrative is marked by a
certain “rigor”, a “biographical precision” that catches Freud unawares. In short, Freud’s
procedure consists in seeking out the distortions in the patient’s narrative that, as
distortions33, owe their manifestation to resistance, so the fact that these distortions are
patently missing from Dora’s narrative poses a significant obstacle to his technique.
Freud is led to ask, where is the resistance?
The Lim its o f Cure

Why should Freud bother to be suspicious of this lack of resistance in Dora’s
narrative? If psychoanalysis is a based on “recollection and narration” as Borch-Jacobsen
has suggested, should not this be a sign that Dora is able to narrativize and recollect just
fine and thus that she is ‘cured’ (“Hypnosis in Psychoanalysis” 51)? In fact, resistance is
not a motivated or purposive “resistance to the treatment” any more than the resistance in
an electric wire is a measure of the electricity’s refusal to complete the circuit. In fact, we
can expand the analogy still further: in the same way that electrical resistance generates
heat, psychoanalytic resistance generates affect.
Indeed, that Freud was puzzled in the presence of Dora’s seeming lack of resistance, in
the fact that not only was she without any illusion about what was going on between her
father and Frau K but that she narrativized it and was exasperated by the way she was
treated by the parties in question in a totally reasonable manner, should be enough to

See the article, written by Freud for an encyclopedia, titled “Freud’s Psychoanalytic
Procedure” for a useful summary of the technique in Studies on Hysteria: “The factor of
resistance has become one of the corner-stones of his theory. The ideas which are
normally pushed aside on every sort of excuse...are regarded...as derivatives of the
repressed psychical phenomena (thoughts and impulses), distorted owing to the resistance
against their reproduction....The greater the resistance, the greater is the distortion” (251).

86

convince us that resistance has nothing to do with any ‘resistance to the treatment’. As I
have already noted above, Freud proceeds in a very specific and way, which should
already give us an idea as to what the notion of resistance actually entails: he works with
the gaps and inconsistencies, with, in a word, the distortions of narrative, which are not
taken by him to be the places where the analysand is ‘resisting the treatment’ but rather
where the narrative veers off or gets redirected down another path in order to avoid
something unpleasant.
So it is, then, that Lacan breaks down Freud’s written case-history into three
“developments of truth” followed by “dialectical reversals”, although it is significant that
the third development of truth remains in abeyance because the analysis ultimately failed:
Freud was unable to contain the transference in time because he had no idea initially what
he was dealing with. His own development of truth along the path of psychoanalytic
discourse begins with the necessary emergence of resistance following the abandonment
of his reliance on hypnotic suggestion in Studies on Hysteria and is followed by the
dialectical reversal that the failure of his treatment of Dora represents. By writing down
and publishing the case (“Fragment of An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria”) in 1901, Freud
is maintaining a fidelity to a second development of truth, the truth of transference.
What is the status of truth in psychoanalytic discourse? It is marked by an irruption
into the patient’s discourse. We should recall here Alain Badiou’s thesis that truth
“punches a ‘hole’ in knowledges”34, it is “heterogeneous to them”, violating “established
and circulating knowledges that a truth returns to the immediacy of the situation, or
reworks that sort of portable encyclopaedia from which opinions, communications and

34 This statement is often attributed to Lacan but I have not been able to find its source in
any of his writings, nor does Badiou cite it.
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sociality draw their meaning” (70). It is precisely this dimension of truth that can be
discovered in the Dora case in the sense that a certain complacency in the new knowledge
of resistance that Freud tells us about in Studies on Hysteria is burst asunder by Dora’s
unexpected departure from the treatment.
It would be a mistake to exaggerate Freud’s complacency here vis-à-vis
psychoanalytic knowledge. The merit of this case study, in which Freud offers a rather
extensive self-criticism, is that it shows Us the moment Freud gives the name of
‘transference’ to this truth that has unexpectedly burst through psychoanalytic knowledge:
a truth, moreover, that re-oriented this knowledge as much as it upset his own prejudices,
and which was to be submitted to psychoanalytic scrutiny in the subsequent period in
which he writes his papers on technique, starting in 1912.
Here we see, in fact, that Freud is not one to lay his patients on the proverbial bed of
Procrustes; rather, he remains attentive to the perforated line that separates theory and
practice, an attentiveness that ultimately allows him to register this truth. In this sense,
truth is not a measure of knowledge’s accuracy—after all, who would be the one to judge
that? Rather, truth emerges when the theory (qua discursive structure of knowledge) fails.
It has a reorienting effect on knowledge, the discursive texture of which can never be the
same once the new name or signifier is inscribed within it35. Thus, we can think of what
Lacan calls “the development of truth” in terms of Freud’s schemas of the psychic
apparatus from Studies on Hysteria: it is the naming of a signifier that takes us from one

35 We might also consider as a concrete example, Lacan’s quip about a non-sense
sentence forged by Husserl, “The green is one for”, which suddenly and unexpectedly
takes on a meaning when we insert a context, as Lacan does, “about voting with green
balls and red balls” (Seminar X V II56). Similarly, Dora’s sudden departure from analysis
just when Freud thought things were going well is given a name, ‘transference’, which
forces a reorientation of the state of psychoanalytic knowledge up to that point.
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stratum to the next along the path of the subject’s speech, by ‘punching a hole’ in the
discourse that constitutes this stratum. Each development of truth opens up new
signifying possibilities by bringing to light a signifier hitherto omitted.
Thus, we see that Freud himself circulates around the problem of the psychoanalytic
cure with all the tenacity of a neurotic trying to come to terms with the question of his
desire. In this way, the question of the cure might itself be more productively thought as a
question of the desire of psychoanalysis itself, as a body of knowledge used for the
treatment of psychic disorder. Jacques-Alain Miller has pointedly stated that
psychoanalysis has “therapeutic effects”, but that “these effects may only be obtained on
the condition that you question the very notion of cure, because for the human condition,
there is no cure” (N.P.). Psychoanalysis, then, was bom out of this questioning of the
“very notion of cure”, which, as we have seen, is reflected in the modification of
technique that began with the shift from Freud’s first applications of Breuer’s ‘cathartic
method’, closely aligned as it was with hypnosis and suggestion, to the brief use of the socalled ‘pressure technique’ and, finally culminated in use of ‘free association’, through
which psychoanalytic technique follows the paths of the subject’s desire laid down by his
or her signifiers and which implicate analyst and patient together.
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CHAPTER 3
Freud the Meta-physician

If I were to sum up the road we have travelled in the preceding chapters so as to form a
conclusion, it would be this: God is a symptom. We should understand this conclusion, to
a certain extent, symbolically: to say that God is a symptom is to suggest that ‘God’ is a
placeholder, a position in the (linguistic/discursive) structure of knowledge (whether that
is scientific knowledge or more informal modes of understanding and reflecting upon our
relationship to the world) that cannot be ignored or otherwise negated (that is, in a more
Freudian language, disavowed). I have not arbitrarily chosen this word, ‘God’; I take it
directly from Descartes, who gives it its purest expression in trying to resolve the
dissonant relation of thought to being: For Descartes, God embodies precisely all that
must be left out in order for thought to represent being without remainder. God becomes,
paradoxically, the remainder: I say “paradoxically” because it is a remainder that is not
questioned as such, a remainder that is more or less ‘successfully’ removed from the
equation, constituted as external to the problem of thought and being36. It is in this sense
that I consider God to be a symptom: it is a point of rupture in knowledge, the place of
impossibility, where words fail. And so, in returning to God, we return to the beginning;
we return to the beginning in order to conclude.
In the beginning was the Word, or rather, a letter, the letter a.
As we have seen, this letter is no ordinary one. By speaking of the letter a in this way,
I want to evoke three registers at once: Descartes’ God as the possibility if not the origin

36 Let us recall, too, that for Marx God is a product of human beings’ alienation from
themselves.
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of certainty; the unconscious, in which there is an instance of the letter, according to the
title of one of Lacan’s Écrits; and Derrida’s a, the a in differance. These are the three
reference points, indeed the three leitmotifs, with which we shall compose our ending.
We must, however, begin at the beginning and so begin with another a, namely,
aphasia.
Aphasiacs and their Relation to the Unconscious

The objet petit a, we said in chapter one, is comparable to a little piece of being caught
up in signification, to which we will now add that, in this way, it evokes the Freudian
drive, in the sense in which it is situated at the limit between the somatic and the
psychical. With this in mind, let us return to the idea of neurosis as a psychosomatic
aphasia. We call it this in order to emphasize the way in which psychoanalysis, whose
task it is to treat these psychosomatic aphasics, can be thought outside of a strictly
hermeneutic framework. Part of what was shown in chapter two was precisely that the
psychoanalyst is concerned not so much with assigning meaning to signifiers as to aiding
the analysand in unearthing them by paying attention to the places where his or her
speech stumbles around a psychical trauma. The locus of this psychical trauma, as the
meeting point of the real, the imaginary and the symbolic, is the objet petit a, which
Lacan also calls the object-cause of desire, as that which is the cause of desire but also
that which objects to being put into words. Freud had been contending with something
similar as far back as 1895 when, in the Studies on Hysteria, he found it necessary to
posit the pathogenic nucleus, as that which resists signification the closer one gets to it.
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For patients suffering from the actual aphasias, speech also stumbles, except the
source of this stumbling is physical brain trauma; the physical lesions that cause aphasia
can be thought of as a nucleus of sorts, albeit a physical as opposed to a psychical one. In
fact, it is in the study of aphasia that we find the clearest expression of this objet petit a as
a little piece of flesh caught up in signification in the way that aphasia interrupts
spontaneous speech. Speech provides a bridge between the psychic and the somatic, or, to
put it in terms of an opposition patterned on the cogito, between thought and being. Freud
was no stranger to the speech disturbances manifested in aphasia, having published a
short monograph on the subject, On Aphasia, in 189137. It is necessary, however, before
examining some of his conclusions in this book, that we place them in the context of
some of the early research into the aphasias.
Owing to the complexity of the topic of aphasia and in order to sift through a vast
amount of material, I will defer primarily to Ernst Cassirer’s detailed account of the early
research in the aphasias, with a specific emphasis on the work of Hughlings Jackson (an
important point of reference for Freud in 1891) and Henry Head. For Cassirer, as for us,
the aphasias reveal an opening to the question “of the relation between the formation of
language and the structure of the world of perception” (208).
As early as 1870 Finkleburg introduced the term asymbolia in an attempt to find a
common denominator for aphasiac disorders, seeing the “core of aphasic disturbances in

37 It is often thought that Lacan introduced language into psychoanalysis by way of
structuralism, that this was the basis of his well known “return to Freud”. The fact of this
1891 monograph, which was not, at Freud’s behest, included in the Standard Edition o f
the Complete Psychological Works o f Sigmund Freud, should, I hope, problematize that
assumption. On the contrary, Lacan’s “return to Freud” seems to me to have been about
reminding analysts of Lacan’s generation, who had curiously forgot, that language had
always been there from the start.
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the inability to grasp the meaning of such symbols” (211). However, it was soon
discovered that what was at issue in aphasia was not confined to language qua “a total or
partial failure to understand artificial signs” but also affected the aphasic’s ability to
“identify visible and tangible objects and make appropriate use of them” (211). Thus, in
the first place, aphasic phenomena came to be understood as affecting either the ‘sensory’
or ‘motor’ abilities of the aphasic (as opposed to strictly confined to various uses of
language), depending on whether the main factor involved an “inability to recognize
things”, with the “ability to make proper use of them...held to be secondary and derived”;
or whether the aphasia made it “difficult or impossible to plan and properly carry out
certain simple movements or complexes of movements” (211).
In parallel, Jackson’s research revolved around the peculiar observation that a
“speechless person may retain the word ‘no,’ and yet have only the interjectional or
emotional, not the propositional use of it; he utters it in various tones as signs of feeling
only” (quoted in Cassirer 213). For him, this observation changed the emphasis of aphasia
from the study of disturbances in the stock of words to that of disturbances in the
associative pathways:
the analysis of the sentence and its function accordingly became the key to the
study of aphasia. If in the clinical observation of aphasiacs we start from a mere
inventory of their vocabulary, if we seek to determine what words they lack and
what words they have use of, this method, Jackson stresses, will lead to highly
fluctuating and unreliable results. For clinical experience shows that performances
in this field vary exceedingly. A patient who has use of a particular word today
may be unable to use it tomorrow; or he may be able to use it without difficulty in
one context and not at all in another. (212)
Although the cause of aphasia is physical damage to the brain, it is significant that the
specific disturbance in speech does not offer any clues as to how it corresponds with
damage to a physical location of the brain. This led Freud, for example, following
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Jackson, to an understanding of aphasia as a functional disturbance of speech in
opposition to the anatomical understanding put forward by figures such as Wernicke and
Lichtheim, who “restrict nervous functions to anatomically definable areas” {Aphasia 1).
Jackson’s observations led him to pose a distinction between the affective (or
descriptive) and intellectual (or propositional) functions of language. In this way, he
divided “the phenomena of speech into two groups, the one consisting of emotional
utterances, the other statements and expositions” (Cassirer 212). Curiously, then, aphasic
disorders reveal that ‘emotional utterances’ “tend to be affected far more rarely than the
latter, or are damaged in much less degree” (212). Thus, “the observation of these
disorders makes it clear that there are two very different and relatively independent strata
of speech: the one in which only inner states are disclosed, the other in which objective
relations are ‘intended’ and designated” (212; my emphasis).
Already, then, we have some further grounds here for the distinction Freud posed
between the affective and the intellectual other than the fact that they were necessary
presuppositions in order to fully account for the mechanism of repression and its effect on
speech and thought, discussed in chapter one apropos of Freud’s “Negation” paper.
Moreover, the aphasias allow for a concrete illustration of how the categories of the
intellectual and the affective, at their most fundamental, pertain to different uses of
language, the propositional (or intellectual) use of language, found to be most commonly
effected in aphasiacs, has to do with statements directed toward the external world or
outside, statements in which the ego of the speaker is not directly implicated—in
Cassirer’s terms, ‘objective relations’—while the affective or descriptive use of language
takes as its point of reference the ego, concerning self-reflexive statements that directly
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concern the subject or otherwise have a certain emotional immediacy to them. As
Merleau-Ponty puts it:
An intentional language...is alone involved in the majority of cases of
aphasia....[W]hat the patient has lost, and what the normal person possesses, is...a
certain way of using [words]. The same word which remains at the disposal of the
patient in the context of automatic language escapes him in that of language
unrelated to a purpose—the patient who has no difficulty in finding the word ‘no’
in answer to the doctor’s questions, that is when he intends to furnish a denial
arising from his present experience, cannot do so when it is a question of an
exercise having no emotional and vital bearing. There is thus revealed, underlying
the word, an attitude, a function of speech which conditions it. (203-4)
Freud, as we will see, will translate the phenomenon described here into the problem of
accounting for spontaneous speech. Although Merleau-Ponty clearly observes that
intentionality is what is at stake, his observation remains confined to the field of
language—an “intentional language” as opposed to an intention to use language.
In fact, as Henry Head discovered, following Jackson, the disturbances manifested in
aphasia are not limited to concrete language phenomena alone—that is, words, sentences,
etcetera—but that there is nothing less than an autonomous “symbolic function” in human
activity itself:
To be sure, language is and remains the most evident exponent of this function,
but language does not exhaust the entire range of its activities. Rather, according
to Head, symbolic behavior occurs in human achievements and activities which
are not directly connected with speech. A close analysis of action in particular
shows it to be shot through with the same contrast as may be found in the sphere
of language. (Cassirer 213)
In 1933, some twenty years before Lacan’s first seminar, Cassirer concludes, in what is
probably one of the most illuminating definitions of the Lacanian symbolic order, that
there is a relative independence o f the symbolic function from language as suck, “a
symbolic relation which as such belongs to an entirely different plane from all those
relations between empirical objects, between real things. Instead of reducing this
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symbolic relation to thing-like determinations, we must rather recognize it in the
condition which makes it possible to posit such determinations” (235). In discovering that
language disturbances were actually related to the more general sphere of (symbolic)
human action, Head observes that “[a]n aphasiac will be able to perform certain actions, if
they are caused and necessitated by a certain concrete situation; but he will not be able to
perform the same actions of his own free will, without such concrete stimuli” (Cassirer
214).
What is evinced here is nothing less than a physiological support for the phenomenon
of transference, the psychosomatic equivalent of the (physiological) aphasic phenomenon
described above. Transference accounts for how,
at the level of neurosis, which brought about the discovery of the realm of the
Freudian unconscious qua register of memory, our good fellow, instead of using
words, uses everything at his disposal—he empties his pockets, he turns his
trousers inside out, he puts his functions, his inhibitions inside, he gets completely
inside himself, with the signifier, it’s he who becomes the signifier. His real, or his
imaginary, enters into the discourse. (Seminar III 155)
The signifier is precisely the Lacanian name for this relatively autonomous symbolic
function, what we might call the instance o f the letter, which implicates the body as well
as what we most commonly understand as language proper. Lacan indicates the relative
autonomy of the symbolic qua domain of the signifier by way of the bar between the
signifier and the signified in his algorithm (see chapter one). As we have seen in chapter
two, hypnotic suggestion seems also to induce the patient, by way of a manipulation of
the “concrete situation” to “perform certain actions”, such as remembering and narrating,
which occurs as if on another plane of consciousness, what Breuer called the “hypnoid
state” (Studies XX). It was, moreover, hypnotic suggestion that Freud began to call into
question through the theoretical developments, first, of the resistance and, then, of the
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transference. Thus, if the link to the external world is what seems to be disrupted in the
aphasias, it is precisely insofar as this link is manifested in the Other qua sujet supposé
savoir—that which makes possible reference to the outside of language within language
itself.
Freud undertook the task, in his aphasia book, of “creating a new model of the speech
apparatus...capable of explaining more than anatomical disturbances of speech. He
wanted to use the same model to explain normal spontaneous speech and functional
reversible disturbances”38 (Rizzuto, “Origins” 241). In Freud’s view, such a model that
could properly account for spontaneous speech remained to be satisfactorily developed:
[h]e observed that when Wernicke applied his notions and model to the process of
speech, the speech apparatus he presented had no relation to the activities of the
rest of the brain and it ‘might be applicable [only] to the activity of repeating
words heard’. This meant that the apparatus could only be stimulated by the
external word of another person and capable only of repeating such word. Speech,
for Wernicke, was a cerebral reflex...and not a spontaneous act. (“Freud’s Speech
Apparatus” 114-5).
We see here that as far back as 1891, Freud was already occupied with the problem of
speech. In particular, he was interested in finding out how the anatomical disturbances of
speech present in aphasia might shed light on (and provide a material framework for) the
psychosomatic speech disturbances of hysterics—in 1891 Freud was also in the midst of
treating Frau Emmy von N (whose case history appears in the Studies), while the

38 On Aphasia is one of Freud’s most specialized texts, aimed primarily at readers with an
extensive neurological knowledge often far outside of my own area of expertise. For this
reason I rely primarily on Ana-Marie Rizzuto’s comprehensive analyses as my guide. In
any case, my aim in this section is to provide a context for situating Freud’s later work in
in relation to this early interest in speech disorders and thus does not involve any
extensive analysis on my part but rather a picking and choosing of the relevant details.
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monograph itself is dedicated to Josef Breuer, who treated Anna O. from 1880-8239
(“Object” 241). In contrast to the image of Freud as the hermeneutist of the mind who
satiates his patients by handing out meanings for their symptoms, we have here a (more
accurate) depiction of a Freud whose patients’ strange symptoms prompted him to look to
the aphasias for answers rather than the dictionary: he searches for the production and
associative movement of signifiers as opposed to yielding to the external imposition of
signification.
Freud’s study of the aphasias leads him to the conclusion that, regarding spontaneous
speech versus reflexive speech, “the pathway by which we speak is identical to that, by
which we repeat” (quoted in Rizzuto, “Object” 242). Thus, aphasiac phenomena are not
produced by a physical damage to the speech apparatus itself, but result instead from
damage to the associative pathways. For Freud, the speech apparatus is elsewhere: he
locates it “exclusively in the cerebral cortex”, as a function distinct from the “subcortical
organs and functions of speech” discovered by Wernicke and Brocha (Rizzuto 242).
Having assembled, then, the foundation of a theory that accounts for both reflexive and
spontaneous speech, the task remained to produce a new model of the speech apparatus.
In particular, the question Freud’s model must answer is: where, exactly, does the
stimulus come from for spontaneous speech? Why do we speak? And, no doubt the
question that was on Freud’s mind as he delved into the world of the aphasic, the obverse,
why can’t we speak? How does speech find itself knotted up, inhibited, at the moment o f
resistance?39

39 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see A. Rizzuto (1989). “A hypothesis
about Freud’s motive for writing the Monograph ‘On Aphasia’”. International Review o f
Psychoanalysis, 16: 111-119.
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To provide a model to explain spontaneous speech is nothing less than to model the
speech act. In order to account for the production and failure spontaneous speech, Freud
wants to understand it in terms of a reflex circuit of stimulus/response (to put it in the
language of his time): that is, he wants to account for the drive—Freud’s name for an
internal stimulus—that culminates in a speech-response. Freud’s conclusion, that the path
by which one speaks and repeats are one and the same, suggests that this external
prompting has the effect of activating the speech apparatus in the same way that it would
have previously been activated by an internal stimulus/will to speak before the aphasic
fell ill. Thus, what the aphasic, like the neurotic, loses (although in a physical as opposed
to a psychical way), according to Freud, is not the speech apparatus as such but the
spontaneous ability to use it to say what he or she wants to say in the manner in which he
or she wants to say it. The aphasic and the neurotic both display an inability to form
words, which are for Freud the activity of this joining of thing- and word-presentation,
except that, for the neurotic this inhibition at the level of the activity of joining thing- and
word-presentation is by definition, according to Freud’s ‘return’ to this terminology in his
paper, “The Unconscious”, the product of repression. We, again, find ourselves in the
territory of the bar between signifier and signified. We have stressed already, in our brief
sketch of the aphasias, that studying them lends itself to the conclusion of a relative
autonomy of the symbolic function vis-à-vis language. In order to grasp what is at stake
here, we must grasp Lacan’s algorithm as something operating within the synthesizing
activity that gives rise to the subject’s self-representation, the ego.
It is well-known that Lacan’s point of reference for the correspondence of the Freudian
notions of displacement and condensation to metonymy and metaphor, respectively, is the
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linguistics of Roman Jakobson, who, in its Fundamentals o f Language, interpreted
aphasie phenomena from the point of view of linguistics and concluded that all aphasias
could be distinguished according to disorders of similarity (metaphor) and contiguity
(metonymy), thus concluding that these operations were fundamental symbolic
operations—hence, the fundamentals o f language40. At the same time, as Jakobson notes,
Freud’s condensation and displacement were the two ‘symbolic’ operations put forward
in his Interpretation o f Dreams, that the dream-work has at its disposal in order to
overcome the censorship, a kind of unconscious counterforce preventing the direct
expression of the wish-content (that is, desire) of the dream. Here again, we grasp the
significance of aphasia as a fundamental point of reference for understanding neurosis, its
psychosomatic counterpart. We can grasp what is at stake in this Freudian distinction
between thing-presentation and word-presentation along the lines of a Lacanian
distinction between gaze and voice as objects.
What begins to come into focus here is how the very desire or drive to speak is tied to
a distinctly abstract/symbolic Other as that which “underlies] the word” (Merleau-Ponty
204), setting the word in motion, as it were. In this way, the facilitation of our everyday,
spontaneous mode of relating to the world, insofar as the aphasias show us that this
relation is thoroughly symbolic, language being not independent of this relation but
actively structuring it, is also a transferential relationship. The sum total of our
knowledge, beliefs, prejudices—in a word, all the symbolic ‘stuff through which we
represent the world to ourselves—is embodied in an abstract sujet supposé savoir. What
the aphasie ultimately lacks is such an abstract relation to the symbolic as the necessary

40 See pages 63-82 o f F u n d a m e n ta ls o f L a n g u a g e .
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‘stimulus’ for spontaneous speech; his or her will to speak, act, etcetera, must always be
embodied in a concrete Other—in “concrete situation^]”, as described above by
Cassirer41.
“IH e a r Your Voice B u t N ot The Words”: Similarity Disorder

Jakobson observes that an aphasic suffering from what he calls a “similarity disorder”
(an impairment pertaining to metaphor), not having the combinatory operation of
metaphor at his or her disposal, must make due with the operation of metonymy.
Curiously, a disruption in the ability to combine and process language along the axis of
metaphor fundamentally affects the aphasic’s relation to the Other. Jakobson notes that
“as long as he does not regard another’s speech as a message addressed to him in his own
verbal pattern....[h]e considers the other’s utterance to be either gibberish or at least in an
unknown language” (68). Tellingly, in Jakobson’s example of this, the aphasic describes
this experience, saying to his interlocutor, “I hear your voice, but not the words” (68).
Aphasia reveals that there is a radical dimension of alterity in the Other, that appears only
as voice when the Other’s words that would otherwise comprise its representation and
‘fill out’ this voice, cannot be assembled into a meaningful discourse.
Here we approach, in an inverse but illustrative way, Freud’s description of the
formation of word-presentations in On Aphasia. For him, this is a separate nmemic
process from that of the thing-presentations. For Freud, a word-presentation is a “complex
41 We approach here an understanding of the drive described by Freud as the “frontier
between the mental and the somatic, as the psychical representative of the stimuli
originating from within the organism and reaching the mind” (“Instincts” 122; my
emphasis). The locus of the drive is precisely the Other qua psychical representative, as
what Lacan calls the “battery of signifiers”. The Other ‘activates’ the drive, giving body
to the psychical representative of the drive.
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presentation, which proves to be a combination put together from auditory, visual, and
kinaesthetic elements” (210). He enumerates the processes of learning to speak, spell,
read, and write; each pertaining to remembering the various muscle movements and
visual or auditory patterns necessary for their repetition. For our purposes, however, we
will focus specifically on the repetition/production of speech. We learn language,
according to Freud, through a process of repetition which involves learning the significant
sounds necessary for the reproduction of words from listening to another’s speech, which
is, moreover, specifically directed at us for the purposes of teaching. This voice of the
Other, the medium of the spoken word’s transmission, reaches us from outside and
commits us to the task of conforming our own vocal sounds, our own voice to its
prototype in order, to be sure, not only for the scant praise offered by the Other in return
for our ‘successful’ repetition, but for the more lasting goal of our vocal sounds being
recognized as speech, so that we can enter into this linguistic universe as subject as
opposed to voice, through the Other’s recognition, which establishes a (communicative)
link in an intelligible language. Freud gives a rather evocative description of this process
as a whole: in childhood, he writes, “we make use of a language constructed by ourselves.
We behave in this way like motor aphasics, for we associate a variety of extraneous
verbal sounds with a single one produced by ourselves” (210).
We become subject to language, whose locus is the Other (mother, caregiver, etcetera)
in the process of learning language, of conforming this “language constructed by
ourselves” to the Other’s language, transmitted through the medium of the voice. This
process, as Jakobsons’s study reveals, is supplemented by an invisible, inaudible
signification indicating context, something that induces us to speak—what for Cassirer
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was described as “objective relations”. The (m)Other does not speak to us, in the process
of learning language, in any way whatsoever but in a way that establishes a link between
voice, word-presentation and thing-presentation. In the first place, the context of language
learning is a kind of pseudo-metalinguistic context. This view accords with Jakobson’s
contention that metaphor establishes the context for aphasics suffering from similarity
disorder:
the context is the indispensible and decisive factor. When presented with scraps of
words or sentences, such a patient readily completes them. His speech is merely
reactive; he easily caries on conversation, but has difficulties starting a dialogue;
he is able to reply to a real or imaginary addresser when he is, or imagines himself
to be the addressee of the message. It is particularly hard for him to perform or
even to understand such a closed discourse as the monologue. The more his
utterances are dependent on the context, the better he copes with his verbal task.
He feels unable to utter a sentence which responds neither to the cue of his
interlocutor nor to the actual situation. (63-4)
What the aphasic suffering a similarity disorder needs is to be provided with the signifier
that establishes a relationship of similarity between context and utterance, a signifier
which, in effect, allows the aphasic to see himself in the picture constituted by the context
of signification. Thus, the context for Jakobson’s aphasic, who says to his interlocutor, “I
hear your voice but not the words”, is the very lack of context itself, the point of reference
for this utterance is the inability of Jakobson’s aphasic to see himself in the picture; he is
thus saying, effectively, “I cannot see myself in you, in your words, and as a result, all
that remains is this stain that indicates your presence, this stain of voice, which I cannot
assimilate into myself in order to establish meaning”.
“I See The Words B u t H ear N o Voice”: Contiguity Disorder

A contiguity disorder is much more difficult to illustrate in the phenomenological
terms that we have used above for the precise and significant reason that the language of
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the aphasic who suffers from this disorder reveals nothing—or, more accurately, reveals
that s/he is, at the level of subject, nothing: s/he does not ex-sist. It is in this way that we
have decided to describe it in terms of hearing no voice, because there is no subject that
would allow for such recognition to take place. In contrast to the similarity aphasic’s
experience of the voice qua voice as an external, meaningless presence, the contiguity
aphasic’s experience is characterized by there being nothing but a gap, an empty place
where a voice ought to be heard. Whereas the similarity aphasic described above can
conform his or her words to a minimal context, should that context be provided by
someone else, or, at its most profound, his or her utterances can refer to the very lack of
context in order to establish a context, a contiguity disorder is characterized by Jakobson
as a fundamental lack of context. More specifically,the contiguity aphasic lacks the ability
to bring him- or herself into signifying relation with the context, which is a function of
metonymy. In this way, a contiguity disorder is described by Jakobson as
[t]he impairment of the ability to propositionize, or generally speaking, to
combine simpler linguistic entities into more complex units, is actually confined
to [this] type of aphasia, the opposite of [a similarity disorder]. There is no
wordlessness, since the entity preserved in most of such cases is the word, which
can be defined as the highest among the linguistic units compulsorily coded, i.e.,
we compose our own sentences and utterances out of the word stock supplied by
the code. (71)
We can illustrate the difference between the similarity and the contiguity aphasic most
clearly in terms of the Lacanian distinction between subject of the enunciation and subject
of the enunciated. This is, moreover, precisely in keeping with the method by which
Jakobson describes the contiguity disorder, which no doubt motivated his choice to
describe it after the similarity disorder, insofar as it is almost impossible to describe
without contrasting it to the similarity disorder. The fact that the contiguity aphasic is best
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described in relation to what it is not has a profound significance: persons suffering from
this type of aphasia seem to occupy the place of the pure void of the subject of the
unconscious, the position of enunciation, without content. We should understand the
subject of the unconscious/enunciated in terms of the sense Freud gives to the
unconscious in his metapsychological papers, as we have seen in chapter one: the
unconscious as thing-presentations lacking any connection to word-presentations.
Thus, if the similarity aphasic’s experience can be described as that of a ‘pure’ subject
o f the enunciation—that is, his position as subject is displaced (the Freudian word for
metonymy) entirely onto the chain of signifiers—then the contiguity aphasic is precisely a
‘pure’ embodiment of the subject o f the enunciated. Every one of his or her utterances is a
profound condensation of the aphasic’s thought, described by Jakobson as a “contexturedeficien[cy]”, characterized by a diminution of “the extent and variety of sentences”:
[t]he less a word depends grammatically on the context, the stronger its tenacity in
the speech of aphasics with a contiguity disorder and the sooner it is dropped by
patients with a similarity disorder. Thus the ‘kernel subject word’ is the first to fall
out of the sentence in cases of similarity disorder and, conversely, it is the least
destructible in the opposite type of aphasia. (71-2; my emphasis)
The contiguity aphasic, then, lacks the ability to establish (metonymically) a relation, as
subject (of the enunciation), to context, the words allowing him or her to register
symbolically such a relation between subject and context being unavailable because they
are a function of metonymy. Interestingly, these words are those that are, according to
Jakobson, “endowed with purely grammatical functions, like conjunctions, prepositions,
pronouns, and articles disappear first”—the same words, we might add, that the dreamwork, by Freud’s description, must resort to all manners of ‘montage’ in order to
represent in the visual medium of dream, thus inscribing the subject into the dream-text—
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“giving rise to the so-called ‘telegraphic style”’ (72). At the level of the subject of the
enunciation, that is, the subject represented for others through words, the contiguity
aphasic is only represented by non-sense utterances, a “word heap” (71).
In fact, Jakobson goes on to describe an advanced progression of the disease, wherein
a single phoneme eventually comes to stand in for an entire sentence, which he
describes—in a way that significantly recalls Freud’s theory of regression—as ‘relapse’
into infantile linguistic development: “If this twofold...disablement progresses further,
the last residues of speech are one-phoneme—one-world—one-sentence utterances: the
patient relapses into the initial phases of infants’ linguistic development or even to their
pre-lingual stage: he faces...the total loss of the power to use or apprehend speech” (74).
If we compare this process to Freud’s concept of regression, it is only the sense, as noted
by Lacan in Seminar II, that regression is a “symbol”, or rather, as Jakobson’s study lends
itself to describing, a symbolic process: “[tjhere is regression on the plane of signification
and not on the plane of reality” (103). The contiguity aphasic indeed provides an
illuminating model of neurotic regression insofar as regression is resorted to in neurotic
speech when he or she tries to put the psychic trauma into words. In the attempt to signify
this ‘kernel’ of the neurotic’s lived experience, he or she can only resort to archaic
associative pathways so that the ‘description’ manifests itself as symptomatic behavior:
thus, “it is a symptom which must be interpreted as” regression, not the person as
somehow ‘regressing’ (103). On the other hand, owing to physical damage of the brain,
the only pathways available to aphasic speech are also these archaic pathways. In both
cases, a single significant word or phoneme stands in for an entire constellation of
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thoughts. They become, as it were, ‘pure’ signifiers marking distinction but carrying no
meaning that would be intelligible to another:
[t]he last level to remain is either a class of significative values, the word, as in the
cases touched upon, or a class of distinctive values, the phoneme. In the latter case
the patient is still able to identify, distinguish and reproduce phonemes, but loses
the capacity to do the same with words. In an intermediate case, words themselves
are identified, distinguished and reproduced; according to Goldstein’s acute
formulation, they ‘may be grasped as known but not understood’ (p. 90). Here the
word loses its normal significative function and assumes the purely distinctive
function which normally pertains to the phoneme. (Jakobson 75; my emphasis)
Alienation and Separation: From Aphasia to Neurosis

In 1964, during his seminar titled The Four Fundamental Concepts o f Psychoanalysis,
Lacan introduced the notions of alienation and separation, which constituted a break
from and a re-articulation of the linguistic operations of metaphor and metonymy,
respectively (Laurent 21), insofar as they shifted the emphasis away from speech and
language—as metaphor and metonymy imply a fundamental relationship of signifier and
signified, even if at the same time they ineluctably defer the realization of the signified—
and toward a logic of the subject and its relationship to Other.
Insofar as the concepts of alienation and separation are derived from Lacan’s previous
elaboration of the operations of metaphor and metonymy, Jakobson’s work on aphasia,
such as we have outlined above, also illustrates what is at stake at the furthest possible
limit of each pole. In our first example, above, that of the similarity aphasic, we see a
manifestation of a kind of ‘pure’ separation. Lacking the operation of metaphor, which
makes possible the subject’s seeing himself in the Other’s discourse, of situating himself
in relation to the Other, the similarity aphasic is literally ‘caused’—brought into being—
by the Other’s desire. We see this most profoundly in the aphasic’s response to the radical
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enigma Other’s desire qua meaningless voice, who is moved to utter, “I hear your voice
but not the words” which indicates, as we have suggested, that the very lack of context
becomes the context itself—that is, the ‘cause’ of the statement—through which the
aphasic realizes himself in the Other’s discourse. This desire of the Other that motivates
the production of the similarity aphasic’s chain of signifiers is evident at very turn in
Jakobson’s description of the context as the “decisive factor” in inducing the similarity
aphasic to speak and is most recognizable in the way the similarity aphasic “readily
complies” with the tasks laid out for him by the Other qua experimenter, etcetera.
On the opposite end, the contiguity aphasic’s subjectivity is radically and profoundly
alienated in the signifier, through which he or she is reduced to non-sense, produced, if
not by the sheer inability of the contiguity aphasic to produce grammatical utterances,
then in its most advanced form of reducing utterances to a single phoneme. In this way,
the necessity of metonymy/separation is shown to be essential for the realization of
subject: that is, for the assumption of a subject position with respect to the Other. We see,
of course, a similar use of phonemes in Freud’s description of the fort/da game from
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in which Freud’s nephew’s utterances do not correspond
exactly to the German words ‘fort’ and ‘da’ but to the phonemes ‘oooo’ and ‘ahhh’,
which Freud, rightly, interprets as ‘fort’ and ‘da’. The difference here, of course, is that
without metonymy/separation, the aphasic’s ‘discourse’ cannot even achieve the status of
a discourse properly speaking—it cannot and does not, like Freud’s nephew’s
significations, circulate around the objet petit a, the “small bobbin” in the child’s game
{Four Fundamental 239). There is just a hole, a lack, in place of the Other. The Lacanian
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name for a ‘discourse’ that has not (yet) achieved the status of a discourse is the ‘call’,
which he introduces in Seminar I.
Here is where we will return to the experience of the neurotic, who, because s/he
suffers from a psychosomatic aphasia, has the ability to constitute him- or herself as
subject and thus to enter into a relation with the Other that is never characterized by his or
her being situated purely on the side of either alienation or separation. The neurotic’s
discourse is, in this way, a discourse proper, and it is in and through this discourse—in
contrast to the aphasic—that he or she takes a position vis-à-vis the Other. Really, we
cannot on this account think of the aphasic’s ‘discourse’ in terms of having an
unconscious or conscious dimension because he or she does not have a ‘choice’ in the
matter—the aphasic’s discourse follows its own path regardless of any conscious or
unconscious mechanism at work. By contrast, Lacan characterizes the neurotic’s coming
into being as a subject in/of discourse as a ‘forced choice’ owing to the fact that the
unconscious is the Other’s discourse. The fact that there is this unconscious dimension to
discourse, or, to put it another way, that the neurotic’s discourse is the discourse of the
Other, is precisely what differentiates neurosis from aphasia.
With this in mind, let us return to the notion of the ‘call’. Lacan introduces it in the
context of a discussion about one of Melanie Klein’s early papers entitled, “The
importance of symbol-formation in the development of the ego”. Here, Klein presents the
case-history of a child, about four years of age, whom she calls (not without irony) “Little
Dick”, whose initial state is uncannily similar to that of the contiguity aphasic in the sense
that his world is also an extremely closed, autistic one. In her initial description, Klein
describes him as being
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largely devoid of affects, and... indifferent to the presence or absence of mother or
nurse. From the very beginning he had only rarely displayed anxiety, and that in
an abnormally small degree. With the exception of one particular interest [which
will be come apparent in a moment]...he had almost no interests, did not play, and
had no contact with his environment. For the most part he simply strung sounds
together in a meaningless way, and constantly repeated certain noises. When he
did speak he generally used his meagre vocabulary incorrectly. But it was not that
he was unable to make himself intelligible: he had no wish to do so. (221)
Crucially, we see Klein take note of a desire: it was not that Dick could not speak, but that
he had no desire to speak. His attitude was one of “apathy, indifference” (Lacan, Seminar
7 81). Lacan, moreover, highlights the “uniform character of [his] reality”, the fact that for
Dick, everything was “equally real for him, equally indifferent” (81). This word,
“equally” that Lacan uses tips us off: we are in a domain constituted almost entirely by
metaphor, a near total alienation, except that Dick can speak, he just has no desire to. This
distinguishes him from the contiguity aphasic. Everything, for Dick, equals everything
else; precisely because it is a state of utter fullness—as Lacan puts it, Dick is “eyeball to
eyeball with reality....there is neither ego nor other for him” (69)—it cannot but be a kind
of void in which Dick is subsumed because there is no space for him to constitute himself
qua subject.
Dick’s world is, thus, effectively void of any symbolic relation. We see in our
elaboration of the case so far that there are only things for Dick, literally only
presentations of things, thing-presentations. Even words are merely things for him,
objects with which he plays, by, for example, repeating noises, “stringing] sounds
together in a meaningless way”. Klein tells us that Dick’s mother notices what she calls a
“negative attitude” in Dick apropos of language: “if she succeeded in getting him to say
different words after her, he often entirely altered them, though at other times he could
pronounce the words perfectly” (222). The dimension of the voice qua voice does not
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enter into Dick’s experience in the slightest. He hears no voice—not because he cannot
hear it, but because he blocks it out, he has no desire to hear it—and as a result he has no
voice, or rather, cannot situate himself, as subject, in relation to it.
In chapter one it was mentioned, following Mladen Dolar’s succinct explanation of
differentiality, that a signifier could never be counted as one, precisely because if it could,
it would mean that it could represent itself, which would amount to what Mikkel BorchJacobsen called a (direct) representation o f the lack. In the most extreme case, Saussure’s
definition of the signifier as pure difference means that even a signifier differs from itself
insofar as the place of its absence also counts. This absence that also counts is a necessary
dimension of the call. Dick’s system of language is there but it is limited; it is not
insignificant in this regard that all of his expressions of play revolve around an attempt to
come to terms with a relation not of presence and absence per se, but, more specifically, a
relation o f presence and not-presence. The two are not equivalent: it is the difference
between an empty container and a container filled to the brim with nothingness itself.
Insofar as Dick has not entered into any relation with the symbolic and is thus not
constituted as subject, his expressions continually slam up against the wall of this notpresence, a void qua void. Lacan describes this as “real, imaginary and symbolic” being
“flush with one another” (74). So it is not as if the symbolic is not there, which is a key
point—Dick is not a psychotic, for whom the symbolic is, quite literally, missing,
inaccessible as such. On the contrary, there is a signifier, only one, marking a presence—
what Klein acknowledges as the mother’s body. The entire trajectory of Dick’s play
consists in trying to symbolize this void qua the trace of the mother’s absence, with only
one signifier at his disposal, one signifier that comprises the entirety of his symbolic. This

Ill

being the case, Dick cannot constitute himself as subject, he can only wallow in this in
between space, waiting, as it were, for Godot.
This is precisely why the ‘call’ is a significant moment. Lacan distinguishes it on the
basis of the difference between speech and language (as he always does, but here the
distinction is made quite concrete), highlighting the fact that Dick “already has his own
system of language, quite sufficient. The proof is that he plays with it. He even makes use
of it to play a game of opposition against the adults’ attempts to intrude” (Seminar 1 83).
Klein elicits the call, which signifies Dick’s entry into language, by treating his play as if
it were a knowledge. She has very little to work with since Dick does not ‘play’
spontaneously, in the way that, as she points out, ‘normal’ neurotic children do. His play
is a kind of ‘discourse in/to the void’ as opposed to a discourse of the Other: so Klein
found herself “obliged to make... interpretations on the basis of [her] general knowledge”
(229). The ‘call’ brings the voice into play qua voice for the first time as an exteriority,
situating Dick qua subject in relation to the symbolic.
Lacan describes the call as the “[cjrucial moment, when the sticking of language to the
subject’s imaginary begins to sketch itself’ (85). What is at stake here is a signifier that
comes to take the place o f the void, so that instead of just one signifier in play, as we said
above, which is best described as marking presence and not-presence as the void of its
absence, another signifier enters: the void itself becomes registered as a signifier. In this
sense, we can say that before the moment of the call, when Dick appeared to be stuck at
the level of the imaginary, he was subsumed under a series of imaginary equivalents.
With the call, language itself “stick[s]” to his imaginary, it becomes itself an object in
play in this realm of (inner) objects that Lacan calls the imaginary. It is, to be sure, a
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special object through which Dick is able to gain access to an ‘outside’ that allows his
relation to external reality to develop.
Dick calls for his nurse, but it would be a mistake to ascribe too much meaning to the
event, in the sense of taking this signifier ‘nurse’ as an inherently meaningful sign. One
must ‘tarry with the negative’ (to refer to the one of the titles of Zizek’s books), which is
to say, one must consider the signifier in its signifierness, and not in what it may or may
not reveal vis-à-vis the signified, which would put into play our own imaginary, and not
Dick’s. On the contrary, we must not lose sight of the little piece of being, the objet petit
a, that that is caught up in this primary symbolization, the moment, again, at which “the
sticking of language to the subject’s imaginary” begins (Lacan, Seminar 1 85).
Prior to the call, there is no unconscious to speak of for Dick. Klein describes this
world that Dick inhabits as an “unreal reality” but this formulation takes for granted that
there is a “true relation to reality” (a phrase Klein introduces in the same sentence, as part
of the ego’s function) to be had, somewhere—where? We do not know. Klein’s so-called
“true reality” is the everyday ego reality that most ‘normal’ (that is, functionally neurotic)
adults inhabit, a reality that is as much fantasy as it is reality, which is to say that it is a
meaningful reality, the fiction structuring our relationship to reality functioning more or
less transparently. On the contrary, it is Dick that lives in a “true reality”, a reality whose
relation, having at its disposal only one signifier to articulate it, is closer to the (Lacanian)
Real. It is his proximity to the Real that condemns Dick to silence.
We can explain this further: Lacan, as is known, defines the signifier as that which
“represents the subject for another signifier”. By this he means that there is a minimum of
two signifiers necessary for meaning to be produced: meaning is a kind of ‘short circuit’
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that occurs between two signifiers, which we will call Si and S2, following Lacan. The
subject is to be found in the meaning that is produced. To be sure, it is not reducible to
this meaning, but where there is meaning, there is a subject. However, because this
meaning is not reducible to the subject, does not represent the subject utterly, the fact that
there is meaning also functions as a trace of the unconscious in the fact that meaning does
not possess the subject utterly, nor does the subject possess meaning utterly.
For the sake of illustration, let us replace for a moment these signifiers with the
following simple schema: + - +. The first plus is a signifier, the presence of a signifier,
the second plus is “another signifier”, and the minus is the subject. What does this mean?
The subject cannot be ‘pinned down’ by meaning. It is in this sense that the subject is the
meaning produced between two signifiers: as soon as that meaning is recognized, this
recognition confers onto meaning a signifier, the minus becomes a plus, which does not
mean that the subject has finally found a representation, but rather, that the subject has
moved, is to be found elsewhere, between two other signifiers, the other signifier that is
brought into play through the act of recognizing the meaning, of giving it a signifier. In
this way, the subject always slips between the cracks.
Thus, before the call, it is not that Dick has no relation with reality, it is that, on the
contrary, he articulates this relation to reality with the entirety o f his being. There is only
one signifier in play, and thus his entire symbolic universe consists not of + - + but of 0
and -1. This is another way of thinking about what I have said above about the difference
between presence and absence and presence and not-presence. The difference between
presence and not-presence is the difference between 0 and -1. There is a signifier that
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signifies nothing, and then there is the void. It is for this reason that the -1 will become,
for Lacan, a signifier of castration: the mark of the subject, a signifier with no signified.
What is castration? We ought not to be afraid of this word that seems to provoke a
kind of anxiety, not only in the sense of a literal fear of castration. The very word, now, is
wrapped up in a part of Freudian theory that we would rather forget or pretend does not
exist. Significantly, and in an uncanny confirmation of the repetition compulsion, we are
exhibiting in this reaction to castration (as an element in Freudian theory), the sort of
thing that Freud describes the neurotic as doing in relation to his own castration. I am
tempted here to suggest that an adequate modification of the old truism, ‘wherever you
go, there you are’ might be, ‘whatever we think, there it is’. In any case, if I say that ‘we’
should not be afraid of it, that is, of castration, it is precisely because I am in this moment
speaking most fundamentally from my position as a man, and am in this way addressing
in my discourse other men. If the much maligned ‘penis envy’ that crops up in Freud’s
discourse every now and again means anything at all—and, significantly, more so in
discussions about Freud’s discourse, with, one might add, all the tenacity of a fixation—
then it is that Woman is precisely she who has nothing to fear from castration. In this
way, we could very well turn ‘penis envy’ around and say that the fundamental problem
for Man is ‘castration envy’, in the sense that Man sees in Woman evidence of castration
(i.e. sexual difference) and thinks to himself, “She is already castrated! How nice it must
be not to have to fear it like I do!” Castration is basically a fundamental structure by
which man tries to account for the fact that there exist other bodies who do not conform
to his image, who are not like him—there exists, in other words, a difference that is

115

fundamentally irreducible. And so we have, quite literally, a little piece of flesh, of being,
at the heart of the whole human drama.
This is not an exaggeration, although it may seem like one. Sexual difference cannot
but be at the heart of any ontology for the simple reason that, if we do not locate our
being in some metaphysical idea of God, being is not one, it is two: male and female, and
thus, every attempt to define Being as either one or the other is necessarily doomed to
fail, or, perhaps more accurately, doomed to repeat.
We ought not, then, to be afraid of castration, for at its most elementary, castration is
this: +/-. No more, no less, but that makes all the differance.
“To Speak, Then, o f a L etter”

It is the objet petit a that enters ‘difference’, as a—the proof is in the effect of non
sense that the resulting conglomeration, ‘differance’ produces, as neither word nor
concept, according to Derrida—and which, according to the logic of differance, is missed
at the level of speech: this a is unpronounceable, silent, visible only in writing. If it is
only visible in writing, we might add, it is only to the extent that we draw attention to it: I
mark it in italics, for example, in order for it not to be confused with a spelling mistake,
Derrida must verbalize the difference (with an ‘e’) between difference and differance, as
he tells us, by always indicating which one he is talking about. It is around the a that
psychoanalysis and philosophy meet, and around the a that they converge, two ships
passing in the night. Or perhaps it would be more in keeping with the silence of the objet
petit a to compare philosophy and psychoanalysis with two magnets of the same polarity
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pointed at each other: the objet petit a is the force of resistance between them, keeping
them from touching.
Derrida’s description of the a as silent, can be taken as more proof that the a in
différance is the objet petit a. The objet petit a, too, is nothing if not silent. Its older
sibling, the (Freudian) drive, was also described by Freud as silent. Drives are a silent
force, emanating from a strange place vis-à-vis the human organism, from who-knowswhere, the place that Lacan calls ‘extimate’, the inside that is outside, which is the part of
the human organism that is as much a part of the real as anything else one might consider
properly (which is to say, symbolically) outside. We have seen this, moreover, in the case
of Dick: the objet petit a is not the call, nor is it represented in or by the call; it is, rather,
the background of silence which is revealed at the moment of the call, that which drove
Dick to cry out—only a voice can break the silence, for without the voice, there is no
silence, only the way things are as neither silent nor not-silent in the same way that silent
movies, for example, are only considered to be ‘silent’ after the technology emerges that
can inscribe sound into film.
The a enters différance and from that point on ‘difference’ is never the same. But was
it ever the same? Do we need this silent a to alert us to the fact that difference is and
always was “differ[ent] from itself’, that it never has and never will, as signifier,
represent itself (Derrida 129)? Another proof that this a is the objet petit a: does not
Derrida’s entire elaboration of différance betray a desire to show us that every
representation leaves something out, that the representation itself cannot be included in
the representation, which is to say that what is left out is precisely the desire upon which
it is founded? And does he not, further, betray his desire in the very act of putting the a in
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differance, the very signifier (a signifier is precisely that which is neither a word nor a
concept) that is supposed to illustrate this?
One is tempted to risk the suggestion that the logic at work here is precisely that of the
child who triumphantly announces that the emperor is naked, the child who utters the
signifier upon which a collective delusion is founded, that of seeing in the emperor’s
nakedness his new clothes. The child who utters this signifier dissolves the delusion.
Derrida utters the signifier, a, but does anything dissolve? What is the delusion? The
delusion is philosophy: or, perhaps more specifically, phallusophy, philosophy qua (a)
discourse on/of being. Derrida takes aim in this presentation-tumed-essay specifically at
phenomenology.
I would not go so far as to say that philosophy itself is a delusion, or that it is
somehow more or less a delusion than any other discourse. There is, in the first place, no
such thing as philosophy as such. This is, no doubt, one of the consequences of
differance. In any case, if I have suggested (which I have) that the particular philosophy
at which Derrida takes aim has a delusional quality to it, it is not, for all that, to accuse it
of anything. There is nothing inherently wrong with delusion. With all fairness and
respect due to the psychotic, a delusion is not morally reprehensible. The major
difference, according to Freud, between the psychotic and the neurotic is that the
psychotic loves their delusion as they love themselves. The neurotic, on the other hand,
finds something else to love.
The desire that sustains Derrida’s discourse—for it is, in the end Derrida’s discourse,
there being nothing in the definition of discourse to suggest to us that in order for it to
belong to somebody, it must be reducible to one’s being, or represent one utterly—is
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nothing less than a love of metonymy. Différance is a discourse for the sake of love, the
love of metonymy, like Anna O., Breuer’s hysterical patient, who produced so many
memories for the sake of love, the love, ultimately, of Breuer.
What is it, then, that Derrida sees in metonymy to love? The answer: separation. This is
not a shocking revelation, to be sure, but the entirety of “Différance” can be read as
nothing less than a love letter to metonymy, to the endless deferral of signifiers, the work
of metonymy. We must risk here another incredibly naïve question: why does Derrida
choose to put his a in the word ‘difference’? Why must difference be shown to be
wrapped up in this endless deferral of signifiers like all the rest? Should this not be
obvious?
Derrida, brilliantly, zeros in on difference as nothing less than a symptom, a symptom
of philosophy (which he unfortunately lumps Freud in with, but we will forgive him for
that):
Differance is neither a word nor a concept. In it, however, we shall see the
juncture—rather than the summation—o f what has been decisively inscribed in
the thought o f what is conveniently called our “epoch the difference of forces in
Nietzsche, Saussure’s principle of semiological difference, differing as the
possibility of [neurone] facilitation, impression and delayed effect in Freud,
difference as the irreducibility of the trance of the other in Levinas, and the onticontological difference in Heidegger. (130; my emphasis)
Difference is nothing less than the symptom of “our ‘epoch’”. It is the very thing through
which philosophy seeks to ‘capture’ being, to effect a “closure of presence, together with
the closure of the conceptual order” (131). ‘Difference’ is the very thing through which
philosophy seeks the representation—the metaphor—of the subject, where the
representation of the subject will finally coincide with itself, represent itself utterly. In
difference, according to Derrida, philosophy hopes it has found the metaphor of metaphor
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itself—for the subject, in the end, is found, or more accurately, is lost, in metaphor. The
subject is ‘found’ only in the loss that constitutes its representation in metaphor, in the
surplus that cannot be contained by the metaphor: objet petit a.
The subject is lost in metaphor. There is no better way of describing what Lacan calls
aphanisis, the ‘fading’ of the subject in alienation. Metaphor encompasses, implicates, the
subject and the Other in a relation that necessitates loss, namely, the loss of the subject—
in other words, its fading or eclipse. This is the precise meaning of Lacan’s vel of
alienation: if you choose Other, you lose the subject; if you choose the subject, you lose
everything, for the unconscious is the discourse of the Other. This is not the mere rote
repetition of a Lacanian axiom: the unconscious is the discourse of the Other means that
if you choose to speak or write, if you choose, in other words, to use language, you must
go through the Other, you must enter into the field of the Other. On the other side, the
‘choice’ of subject, the choice that precludes everything, you become Little Dick, silently
manipulating imaginary objects, repeatedly bumping your head against the void, or like
the contiguity aphasic, whose every utterance is a repetition of non-sense vocables, a
silence that tries to encompass the Other. Both Dick’s silent manipulation of his
imaginary objects and the contiguity aphasic’s repetition of vocables are, to be sure, filled
to the brim with meaning but no one can make heads or tails of them. The price they pay
for being pure subjects (we must recognize that, of course, the contiguity aphasic has no
choice in the matter, but that does not make him any less a pure subject) is non-sense.
Herein we locate the very gesture of separation, Derrida’s gesture, with which
“Differance” (the essay) begins. We catch a little glimpse of the subject in the initial non
sense of the a that Derrida inserts in difference. The subject is differance. The subject is

120

not, to be sure, reducible to the conglomeration of letters that Derrida puts before us, nor
is it reducible to the logic of differance. It is, rather, to be found, however briefly, in the
non-sense that strikes us when we first see it there on the page. The proof, if we need
more proof, is that, upon introducing this non-sense, Derrida will spend the next thirty
pages at the mercy of the discourse of the Other, the Other of philosophy, explaining its
meaning, giving it sense. In a word, no matter how hard he tries, no matter how true his
love for metonymy, Derrida, in the end, cannot avoid metaphor. Non-sense only takes us
so far. At a certain point, we must choose the Other. If we wish to be heard, we must
choose, in short, to alienate ourselves.
Differance culminates in the ineffable, that is, in a question concerning the ineffable;
Psychoanalysis starts from the ineffable. That is how we ought to conceive the difference
between philosophy and psychoanalysis. In a way, Derrida gets it backwards:
if we accepted the form of the question in its own sense and syntax (“What?”,
“What is?,” “Who is?”), we would have to admit that difference is derived,
supervenient, controlled and ordered from the starting point of a being-present,
one capable of being something, a force, a state, or a power in the world, to which
we would give all kinds of names: a what, or being-present as a subject, a who. In
the latter as, notably, we would implicitly admit that the being-present (for
example, as a self-present being or consciousness) would eventually result in
differing: in delaying or in diverting the fulfillment of a “need” or a “desire,” or in
differing from itself. But in none of these cases would such a being-present be
“constituted by this difference.” (“Difference” 145)
Every being-present, for Derrida, appears to need to be self-present. But what about that
experience of being-present that is anything but a self-presence, the experience of the
ineffable that psychoanalysis begins with, the being-present that “does not deceive”
(Lacan), anxiety?
In the a of objetpetit a, Derrida’s a, we should also hear angoisse, anxiety. Anxiety, in
psychoanalysis is closely linked to castration, which is not irrelevant to the discussion at
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hand. And if upon hearing or reading Derrida’s word, differance, one is suddenly a little
anxious—not to mention a little perplexed—and has the feeling that he or she might not
measure up to this non-sense word, and either wants to dismiss the whole thing as
frivolous mental masturbation or intently listen in hopes of finding the secret of the
meaning of this word from the divine mouth of its creator, then one has found oneself in
the midst of an experience of castration. The key feature not to missed here is that central
to both of these ‘experiences’ of castration, is a retreat into an image of the Other, as
either all-knowing, full of knowledge, or full of shit. Both of these experiences amount to
the same: they are predicated upon an encounter with the Other’s desire—Derrida’s
desire, in this case—which makes of it an object that is either worthy of thought or
reducible to excrement. This is precisely what is at stake in alienation: the feeling that the
Other is a little too close, because the operation of metaphor at work in alienation that
attempts to represent the subject, to metaphorize the subject, cannot, in the end,
metaphorize his or her desire, insofar as at the very core of this metaphorization there is
the desire of a subject that produced the metaphor, an enigmatic subject qua Other. The
closer the Other’s metaphor gets to us, the more it tries to encompass us, to speak for us,
the more it provokes resistance, a resistance that makes itself felt in the guise of
transference. Transference, in the end, is revealed in the image we impute to the Other in
order to maintain our distance from his or her desire—as either full of wisdom or full of
shit. No wonder, then, that Freud’s encounter with the transference, his first attempt to
properly theorize it in the Papers on Technique, led him to a distinction between positive
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and negative transference, depending on the (initial) attitude the patient adopts toward the
analyst42.
So Derrida’s gesture of separation, paradoxically, has a very alienating effect, an
alienation that makes one a little anxious. Alienation tips over into separation at place
where I cannot recognize myself in the metaphor that is made of me. This is why there is
no better way to describe alienation than by describing it as the subject lost in metaphor.
Everywhere I (ego) look, I (subject) cannot find myself. Why, in the end, can I not find
myself? Why does being, for psychoanalysis, resist every representation? Why ought we
to have an experience of anxiety at all?
The psychoanalytic answer is castration. In order for there to be any kind of self
representation, we have to ignore the real(ity) of sexual difference. I do not mean, at an
imaginary level, the representations of male and female which proliferate. I mean that the
Real of sexual difference cannot be named. There is an irreparable hole in the symbolic
order which is the bar that separates + from -. + and - are not different names for male
and female. + and - means that Being is not One, it is two, a two that can never become
One. Lacan sums this up by saying, il n ’y a pas de rapport sexuel, usually translated as
there is no sexual relationship, which does not quite capture, in particular, the
connotations in French of ratio or report, the former suggesting the possibility of some
kind of balance to be established (if not equality) and the latter suggesting a symbolic
registering of sexual difference: ‘reporting’ suggesting the possibility of unearthing
signifiers that might somehow account for sexual difference. Ultimately, at the very core

42 See “Observations on Transference-Love” and “The Dynamics of the Transference” in
Volume 12 of The Standard Edititon o f the Complete Psychological Works o f Sigmund
Freud.
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of the human experience, is a fundamental piece of non-sense that cannot be integrated
into the symbolic order, into the text of sexual difference.
Sexual difference is not about literal males and females, it is about a primordial
experience of a difference that cannot but make no sense, an experience that my body
cannot be counted as one, is incommensurate to all other bodies. In this way, the
unconscious is not a “metaphysical name” for alterity (“Differance” 151); it is alterity
itself, not alterity as impossible self-identity, but alterity as constitutive antagonism:
Perhaps therein resides the abyss that forever separates the Real of an antagonism
from Derrida’s differance [sic]: differance points toward the constant and
constitutive deferral of impossible self-identity; whereas in Lacan, what the
movement of symbolic deferral-substitution forever fails to attain is not Identity
but the Real of an antagonism. (Zizek, “Eclipse” 195)
As a result of missing the antagonism at the very core of being, Derrida heroically strives
to maintain ontological openness, with all the power that his love of metonymy can
muster. In this perpetual separation, he misses that he has no control over whether or not
the other sees what he is doing as a metaphor. In the polarized reaction to Derrida during
his life and after his death, in the metaphors that others used to describe his work or its
value, there is found a certain truth about his praxis: that in trying to maintain an
ontological openness to the Other, he unwittingly alienated others. To be sure, any
)

discourse can have such an alienating effect. Psychoanalysis, to say nothing of Lacan’s
discourse specifically, can be profoundly alienating. The difference is that Derrida’s is a
discourse that strives to maintain an openness to the Other in discourse as such. The truth
about Derrida’s discourse consists in the way that his attempt to maintain this openness
unwittingly closes the door. The lesson here is nothing less than the lesson of castration,
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the lesson of the forced choice: one cannot have it both ways for there is no separation
without alienation and vice versa.
Our Father, Who A r(en ’) t In Heaven, Hollow is Thy N am e

How, then, should we conceive of this dimension of self-identity versus antagonism?
For philosophy, the Other has always been one of the names of God qua unity of Being;
psychoanalysis turns this around: God is one of the names of the Other qua radical
alterity. Such a unity of Being is, in the end, a response to, even a disavowal of, radical
alterity qua originary antagonism. So it is then that Freud spoke, and founded
psychoanalysis; Descartes spoke, and found God. What, we might ask, is the difference?
The a with which Derrida inaugurates his gesture of separation is in the last instance an
attempt to overcome the originary antagonism, a trace that bears the mark of the God who
‘haunts’ any discourse that tries to conceive of Being as One, Descartes’ God, which is at
the core of modem subjectivity. Derrida cannot avoid this God, even if his aim is to call
God into question, to situate himself firmly in opposition to it because his gesture of
separation itself is founded upon an initial alienation, an alienation inaugurated by the
cogito as faux-full presence:
[w]hat is unnamable here is not some ineffable being that cannot be approached
by a name; like God, for example. What is unnamable is the play that brings about
the nominal effects, the relatively unitary or atomic structures we call names, or
chains of substitutions for names. In these, for example, the nominal effect of
‘differance’ is itself involved, carried off, and reinscribed, just as the false
beginning or end of a game is still part of the game, a function of the system.
(“Differance” 159)
God, we recall from chapter one, was not there from the first in Descartes’ cogito:
Descartes had to put him there. Another act, another gesture of separation, a fundamental
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act of separating God and Man. God, like the a of differance, is brought into Descartes’
discourse in order to account for something that does not otherwise make sense: the fact
of being and of thinking, the fact of being (a) subject. Descartes desired certainty; this
desire for certainty signals to us Descartes’ alienation, an alienation in a proliferation of
knowledges which one cannot make heads or tails of, this desire for certainty leads
Descartes’ into doubt—but not just any doubt, to be sure, a methodical doubt.
One cannot see Descartes’ a, but one can hear it, if only for a brief second, in the ergo:
cogito ergo sum. This a, which one can hear if one listens closely, is the same a that
Derrida puts inside his non-sense word, differance, in order to drive a wedge between
cogito and sum, in order to abolish the ergo that constitutes (illusory) self-presence or
being-present so as to make room for the Other. Thus, it is Descartes’ desire that holds
this whole thing together, his desire that is expressed in his symptom, which he names
God. One subject’s desire, which can only express itself in the act o f separation, is an
Other’s alienation. Such is the antagonism at the core of the human drama:
the ‘subject’ is the act, the decision by means of which we pass from the positivity
of the given multitude to the Truth-Event and/or to Hegemony. This precarious
status of the subject relies on the Kantian anti-cosmological insight that reality is
‘non-all’, ontologically not fully constituted, so it needs the supplement of the
subject’s contingent gesture to obtain a semblance of ontological consistency.
‘Subject’ is not a name for the gap of freedom and contingency that infringes upon
the positive ontological order, active in its interstices; rather, ‘subject’ is the
contingency that grounds the very positive ontological order, that is, the
‘vanishing mediator’ whose self-effacing gesture transforms the pre-ontological
chaotic multitude into the semblance of a positive, ‘objective’ order of reality.
{Ticklish, 158).
What is the difference, then, between (Cartesian) philosophy and psychoanalysis? God is
the name of Descartes’ symptom, ‘psychoanalysis’ is the name of Freud’s: in other
words, Freud’s desire is not alienated in some external semblance, something that he does
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not have to take responsibility for, like God, it is, on the contrary, inscribed in the very
discourse o f psychoanalysis itself. In Freud’s texts, there is the purest expression of the
Lacanian axiom, the unconscious is the discourse o f the Other, insofar as our only access
to the unconscious is ultimately through Freud's discourse, the discourse that Freud quite
literally dreamed up. He found(ed) it in his dreams. Rather than invent God, Freud
invented a language, a language in which his symptom was allowed to speak. Freud dared
to put his symptom into words, instead of confining it to the ineffable. If Freud allowed
his symptom to speak, there is no relation of (self-)transparency implied by this. As was
shown in chapter two, Freud did not always understand what this symptom was saying, as
is most evident Dora’s abrupt departure from his treatment. It was, if we can put it this
way, a voice that spoke through him, but which did not belong to him, which certainly no
longer belongs to him now, and which continually called his practice into question.
Thus, as one begins to read the Standard Edition of his works, one begins to notice
that Freud’s discourse does not depart much from the initial line of questioning, the
beginnings of which are outlined in Studies in Hysteria, an experience which led him
through the aphasias. Every subsequent publication of Freud’s is a return to this initial
question, an attempt to see it in a new light, to bring something else to bear on this
question, the question of desire:
The fact that, in order to cure the hysteric of all her symptoms, the best way is to
satisfy her hysteric’s desire—which is for her to posit her desire in relation to us
as an unsatisfied desire—leaves entirely to one side the specific question of why
she can sustain her desire only as an unsatisfied desire. So hysteria places us, I
would say, on the track of some kind of original sin in analysis. There has to be
one. The truth is perhaps simply one thing, namely, the desire of Freud himself,
the fact that something, in Freud, was never analysed. (Lacan, Four Fundamental
12)
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And so, our story of the notion of resistance must end here, at the most appropriate
place for it to end, in the question of Freud’s desire, for it is, after all, Freud’s notion. It is
his desire that at the beginning of Lacan’s paper on the mirror stage, which forces us to
choose between the cogito or psychoanalysis. It is resistance, in the end, that forces us to
choose, or rather, confronts us with a choice that we have already made insofar as it
appears to us in the guise of transference: the presence of the Other, a presence which is
represented to us only as a symbolic constellation, a fantasy that ties us to the Real, which
sustains reference to the outside of language but which, as such, can only be articulated in
the (imaginary) objects and (symbolic) signifiers that we have at our disposal. There is no
outside of the text, except in fantasy, the fantasy that is held in place by the sujet supposé
savoir, the only savior, through which a relationship to the external world is established.
Ultimately, the choice of the cogito or psychoanalysis is a choice between being
fascinated by the fantasy, thereby lending it the powers of a God lording over us, to
whom we enslave ourselves in a state of transfixion, or traversing the fantasy by putting it
into words. It is here, not where psychoanalysis ends, but where it begins, in the fantasy
that cannot but tie us to the Other and which is written on the Other in a peculiar and
foreign language insofar as it is the Other that, by definition cannot be represented
directly, cannot be reduced to the singular language that each of us, as subject, embodies.
It is ultimately fantasy that is the discourse of the Other. We encounter this discourse at
the very limit of thought, imposing itself on us as if from outside as a gateway through
which to encounter being.
Psychoanalysis shows us how such fantasies come to the fore when signification
otherwise fails, when it cannot find an outlet in words. Fantasy encircles the failure,
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expressing that which cannot be otherwise expressed. We have already said in the
introduction to the present work that the chief difference between psychoanalysis and
post-structuralism derived from Derridian deconstruction and the hermeneutical approach
to meaning is the fact that, for psychoanalysis, meaning is not always-already there, from
the beginning, heterogeneous to signification à la the Derridan transcendental signified.
We see this most clearly in the way that the Lacanian (structural) correlate to the
transcendental signified is the master-signifier. Everywhere Lacan emphasizes the
signifier as primary as opposed to the signified precisely insofar as meaning is literally
nothing without a representative: it does not exist without something to hold its place.
As is most evident in The Four Fundamental Concepts o f Psychoanalysis, often
considered to be his most direct confrontation with the cogito (although almost every
seminar and Écrit is not without some reference to it), Lacan locates a shift from what we
might call the (hermeneutic) philosophical discursive paradigm, which either overtly or
covertly refers to God in the structural position of the sujet supposé savoir, to the
psychoanalytic discursive paradigm in which Freud as a charismatic and enigmatic figure
holds the position of sujet supposé savoir. In more abstract terms, Lacan articulates a shift
from God’s desire as a function that maintains a transcendental stance toward meaning as
heterogeneous to signification to the Father’s desire. The Father is to (Freudian/Lacanian)
psychoanalysis what God is to (Cartesian) philosophy; the fact that in this shift in
emphasis from God to the Father, the structural position or ‘empty place’ in the structure
that is held by this signifier, God, is brought down to a worldly level changes the very
meaning of the transcendental in the precise sense that it brings to light something that
was otherwise obscured in the Cartesian emphasis on God qua God. That which is
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otherwise obscured is precisely the dimension of desire, a desire that one must take
responsibility for, that cannot be alienated onto a transcendental Other or entity outside of
the structure of signification. Such is why Lacan ends his most well-known seminar,
which was directed, for the first time, to an non-psychoanalytic audience after being
thrown out of the International Psychoanalytic Association, with the question of Freud’s
desire and its role in constituting the discourse of psychoanalysis itself. For according to
Lacan’s method of reading, the meaning of Freud is not something which is buried under
his signifiers, to be found by clever interpreters or to be approached gradually, over time;
rather, meaning and thus interpretation is a dialectical process that arises out of a
confrontation with the text by a (interpreting) subject. One must interpret one’s own
spontaneous inclination toward understanding as much as the signifiers that comprise the
text and to be prepared and alert to those moments when understanding fails to arise and
interpretations falter. Meaning is not something to be found but something to be
overcome in order to produce signification.
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